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Discuss the role of cognitive behaviour therapy in the management of
a psychotic disorder.
Introduction.
This paper aims to explore the role which cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) currently 
plays in the management of psychotic disorders within the context o f other 
psychological and pharmacological therapies. The specific uses o f CBT will be 
discussed along with their theoretical assumptions. Evidence available to date from 
treatment outcome studies will then be described. Finally, an attempt will be made to 
evaluate the role o f CBT in the light o f all o f the evidence with a view to exploring 
areas for future intervention and research.
Definition of Psychotic disorders.
“Psychotic Disorder” is a broad term that requires some clarification. It describes a 
number of psychiatric conditions of “organic or emotional origin”, disorders which 
have in common a marked impairment in reality testing, (Reber, 1985). Psychotic 
disorders can include the following; delusions, hallucinations, disorganised speech and 
grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour, (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). In addition, those suffering from schizophrenia may also experience negative 
symptoms such as flattening of affect and lack o f motivation. Many of the studies 
looking at the effects of CBT on psychotic symptoms have used samples of patients 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Therefore, this essay will focus on the treatment of 
schizophrenia. However, the techniques discussed here, may be used with people 
suffering from other psychotic disorders where similar types of symptoms are present.
Historical Attempts to Manage Schizophrenia.
When considering the role of CBT in the management of schizophrenia it is necessary 
to put this therapeutic approach into the context of other therapies. This is to see where 
other therapies have had limited success, but also to show where CBT can be used in
conjunction with other approaches in treating what is a complex and debilitating 
illness.
Medication.
There is no doubt that medication in the form of neuroleptics is invaluable in the 
treatment of schizophrenia, especially in the acute phase. In fact between 80% and 
85% of patients improve dramatically within the first few days of treatment, (Davis &
Gierl, 1984). Medication can only be effective if it is taken consistently and regularly.
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However, for a number of reasons, a large number of those suffering from 
schizophrenia are not compliant, between 40% and 70% in one study by Kessler and 
Waletzky, (1981). Buchanan (1992) has suggested that about half of the patients 
discharged from hospital do not even take 75% of the medication prescribed to them. 
However, medication has its limits, even when compliance is good, and few people are 
“cured”, (Andreasen, 1984, cited in Bentall, 1996). Medication side effects are also a 
distressing and common concern (Finn et ah, 1990) and would suggest the need for 
psychological therapies to ameliorate symptoms so that medication could safely be 
reduced.
Behaviour Therapy.
In 1986, Bellack suggested that research into the development of behavioural 
techniques had slackened for a number o f reasons, some being the misconceived idea 
that schizophrenia was adequately managed by medication and that schizophrenia was 
too severe a disorder to be treated by behaviour therapy, (Bellack, 1986). However, he 
did suggest some areas that were fruitful avenues for behaviour therapy, in enhancing 
compliance with medication, in family therapy and social skills training and in daily 
living skills training. He also suggested that patients be taught about the role of 
medication in the management of their illness and how to recognise changes in their 
symptoms in order to control relapse. Behavioural family therapy has been shown to 
be effective in reducing relapse rates in schizophrenic patients when compared with 
individuals not receiving this help. Relapse rates for the former group were only 6 % 
compared to 44% in the latter, (Falloon, Boyd, McGill, et al., 1985).
Other behavioural treatments have ranged from the use of self-administered electric 
shocks with hallucinating patients (Weingaertner, 1971) to the use of headphones and 
earplugs to modify auditory hallucinations, (Morley, 1987). Outcome has been varied, 
with a placebo effect being present in the study by Weingaertner and only transient 
beneficial effects in Morley’s study. Nydegger (1972) described the case of a man 
whose delusions and hallucinations were apparently successfully treated by the use of 
verbal conditioning and assertive training and also some evidence that auditory 
hallucinations can be affected by thought substitution and by distraction, (Allen, 
Halperin & Friend, 1985.)
Psychotherapy.
Although Freud suggested that psychoanalysis was not suitable for people suffering 
from schizophrenia, (Mueser & Berenbaum, 1990) it has nonetheless been used with 
this population. Evidence from outcome studies has been varied and those studies 
which have shown improvements in patients receiving psychodynamic therapy have 
been criticised for their flawed methodology, (Mueser & Berenbaum, 1990). In fact, 
outcome studies of such treatments have either shown there to be improvement, 
(McGlashan, 1984, cited in McGlashan 1994) or have in fact suggested that 
psychodynamic therapy with schizophrenics can be damaging, (Strupp, Hadley & 
Gomes-Schwartz, 1977, cited in McGlashan, 1994). McGlashan (1994) suggests that 
although only a few individuals with schizophrenia are able to benefit from 
exploratory psychotherapy, they may benefit from a supportive relationship and one 
which addresses issues such as coming to terms with their illness and the disabilities 
which are part of it.
Cognitive- Behavioural Interventions.
Cognitive behaviour therapy has drawn upon some of the techniques of behaviour 
therapy but has added a cognitive aspect to the treatments that have only had specific 
and limited effects. The elements of psychotherapy that are beneficial are also present 
in CBT without the associated detrimental effects.
One of the first published studies to use cognitive therapy in the treatment of 
schizophi'enia was by Beck, (1952) (cited in Alford & Correia, 1994). The evolution of 
cognitive behaviour therapy has meant that a wide range o f techniques are available to 
therapists to tackle the complex needs o f an individual with schizophrenia.
The process of CBT in the assessment stage is of paramount importance in that 
intervention is individualised and targeted at specific problems which the individual is 
experiencing, be it, for example, hallucinations, or depression associated with 
delusional beliefs. CBT has also contributed to the view that the content of 
hallucinations and delusions is important and may facilitate the understanding of their 
cause and the function that they may serve in the individual. This means that the 
complex nature of psychosis is taken into account, by exploring the development of 
psychotic experiences as being part o f an interaction between the individual’s 
personality their past and their current life experiences, (Garety et ah, 1998). 
Assessment as well as the self-monitoring and evaluation which it encourages can 
itself be therapeutic, (Johnson & White, 1971).
Cognitive-behavioural interventions have either focused on the psychotic symptoms of 
schizophrenia (e.g. for delusions, Chadwick, Lowe, Home & Higson 1994, and for 
hallucinations, Bentall, Haddock & Slade, 1994a) or have aimed at reducing the 
distress caused to patients from suffering from a psychotic illness (Kingdon & 
Turkington, 1991). This latter approach was advocated by Bellack, (1992), who felt 
that the cognitive deficits, which were a part of schizophrenia, would limit the 
usefulness of cognitive approaches. However, it will be argued that both of these 
approaches are useful.
Stratesies for Cosnitive Deficits.
There is a wealth of literature looking at the cognitive biases and cognitive deficits, 
which are present in those suffering from schizophrenia. By focusing on such deficits 
researchers have attempted to utilise strategies which will help an individual to 
overcome Them. One such attempt has been made using self-instructional training to 
teach individuals to control their attention using self-directed speech. Although this 
technique has shown success in some studies, (e.g. Meichenbaum & Cameron, 1973)
in others, the self- instructional skills do not generalise to other tasks and therefore are 
of limited use, (Bentall, Higson & Lowe, 1987). Bentall (1996) has argued that since 
improvements in cognitive skills do not lead to the amelioration o f psychotic 
symptoms, the utility o f this approach should be questioned.
Since the presentation of schizophrenia in each individual will be different, no one 
treatment will be applicable for every individual. This being the case many researchers 
focused on specific symptoms when testing out techniques and these will be outlined 
below.
Manasement o f Delusions.
Definition.
The formal definition of a delusion is “a false belief based on incorrect inference about 
external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone believes and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary”, (APA, 1994). The definition in itself implies that modification o f delusions 
is a difficult task, however, as will be seen, some techniques have been seen to be 
effective in such cases.
Maher and Ross (1984) identified more than seventy-five clinical disorders where 
delusions are present. Their abundant presence in psychiatry would therefore support 
research into techniques to reduce their impact on individual’s daily functioning. 
Sacks, Carpenter and Strauss (1974) suggested three stages through which deluded 
patients pass before they recover; the delusional phase, the double-awareness phase 
and the non-delusional phase. CBT is particularly relevant in the double-awareness 
phase when the validity of delusions is questioned.
Theoretical issues in the manasement o f  delusions.
Cognitive biases are thought to be relevant in the development and maintenance of 
delusions. Maher (1974) believed that delusions were formed in the same way as 
normal beliefs. In schizophrenics, delusions are theories that explain the abnormal 
experiences that they have been subjected to. Bentall (1994) argues that deluded 
(paranoid) individuals have an exaggerated self-serving bias, the function of which is
to protect self -esteem. If delusions serve this function, for example in delusions of 
grandeur, as Bentall and his colleagues would suggest (Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 
1994) then this must be taken into account when attempting to modify them. It may 
also be a factor in understanding why individuals may not be motivated to give up 
their delusions.
Belief Modification.
The principles for belief modification in delusional thinking stem from Beck’s work 
on depression. Change in cognitions and beliefs can be encouraged through verbal 
challenge and through the use of empirical tests, (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979).
Consistent evidence from the literature regarding beliefs suggests caution when 
working with an individual’s beliefs since direct challenging can often lead to a 
strengthening of the belief, (Watts, Powell & Austin, 1973). Further work on the 
modification o f delusional beliefs suggested ways o f exploring them with clients, 
(Milton, Patwa & Hafner, 1978). The focus should at first be on weakly held beliefs, 
then on presenting alternative explanations for beliefs and discussion on the validity of 
the evidence on which the belief is based (rather than the belief itself). Individuals 
should be encouraged to form their own arguments against their beliefs. Good support 
for the use of this strategy, especially in combination with other forms of treatment has 
been reported. Chadwick and Lowe (1994) used belief modification along with verbal 
questioning and reality testing in their sample o f deluded patients. Following 
treatment, five of the twelve patients no longer held their beliefs to be true whilst a 
further five did not hold their beliefs as strongly. Reality testing alone is not an 
effective treatment of delusions although when it is combined with verbal challenge, it 
can be successful in the treatment of delusions, (Chadwick, Lowe, Home & Higson, 
1994).
Manasement of Hallucinations.
Definition.
Nuechterlein and Subotnik define hallucinations as being “fully formed perceptions in 
a state of full consciousness that have no related external sensory basis, typically
involving hearing of voices but sometimes also involving other sensory modalities” 
0x17,1998).
Theory And Therapy o f  hallucinations.
The most commonly cited theory o f hallucinations is that internal events are 
misattributed to external or alien sources. Some argue that this results from a deficit in 
cognitive functioning, for example because of internal monitoring dysfunction, (Frith,
1992), or because o f deficits in the processes of language production, (David, 1994). 
Bentall describes this misattribution as being due to a bias rather than a cognitive 
deficit, (Bentall, 1990) and that faulty reality monitoring, leads to a failure to attribute 
internal events to the self, (Bentall, Haddock & Slade, 1994a). With regard to therapy, 
the focus is on re-attribution, so that the individual sees them as being produced 
internally rather than externally. In a preliminary study, some success was observed in 
a reduction in severity of auditory hallucinations along with a decrease in associated 
distress. Patients were asked to focus on the physical characteristics of their voices as 
well as on their content. Patients’ views and beliefs about their voices were explored 
in order to produce a formulation which could then be used in the stage o f re­
attribution (Bentall, Haddock & Slade, 1994a).
If auditory hallucinations can be normalised and seen as being produced internally 
rather than externally, then Kingdon and Turkington (1998) argue that this acceptance 
“can pave the way for improved compliance with medication and with other 
techniques aimed at voice reduction” (p.65). Kingdon and Turkington attempt to 
normalise the psychotic experience by educating individuals about the relationship 
between psychosis and stress and that the general population could hallucinate if they 
were under extreme stress.
Therapeutic strategies are being developed to look at the individual’s thoughts, 
feelings and beliefs about their voices and their omnipotence, (Chadwick & 
Birchwood, 1994). They suggested that by challenging these beliefs the distress 
surrounding their voices would be reduced and there would also be a reduction in 
voices. Other researchers have considered individual’s thoughts about the origin of 
their voices, (Haddock, Bentall & Slade, 1993), this being a precursor to re-attribution.
In a paper by Fowler and Morley, the limitations of techniques such as thought 
stopping and distraction techniques were discussed. It was considered that these 
techniques failed to generalise to situations outside o f the treatment session, because 
of the beliefs that the individuals held about their hallucinations. In order to increase 
their perceived control over their voices, they were asked to “bring on” and then to 
dismiss their voices during sessions with the therapist. In doing so it was hoped that 
voices would be seen as being internally generated, (Fowler & Morley, 1989) and 
therefore perceived control would increase. Changing individuals’ beliefs about their 
voices has been shown to be effective in reducing the severity of hallucinations in 
previous studies, in the absence of additional coping strategies, (Fisher & Winkler, 
1975). However, Fowler and Morley also trained their patients in the use o f coping 
strategies using focusing on external stimuli. Only one of their five patients made 
significant improvement and whilst the other four patients felt that they had more 
control over their voices at the end of therapy, this did not translate into symptom 
reduction. Even though their results were mixed, the results may have been 
confounded by other variables such as two of the patients missing their regular 
medication and the chronicity o f the illnesses experienced by this sample. Although 
the sample size in this study is small it does suggest that offering alternative 
explanations about patient’s psychotic symptoms may be useful. Fowler and Morley 
suggest that if  the patient is not at a stage where they are willing to give up the beliefs 
they hold about their psychotic experiences then they may not be motivated to use 
coping strategies.
Distraction and Focusing.
It has been demonstrated that certain distraction techniques can be useful in reducing 
the severity of auditory hallucinations and that this technique has more impact on 
symptom severity, the more meaning the distracter has for the individual, (Margo, 
Hemsley & Slade, 1981). Techniques such as reading aloud appear to reduce 
hallucinations because they interfere with subvocalisation, which has been linked to 
auditory hallucinations, (Inouye & Shimizu, 1970). However, distraction has been 
shown to decrease individuals’ perceived ability to be able to cope with their voices, 
(Romme et al., 1992, cited in Kingdon, Turkington & John, 1994).
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Bentall and his colleagues argue that techniques such as distraction, though they may 
offer some symptom relief in the short term, will not produce lasting effects. This is 
because they do not tackle the faulty reality monitoring which is felt to be at the core 
of hallucinations, (Bentall et al. 1994b).
Haddock and her colleagues compared focusing and distraction techniques in the 
treatment of auditory hallucinations. Although there was no difference in the groups 
after treatment with regard to severity of symptoms, those in the focusing group 
believed more that the voices were their own thoughts. This obviously has 
implications for techniques which aim to re-attribute voices to the self. Those in the 
focusing group showed increases in self-esteem whereas the distracters showed a 
decrease in self-esteem. This was explained as being due to the effect which focusing 
had on the sense o f empowerment and control over their voices, whereas the effect of 
using distraction was the reverse, (Haddock, Slade, Bentall, Reid & Farragher, 1998). 
Focusing on voices may decrease anxiety through exposure itself, (Haddock, 
Morrison, Hopkins, Lewis & Tarrier, 1998) and by focusing on hallucinations rational 
responding can be introduced, (Kingdon & Turkington, 1994).
Other Stratesies Used With Positive Psychotic Symptoms.
Cognitive Restructuring.
Bouchard and colleagues reviewed a series of studies which used cognitive 
restructuring in the treatment of symptoms of schizophrenia which involved 
challenging dysfunctional core beliefs, (Bouchard, Vallieres, Roy & Maziade, 1996). 
They found that this technique had a significant effect on the reduction of 
hallucinations and delusions. Other reports have also shown that delusions and 
hallucinations can be amenable to reasoning if it is done in a “non-confrontational and 
collaborative way with full exploration of alternative explanations”, (Kingdon, 
Turkington & John, 1994, p.586).
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Coping Strategy Enhancement.
Estroff considered that many people automatically use strategies to attempt to cope 
with their illness, (Estroff, 1989) and to try to alleviate their symptoms. In another 
study it was found that those who used more than one coping strategy were more 
successful than those using only one, (Tarrier, 1987) and that 30% of patients do not 
find them effective at all, (Tarrier, 1987).
Stress management may be viewed as being a form of coping with psychosis. Hatfield 
has described the link between stress and onset o f symptoms in schizophrenia, one 
factor being that an individual may be vulnerable to stress because they under-estimate 
their resources for coping with stress (Hatfield, 1989). Indeed the role o f stress is an 
integral factor in the vulnerability model of schizophrenia described by Zubin and 
Spring (1977). It would follow from these assumptions that perceived ability to cope 
may need to be developed as a precursor to coping strategy enhancement.
Coping Strategy enhancement (CSE) has developed out of studies that have attempted 
to teach individuals self- management of their symptoms, hopefully resulting in a 
reduction in the frequency and severity o f symptoms and in a reduction in the distress 
associated with them, (Tarrier, Beckett, Harwood, Baker, Yusupoff & Ugarteburu,
1993). CSE assumes that strategies will be more effective if  they are already naturally 
occurring in the individual, and indeed that individuals would be more inclined to use 
those which they were familiar with, (Tarrier, Harwood, Yusupoff, Beckett & Baker, 
1990). In an initial study the results were mixed and it was suggested that chronic 
patients may need booster sessions in order for improvements to be maintained. They 
also suggest that a gap in the individual’s life may be left if  psychotic experiences are 
removed, especially if they are long-standing. Paradoxically, individuals may need 
help to cope with a life without psychotic symptoms.
In another study, both CSE and problem solving training significantly reduced positive 
symptoms, when compared to a waiting list control group. However, there was some 
evidence that those receiving CSE benefited slightly more than the problem- solving 
group. The CSE appeared to reduce anxiety but it did not have an effect on negative 
symptoms or on depression. Also its impact on psychotic symptoms was on delusions
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rather than hallucinations, (Tarrier, Beckett, Harwood,, Baker, Yusupoff, & 
Ugarteburu, 1993).
Treatment ofNesative Svmytoms in Schizoyhrenia.
Negative symptoms are often not alleviated by medication and can include, lack of 
motivation and energy, flattened affect and impaired cognitive functioning, (Hogg, 
1996). The prevalence of negative symptoms predicts a poor prognosis and as such 
warrants treatment, (Pogue-Geile & Harrow, 1985). Negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia may need treatment before coping strategies can be used, (Fowler & 
Morley, 1989). Activity scheduling could be used in such cases in a way similar to the 
treatment of inactive depressed patients. Specific skills training may also be necessary 
to aid progress towards normal functioning, such as training in appropriate use of eye 
contact and assertiveness, (Hogg, 1996). Life skills training has also been used with 
individuals to learn, amongst other things, how to manage money and to look after 
their physical health, an increasingly important aspect because of the move towards 
‘ community care and in the rehabilitation o f long stay patients. Another approach, 
which can be used alongside other cognitive-behavioural strategies, is teaching 
individuals how to problem-solve, (Tarrier et al. 1993).
Anxiety, Depression and Self- Esteem.
Depression is an important aspect to consider when treating schizophrenic patients 
since about 20% of these patients commit suicide, (Birchwood & Preston, 1991). 
Anxiety and depression may be treated using cognitive-behavioural techniques in the 
same way as with non-psychotic patients (Haddock, Morrison, Hopkins, Lewis & 
Tarrier, 1998).
In a recent paper by Drayton, Birchwood and Trower (1998) a study was carried out to 
investigate the link between the style of coping with psychosis and depression. They 
compared individuals who used “integration” and those who “sealed over” their 
experiences. Significantly more of the latter group were found to be moderately to 
severely depressed. This study clearly has implications for the types of coping 
strategies that could be encouraged in psychotic patients by exploring with them the 
personal meaning of having a psychotic disorder.
Garety and her colleagues stress the importance of the role of affect and self-esteem in 
the formation and maintenance of psychosis and as such they warrant investigation 
and treatment, (Garety et al. 1998). Improvements in self-esteem can be achieved 
through educating the patient about their disorder, (Goldman & Quinn, 1988).
Reviewing studies that have tackled psychotic symptoms, it is clear that symptom 
reduction in itself does not necessarily have an impact on affect or on self-esteem. 
Therefore it may be necessary to use CBT strategies to work on these directly instead 
of assuming that they will decrease as psychotic symptoms decrease.
Early Intervention.
Recent developments in the CBT of psychosis have focused on early intervention in 
recent onset or in acute psychosis, rather than on patients with a long history of 
psychotic illness, (e.g. Haddock, Morrison, Hopkins, Lewis & Tarrier, 1998; Drury, 
Birchwood, Cochrane & Macmillan, 1996ab). In the study by Drury et al. (1996a) a 
cognitive therapy group was compared to a control group receiving informal support 
and structured activities. They found that the cognitive therapy group had significantly 
fewer residual symptoms than the control group at the nine-month follow-up. They 
also found that recovery time was reduced by between 25% and 50% in the cognitive 
therapy group, (Drury et ah, 1996b). This trial highlights the need for more studies 
into the use of CBT in the acute phase, the rationale being clear; delusional beliefs and 
beliefs about hallucinations will be more amenable to treatment if  they have not been 
held for many years. Early intervention in relapse is also important. Prodromal signs 
are present in between 50% and 65% of patients for between a week to a month before
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relapse, (Birchwood, 1995), and it'is important that patients are able to recognise these 
signs.
Increasins Medication Compliance.
Behavioural principles using reinforcement have been used with patients in order to 
increase their compliance with medication, however their sample of patients was 
already fairly compliant with medication (Eckman, Liberman, Phipps & Blair, 1990). 
A more cognitive-behavioural treatment would be to educate the patient about the role 
of medication in the management of their illness in order to change their attitudes and 
beliefs about it. This education would also include acknowledgement of the negative 
aspects of long-term medication and any possible side effects, (Haddock, Sellwood, 
Tarrier, Yusupoff, 1994). This can be done more effectively by having a good 
therapeutic relationship with the patient, (Falloon, 1984). A collaborative working 
alliance is an important factor in cognitive-behaviour therapy of any disorder.
Family Interventions.
Another promising area of study in cognitive behaviour therapy has been the use of 
psycho-education and other family interventions in order to help change the family’s 
attitude and therefore behaviour towards the member with schizophrenia. Strained 
family relationships and interactions can be brought about if families misinterpret 
psychotic symptoms, (Kingdon & Turkington, 1991). It has been thought that by 
reducing the amount of intrafamilial stress, relapse can be controlled, (Birchwood & 
Preston, 1991). Studies have focused on families with high expressed emotion (EE), 
results showing that risk of relapse is reduced when compared to control groups, 
(Barrowclough & Tarrier, 1992). It has been argued that families with low EE should 
also receive some intervention, (Birchwood & Preston, 1991).
As with the patients themselves, families are given education about symptoms which 
emphasise the view that they fall on a continuum with normal behaviour, thereby 
hopefully de-stigmatising the individual and changing their family’s beliefs about 
themselves and their illness. Education is also given about the role o f stress in 
schizophrenia, and ways to deal with this are discussed as well as using techniques to 
solve long-standing problems within the family. Therapists encourage the behaviour to
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be seen in terms o f illness rather than personality and encourage all members of the 
family to increase their social networks, in order to reduce stress further, (Hogarty, 
Anderson & Reiss, 1986). Family intervention has been shown to be effective and it 
appears that patients can be sustained on lower doses of neuroleptic medication, 
(Falloon & Pederson, 1985). However, there are some who argue that relapse is only 
being delayed, not prevented, (Birchwood & Preston, 1991).
Methodolosical Problems with yrevious studies and Imvlications for Future 
Research.
The wealth of literature on the outcome o f cognitive-behaviour therapy for psychotic 
symptoms is growing. However, as yet there is no standard approach to the 
measurement of symptoms or in the type of patient being treated and the duration of 
their symptoms. As a result of this, studies stand isolated from one another and it is 
difficult to establish comparable results between the studies, which would add strength 
to their findings.
Most studies have only used chronic patients in their samples. Therefore, the duration 
of their symptoms will itself be a factor in the outcome of treatments; delusional 
beliefs which for example a person has held for 10 years will be more difficult to 
challenge than those newly formed beliefs which an individual with recent onset 
schizophrenia may be experiencing. It is for this reason that early intervention research 
is showing good treatment outcomes.
There is often a high rate of drop-outs in studies and this may bias results especially if  
those who are seeing treatment benefits stay in the trial whereas those who are not 
noticing any improvements in symptoms, may drop out. However, treatment of 
psychological and psychiatric disorders in general often have a high drop-out rates, 
(Emmelkamp & Foa, 1983, cited in Tarrier et al., 1993) and this in itself should not be 
a problem if it occurs prior to allocation to treatment groups.
Future studies should try and replicate some o f the promising findings from recent 
studies by using similar populations, outcome measures and treatments. There is also
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need for reliable tools to assess the content o f delusions and hallueinations, (Garety et 
af(1998).
Recent Develovments in Theoretical Issues and Imvlications for Treatment.
In a recent paper, Morrison argues that it is the misinterpretation of auditory 
hallucinations rather than the hallucinations per se which cause distress and that in this 
way they can be likened to bodily sensations in panic disorder being perceived as an 
immediate threat to their physical or psychological health. As such, Morrison suggests 
that individuals use safety- seeking behaviours, which in turn serve to maintain the 
hallucinations. (Morrison, 1998). Researchers often argue that hallucinations fall 
along a continuum of behaviour and that hallucinations can be experienced by anyone 
and indeed, can be induced in individuals by the use of suggestion and the presentation 
of ambiguous stimuli, (Feelgood & Rantzen, 1994). Individuals seek to explain their 
experiences, and the appraisals which they make of them (in this case hallucinations), 
will determine their cognitive, behavioural and emotional responses to those 
experiences, (Morrison, Haddock & Tarrier, 1995). Perhaps one o f the strengths of this 
theory lies in the association of psychotic symptoms with symptoms of panic disorder 
where cognitive-behaviour therapy has been shown to be effective and where there are 
established models and treatment strategies (Clark, 1989). In doing so, the problem of 
psychotic symptoms and their treatment may be perceived as being more manageable.
Morrison (1998) argues that, just as with individuals with panic disorder, treatment 
should not be focused on the symptoms themselves (i.e. the hallucinations) but on 
treatments which aim to control the negative feelings and distress associated with 
them. A common goal of most of the treatments, whatever is believed to be the 
underlying cause of the hallucinations, is to alter the individual’s perception o f and 
belief in their voices which should result in a reduction in distress, (Chadwick, 
Birchwood & Trower, 1996).
Future Directions for Research.
A large randomised controlled trial has recently been conducted with promising 
results. The London- East Anglia trial o f cognitive- behaviour therapy for psychosis 
had integrated a number of different treatment techniques with good result. Their aims
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were to reduce distress associated with psychotic symptoms, to reduce symptoms such 
as depression and anxiety and to encourage individuals to an active role in the 
management of their disorder, particularly in the management of relapse, (Kuipers, 
Garety, Fowler, Dunn, Bebbington, Freeman & Hadley, 1997). Techniques used in the 
treatment included; coping strategy enhancement, education about the nature of 
psychotic experiences and their cause, modification of delusional beliefs and beliefs 
about hallucinations, modification of dysfunctional assumptions which patients may 
hold about themselves and finally, discussion about relapse predictors and what to do 
in the event of recognising the signs of relapse. After the trial improvements were 
shown mainly in the reduction of hallucinations and delusion. However, there was no 
improvement in levels of depression. Patient characteristics that may predict outcome 
were also considered. They found that those individuals who had some level of 
cognitive flexibility regarding their delusions had a better outcome following CBT and 
it was thought that 50% of patients did have this flexibility. They also suggested that 
intellectual functioning had no bearing on outcome, (Garety, Fowler, Kuipers, 
Freeman, Dunn, Bebbington, Hadley & Jones, 1997). An eighteen- month follow-up 
of these patients has shown persisting improvements from therapy, 65% of the CBT 
group demonstrating clinical improvement compared with only 17% in the control 
group, (Kuipers, Fowler, Garety, Chisholm, Freeman, Dunn, Bebbington & Hadley, 
1998). Studies such as this which follow up a large sample o f people over a long 
period of time and which use a variety of psychological techniques are good examples 
to follow for future research.
Conclusions.
The evidence for the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural strategies with psychotic 
disorders is growing. Its impact is not only on the symptoms of the disorder 
themselves, but also on the depression, anxiety and low self-esteem which often 
accompany psychotic disorders. Recent developments in family interventions and 
intervention in the acute phase of illness have shown promising results. Particularly 
effective interventions appear to be those that integrate a number o f cognitive- 
behavioural techniques, and would include the need to be aware of the cognitive 
deficits which may also be present and treat these where necessary.
Cognitive-behaviour therapy has a central role in the management o f psychotic 
disorders, but few would argue that it would succeed without the use of neuroleptic 
medication. It can however help to increase compliance with medication and may also 
mean that due to successful use of psychological techniques, the need for large doses 
of medication could be reduced.
The strength of CBT is in its ability to incorporate a wide range o f techniques and to 
tailor them to individual needs through a thorough assessment and formulation of the 
problem. In this way its contribution to the treatment of psychotic disorders far 
outweighs that offered by other psychological therapies and provides a useful 
treatment in conjunction with medication.
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What is an autistic spectrum disorder and what aetiological models have 
contributed to our understanding of autism? To what extent have these models 
guided intervention practices?
Introduction.
Despite the fact that autistic spectrum disorders are relatively rare in the general 
population, they have generated a great deal of academic interest. This essay aims to 
cover the current defining characteristics of the autistic spectrum disorder, although 
the focus will be on autism and on Asperger’s syndrome. The aetiological models of 
autism, will be examined, with a focus on cognitive theories and intervention practices 
will then be explored in relation to these models.
Autism is not a new disorder. Frith (1989) describes a case from the eighteenth 
century, from a physician named Itard. He described a boy named Victor, the “wild 
boy of Aveyron”, whose behaviours, according to current criteria would suggest that 
he was autistic, (Frith, 1989).
At the end of the 19* Century Henry Maudsley suggested that children could suffer 
with psychosis. What are now known as autistic spectrum disorders were considered 
then to be childhood psychoses, (Wing 1996).
The concept of autism, and the diagnostic criteria used to define it have evolved over 
time. The following section aims to explore the history of autism and current thinking 
about the disorder.
The Autistic Spectrum.
In 1943 Kanner coined the term, “early infantile autism” to describe an unusual 
behavioural pattern in a group of children, (Kanner, 1943, cited in Wing, 1990). The 
children Kanner studied displayed a number of behaviours which included a lack of 
emotional contact with others, a lack of communicative speech, a strong interest in 
objects and a desire for sameness. The children he studied also displayed some areas 
of good ability for example in memory and in some performance tasks, (Kanner, 1943, 
cited in Wing, 1990). He also noted that some o f the children responded strongly to
30
loud noises and others had problems with feeding, (Kanner, 1943, cited in Happe, 
1994a). Kanner revised his initial descriptions in order to pick out the characteristics 
which he thought best defined the syndrome, those being the autistic aloneness and a 
desire for routine and sameness, (Kanner & Eisenberg, 1956, cited in Happe, 1994a). 
Another physician named Asperger described similar behaviours that he termed 
“autistic psychopathy” in a group of his patients in 1944. However, his work and his 
syndrome were not discovered until 1991 when his papers were translated into English 
by Frith, (cited in Happe, 1994a). Asperger also commented on the central importance 
of the social difficulties that his group displayed as well as the pervasive nature of the 
disorder. Both Kanner and Asperger described the lack of appropriate eye contact, 
repetitive routines and special interests often in bizarre topics that their patients 
displayed. They also both commented on the fact that the condition appeared to be 
present from very early on in the child’s life, (Happe, 1994a). Asperger’s group 
differed from Kanner’s group in that they were higher functioning [a diagnosis is 
rarely made if  the IQ is below 70, (Gillberg, 1998)] and had slightly more interest in 
social contact (although contact was sought inappropriately) and had poor motor co­
ordination.
There is current debate as to whether Asperger’s syndrome is a distinct disorder or if  it 
is a “mild” form of autism, (Blake, 1988) and it has been argued that it should not 
merely be seen as the normal end of autism, (Frith, 1989). Asperger felt that his 
syndrome was distinct although there were similarities, (Wing, 1996). Frith argues that 
Asperger’s description of “autism” was much wider than Kanner’s and as such 
encompassed individuals with a wide range of abilities and impairments, (Frith, 1989). 
The term has been useful in clinical terms in its ability to include those individuals 
who would have been excluded by the more rigid nuclear features of Kanner’s autism, 
(Frith, 1989). Happe and Frith suggest that it deserves its own label because its 
prognosis and management is different to Kanner’s autism, (Happe & Frith, 1996). 
Currently, Asperger’s is differentiated from Kanner’s autism in the fact that there is no 
early delay in language and speech, (Wing, 1996).
Rutter made the first attempt to produce defining criteria for autism, which were based 
on Kanner’s autism. Rutter’s criteria included Kanner’s ideas of impaired social
development, impaired or delayed language and a desire for sameness that produced 
odd or repetitive behaviours. He added age of onset which had to be before 30 months 
of age, (Rutter, 1978).
Wing and Gould undertook a large study in Camberwell as a reaction against the tight 
criteria for autism. They believed that a great number of children were being excluded. 
They did not fit Kanner’s definition of infantile autism but nevertheless displayed 
social impairments. They studied children identified as having severe learning 
difficulties or those with social impairment language impairment or repetitive or 
stereotyped behaviours, (Wing & Gould, 1979). They found that 74 out o f the 132 
children who met their inclusion criteria had social impairment and of these 17 had 
Kanner’s autism, (Wing and Gould, 1979). Simply using Kanner’s criteria would 
ignore a substantial proportion of individuals who had similar impairments.
From this study, they proposed the idea o f a “triad of impairments”, suggesting that in 
children with social impairment, there was always stereotyped behaviour, absent or 
limited communication and a lack of imagination, (Wing & Gould, 1978). The 
presence of this triad is the defining feature in autism and lies at the core of the 
disorder, though the specific handicaps associated with the impairment may differ 
between individuals, (Happe, 1994a). Wing suggests that the whole autistic spectrum 
“is united by the presence” of the triad of impairments, (Wing, 1997, p.20) and that the 
triad can be present at any level of ability.
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder. It is a life-long condition, which is 
characterised by social and communication impairments, (Lord & Rutter, 1994). There 
is a certain amount of confusion and varying opinion in academic and research papers 
concerning the extent to which different disorders are part of the autistic spectrum. 
Aarons and Gittens suggest that the classifications of autistic disorders in ICD 10 
(WHO, 1990) and DSM -  III-R (APA, 1987), grouped under pervasive developmental 
disorders (FDD), are “roughly equivalent to the continuum of disorders in which 
Wing’s triad of social and communication impairments occur”, (Aarons & Gittens, 
1992). This would include atypical autism, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder and 
Rett’s disorder in the spectrum. Myhr (1998) also suggests that subgroups within the
PDD classification should be considered as being similar to each other and “can be 
seen as existing on a continuum, differing only by degree of impairment” (p. 589). 
However, she goes on to exclude R etf s and Childhood Disintegrative Disorder from 
her discussion because of the rarity of such conditions. Rett did not feel that his 
disorder was linked with autism since the girls he studied did not display the extreme 
social impairments that those with autism showed, (Cohen & Volkmar, 1997). 
However, it was included in the PDD classification and thus could take its place on the 
autistic spectrum. Lord and Risi (1998) also include it in their classification and 
discussion of autism spectrum disorders and a reading of Wing’s writing would 
suggest that all o f the PDD are part of the autistic spectrum, (Wing, 1996). Volkmar 
and Lord (1998) comment on the difficulty in defining the boundaries of the different 
syndromes within the pervasive developmental disorder category. There is also some 
debate as to whether semantic-pragmatic impairments could also be considered as 
being part of the autistic spectrum, (Brook & Bowler, 1992).
The concept of a spectrum of disorders is important when considering the range and 
severity of impairments found across individuals who could all be described as 
showing the characteristics of autism, from those who have little or no speech, to those 
who display echolalia. The concept of a spectrum accounts for this range between 
subjects, but also accounts for the different presentations of behaviours within a 
particular individual over time, for example, a child may become less socially 
withdrawn as they become older, (Frith, 1989).
Aetiological Models.
Autism has always been behaviourally defined and research findings have been unable 
to pinpoint a specific neurological or biological feature which is specific to the 
disorder and which diagnose autism. This section will provide an overview of some of 
the main aetiological theories and how they contribute to the understanding of the 
behavioural symptoms of autism. The focus will however be on the cognitive models 
of autism.
Population studies such as that by Wing and Gould (1979) have proposed that the 
number of individuals with the triad of impairments is likely to be about 21 per 10,000 
children and around 2 per 10,000 for Kanner’s autism, (Bryson, Clark & Smith, 1988). 
Myhr (1998) suggests that if  all forms of pervasive developmental disorders are 
considered, then the figure is nearer 70 cases per 10,000. Wing and Gould’s study did 
not include higher functioning children who were in mainstream schools, (Wing,
1996). Wing suggested that if  all of the individuals of all abilities on the spectrum 
were included then the prevalence could be as high as 9 in every 1,000 children (Wing,
1997).
The sex differences in autism have provided some clues as to the cause o f autism and 
have suggested a genetic component. Studies have shown a greater proportion of 
males with the disorder, about 3:1 for low functioning autism (Steffenberg & Gillberg,
1986) and about 5:1 for Asperger’s syndrome, (Lord & Schopler, 1987).
Psvchogenic Models.
Psychoanalytic theory was influential in suggesting that autism was caused by a 
“refrigerator mother” (Bettleheim, 1967, cited in Happe, 1994a). This view held that 
children had adapted to their unloving environment by becoming “autistic”, (Happe, 
1994a). Kanner was influenced by psychoanalytic theory and as such began to believe 
that there was nothing organically wrong with the children he observed but that the 
behavioural manifestations were the result o f emotional damage, (Wing, 1997). There 
is no evidence to suggest that autism is caused by parents neglecting or mistreating 
their children. Similarly, children who have been mistreated do not develop autism, 
(Clarke & Clarke, 1976, cited in Happe, 1994a).
Some psychoanalytic theorists have suggested that “Autism” in early infancy is a 
normal process and that most children pass through this stage normally. “Pathological 
Autism” has then been described as a regression to, or a failure to pass through this 
stage and that recovery could occur by finding a way through this stage, (Tustin, 
1974).
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Biological Models .
Rimland argued against blaming the family by suggesting that autism could be caused 
by biological factors. He hypothesised that a defect in the reticular formation of the 
brain stem which would mean that information obtained from the senses could not 
easily be linked with past experiences and that the autistic’s need for sameness was 
linked to this defect. The defect also means that learning becomes difficult since each 
experience appears to be new. Rigid patterns of behaviour may form as a way of 
trying to add order to an ever changing world, (Rimland, 1964, cited in Wolf- Schein,
1996).
Evidence for an organic basis to autism is convincing. Steffenburg (1991) found that 
about 90% of a sample of children with autistic spectrum disorders were found to have 
signs of organic damage or brain dysfunction.
From a study by Courchesne, using Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), 
abnormalities in the cerebellum were implicated in 98% of the sample. This defect is 
reported to be a causal factor in the social impairments found in autism since it would 
render them unable to follow the rapidly changing verbal and non-verbal information 
that is available during social encounters, (Courchesne, 1995). A lack of such 
information would impede the natural process of communication between people.
A study by Piven and his colleagues again using MRI showed that in their sample 
there was an increase in brain size, when related to controls, both in the total brain 
volume and in the parietal, temporal and occipital lobes, (Piven, Arndt, Bailey & 
Andreasen, 1996). Although they did not find enlargement in the frontal lobes they 
suggest that this does not rule out the involvement of frontal pathology in autistic 
individuals since brain size may not be directly related to function. The fact that the 
frontal lobes were not enlarged like the rest of the brain, could in fact indicate 
abnormal development in the frontal region, (Piven et al, 1996). Other studies have 
found reduced numbers of Purkinje cells, (Bailey, Luthert & Dean, 1998), increased 
serotonin levels or have implicated the dopamine system, (Fisher, Van Dyke, Sears, et 
al, 1999). Neuropsychological testing has indicated that people with autism tend to fail 
on tasks which are said to measure frontal lobe functioning, (Ozonoff, Pennington &
Rogers, 1991). However failure on such tasks does not necessarily mean that the 
damage is in the frontal lobes.
Autism’s association with other hereditary disorders suggests a genetic causal factor. 
Sex chromosome abnormalities might be a causal factor in autism, (Gillberg, 
Winnegard & Wahlstrom, 1984). This has been suggested because of the association 
which has been found between autism and the fragile X syndrome, (Wolf- Schein, 
1992). Autism has also been associated with phenylketonuria and tuberous sclerosis, 
(Reiss, Feinstein & Rosenbaum, 1986). There is an overlap in the behavioural patterns 
associated with these disorders and those associated with autism which provides 
further evidence for a physical cause of autism, (Wing, 1997). Twin studies have 
provided evidence for hereditary factors in autism, (Folstein & Rutter, 1977) and that 
“for autism to develop, brain damage has to occur in the setting o f a genetic 
predisposition”, (Wollf, cited in Aarons & Gittens, 1992).
Rimland has suggested that the behavioural symptoms of autism could be due to 
subclinical seizures, (Rimland, 1995). Whether or not this is the case, there is certainly 
a high incidence of epilepsy in individuals with autism, (Olsson, Steffenburg & 
Gillberg, 1988). Epilepsy has also been shown to develop in about a fifth of people 
who had no signs of neurological abnormalities, as they reached adolescence or 
adulthood, (Rutter, 1970, cited in Bailey, Phillips & Rutter, 1996).
It is possible that the gene(s) responsible for producing autistic behaviours in children, 
can produce a varying picture of the disorder since “milder” symptoms o f the triad of 
impairments have been found in the siblings of some autistic individuals, (August, 
Stewart & Tsai, 1981).
Other suggested causes of the behavioural features in autism range from food 
allergies, (W olf Schein, 1996) to contact with infectious diseases such as rubella, 
(Chess, Korn & Fernandez, 1971, cited in Wolf- Schein, 1996).
It has been suggested that there niay be a common pathway leading from a variety of 
different underlying pathologies which would account for the disorder, (Schopler & 
Mesibov, 1987, cited in Happe, 1994a).
Cognitive Models.
Any cognitive theory of autism must be able to explain the triad of impairments. 
There are three main cognitive theories o f autism and these will be outlined below.
Theory o f  Mind.
Perhaps the most well known psychological theory of autism is the “theory o f mind” 
explanation. It has been suggested that an inability to “mind read” could account for 
the triad of impairments. This theory suggests that in people with autism there is an 
inability to think about thoughts, (Happe, 1994a) whilst the ability is thought to be 
innate in normally developing children and present by the age of four, (Frith, 1996). 
The child without a theory of mind would be unable to attribute mental states to others 
or to themselves. This would result in impaired social functioning and difficulties in 
communication.
Pretend play is thought to be a precursor to mentalising ability. Leslie (1987) 
suggested that autistic children are impaired in their ability to engage in pretend play. 
It follows that they do not have the ability to form metarepresentations which would 
enable them to think about mental states, such as thinking, wishing and believing, 
(Frith, 1996). An inability to understand the mental states of others means that they 
cannot predict how other people will behave, (Frith, 1996). The impairment is specific 
and will only effect social behaviours which require mentalising, for example taking 
hints and keeping secrets (Happe, 1994b).
A number of tests have been designed in order to test out this theory, the most famous 
being the Sally-Ann task, (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). Using this test, Baron- Cohen 
and his colleagues found that whilst 80% of the autistic sample failed on this task, all 
of the normal four year old children passed it, (Baron- Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). 
Autistic children do not fail the theory of mind tasks for the same reasons as normal 
three-year-olds would fail them. Roth and Leslie modified the Sally-Ann task and
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found that although the three-year-olds failed the task, they did demonstrate an 
understanding of “beliefs” and the mental states o f others. The autistic children 
however did not consider mental states at all, their answers being purely based on 
reality, (Roth & Leslie, 1991), they are unable to see that people’s mental states can be 
different to what is happening in reality, (Happe, 1994a). Similar findings from 
another study suggest that autistic children fail on the task due to a 
metarepresentational (conceptual) impairment whereas three-year-olds fail due to their 
limited information processing capacities, (Surian & Leslie, 1999).
Baron- Cohen (1989) thought that lack of theory of mind was a sign of developmental 
delay, however Burack (1992) argued that children with autism did not show delay but 
showed “deviant development”. The fact that the children in Roth & Leslie’s study 
failed the task for different reasons would support this.
A study by Fletcher and colleagues (Fletcher, Happe, Frith, Baker, Dolan, Frackowiak 
& Frith, 1995) examined the brain using a PET scan whilst theory o f mind tasks were 
being performed. Brodmann’s area in the left medial frontal cortex of the brain was 
implicated in mentalising ability, (Fletcher et ah, 1995).
Frith suggests that although many people with autism fail theory o f mind tests, the 
tests themselves should not be used as a diagnostic tool, since being able to pass them 
does not rule out autism, (Frith, 1989). Some individuals with autism do pass the tasks 
and as a result it has been suggested that the primary deficit is therefore not in 
mentalising but is in the inability to apply existing knowledge, (Bowler, 1992). Many 
people however who pass the first order tasks do not pass the second order tasks of 
theory of mind, (Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1997).
Some authors have suggested that the mentalising deficit is just a manifestation o f a 
deeper impairment, for example an impairment in intersubjectivity, (Hobson, 1993) or 
is an impairment of affect. Evidence for this comes from an inability to engage in joint 
attention which is a desire to share thoughts and ideas with others, (Mundy & Sigman, 
1989).
There are limitations to the theory of mind explanation in autism. It does not take 
account of the high proportion of autistic people who also have moderate to severe 
learning disability and it only accounts for the triad of impairments and not the other 
features that can be associated with autism, such as stereotyped behaviours and special 
talents (Frith, 1996). The cognitive models of weak central coherence and of impaired 
executive functioning are thought to be useful in addition to the theory of mind when 
considering the different behavioural symptoms present in autism, (Frith, 1996).
Central Coherence Theorv.
Frith suggested that people with autism lack a “drive for central coherence” and find it 
difficult to understand complex information, (Frith, 1989) since they do not have the 
drive to integrate information into a coherent meaning, (Baron- Cohen & Swettenham,
1997). The theory stemmed from observation of the “spiky” performance on 
intelligence tests with peaks of good performance, (Frith, 1996). This theory is able to 
explain some of the specific abilities which people with autism sometimes display. 
There is a consistent finding that autistic people perform better on the Block Design 
subtest of the Wechsler intelligence scales in relation to their performance on the other 
subtests. Frith argues that this is because they process the information in parts rather 
than as a whole and do not get distracted by the wider figure, (Frith, 1989). Happe 
found that autistic people failed to use context to guide them in the pronouncing 
homographs correctly, (cited in Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1997) again adding 
evidence of weak central coherence.
Happe suggests that the theory of weak central coherence may enhance rather than 
replace the theory o f mind, since it can account for some of the behavioural features of 
autism which are outside the triad of impairments, such as savant skills and 
obsessional interests, (Happe, 1994b). It has also been suggested that performance on 
theory of mind tasks is not linked to performance on central coherence tasks, and 
therefore it would appear that the two processes are not linked, (Baron- Cohen & 
Swettenham, 1997).
Impairments in Executive Functioning.
People with autism have been shown to perform poorly on tasks that aim to test 
frontal lobe (or Executive) functioning, showing perseveration on tasks and poor 
planning, (Frith, 1996). The exact mechanism for such frontal deficits is unclear. 
People with autism display very different behaviours from people who acquire frontal 
damage later in life, (Frith 1996). Baron-Cohen and Swettenham (1997) also point out 
that since frontal lobe pathology and executive dysfunction are not specific to autism, 
it cannot be the cause and it cannot entirely explain the disorder. It may however 
account for repetitive behaviours, which are not explained by other models of autism.
Interventions.
Interventions for autism have been varied and have been guided by aetiological 
theories. Initially because theories suggested that parents were to blame for causing 
autism, children were often removed from their families or steps were taken to teach 
the parents how to change their behaviour, (Wollf Schein, 1996). Fortunately current 
aetiological models suggest different interventions and this section will focus on some 
of the more recent attempts to intervene with those who suffer with autism.
Intervention with a child with autism should begin as soon as a diagnosis is made. 
Early intervention before the child begins school has predicted better outcomes, 
(Wolf- Schein, 1996). Some would even argue that because young children’s brains 
are still developing, it may be possible to change the workings of the abnormal brain 
functioning before they become fixed, (Perry, Cohen, & De Carlo, 1995).
There is no cure for autism and so Leblanc, Schroeder and Mayo (1997) advocate a 
life span approach when dealing with people with autism. They emphasise the fact 
that the needs of the individual and of the family in terms of education and support 
will change over time. They suggest that lifetime goals should be established early in 
order to guide the education and intervention programme. From this perspective early 
diagnosis and intervention is important for success although it has been argued that 
there is no real evidence that interventions which begin later are any less effective, 
(Rutter, 1999).
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Cognitive Interventions.
Attempts have been made to teach autistic children theory of mind (in order to try and 
improve social functioning) tlirough repetition, explanation and correction, using 
prompts and modelling, (McGregor, Whiten & Blackburn, 1998). After teaching, 
some children with autism are able to pass theory of mind tasks, (Hadwin, Baron- 
Cohen, Howlin & Hill, 1996). However there is no evidence that these effects 
generalise to real life settings, (McGregor, et al, 1998) or that they improve social 
functioning. Ozonoff and Miller (1995) tried to teach people with high functioning 
autism to pass theory of mind tasks. They were successful in doing so but the new 
skill had no effect on their social competence.
Behavioural techniques.
Lovaas suggested that faulty conditioning caused autism and thus suggested that 
autism could be cured using behavioural techniques, (Lovaas, 1987). Some of the 
interventions currently used in autism are not unique to this disorder but are used with 
equal success with individuals with moderate and severe learning disabilities, (Eaves 
& Awadh, 1998). Programmes have been developed along behavioural principles to 
treat individuals in their homes. Parents were trained as to how to interact at an 
optimum with their children whilst shaping their behaviour and teaching them new 
communication and social skills, (e.g. Hemsley et al, 1978, cited in Rutter, 1999). 
Howlin (1998) suggests that challenging behaviour in people with autism is likely to 
be due to communication difficulties and it is therefore amenable to behavioural 
interventions used with non-autistic individuals who display these behaviours. 
Behavioural interventions can be used to alter a variety of behaviours such as 
repetitive questioning and echolalia, and obsessions and rituals, (Howlin, 1998).
Specific problems such as self- injury and depression, have been shown to be 
amenable to cognitive -  behavioural therapy although the use of such techniques with 
this population is still in its infancy, (Hare, 1997).
Social skills groups may be successful in providing superficial social skills but there 
have been no studies looking at outcome after such groups, (Gillberg, 1998).
41
Education.
Returning to the wild boy of Aveyron, Frith describes one of the earliest attempts at 
intervention with an individual with autism. Itard showed that, even though Victor 
would never become “normal”, his life could be improved through education, (Frith, 
1989).
Lovaas (1987) has published outcome studies of students following the TEACCH 
programme. The programme included 40 hours of intensive treatment per week and 
was shown to have made substantial improvements in 50% of this group. The 
improvements were maintained in children whose parents had been trained in 
behaviour modification techniques, emphasising the need for family involvement 
where possible. The TEACCH program employs behavioural techniques based on 
research showing that autistic people are more able to process clear, concrete visual 
information, (Schopler, 1966 cited in Mesibov, 1997) in a structured environment. 
The programme aims to shape behaviours that will generalise and also aims to teach 
new means of communication, (Mesibov, 1997). They use techniques such as 
incidental teaching, using naturally occurring situations, and aim to provide students 
with functional skills that will be useful to them in community living, (Mesibov,
1997). At present there is no independent research looking at the effectiveness o f 
TEACCH programmes. Replication of Lovaas’ findings is necessary for the claims to 
be validated, (Rutter, 1999). The programme is intensive and time consuming and 
because it is complex, it is difficult to ascertain which aspects of the programme are 
effective, (Mesibov, 1997).
There has been much debate over whether children with autism should be placed in 
mainstream or in special schools. Wolf- Schein (1996) argues that since children with 
autism do not model from their peers, an idea that behaviour may improve through 
watching others is not a valid reason for them being taught with their peers. However, 
the range of abilities and impairments associated with an “autistic spectrum disorder” 
are so wide that generalisations cannot be made and each intervention package should 
be individualised and should be monitored and revised frequently.
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Some mainstream schools have been very proactive in their approach to integrating 
children with autism using a framework called the “Circle of Friends” which was 
developed by two educational psychologists working in Nottingham. It is a support 
system for children with emotional and behavioural needs in mainstream schools. The 
Circle of Friends aims to help the other children to understand the nature o f the child’s 
disorder and aims to help the child become integrated into the peer group thus 
preventing isolation, (Wilson & Newton, 1996).
Studies suggest that a well-controlled, structured environment which uses specific 
teaching techniques appropriate to the level o f the students achieved better results than 
more permissive environments, (Bartak & Rutter, 1973 & Rutter & Bartak, 1973).
Development o f  Lansuase and Communication Skills.
If useful language has not developed by about the age of 6, then it is unlikely to 
develop, (Howlin, 1998). Speech and language therapy should then be recruited to 
attempt to teach the child and family other ways of communicating. It should also aim 
to make the adults more aware of what they are saying, for example by trying to avoid 
using figurative language which will be taken literally by a child with autism.
Family Support.
Wolf- Schein (1994) emphasises the family’s need for professional as well as informal 
support. Self- help groups and support for parents and siblings o f autistic children are 
valuable resources.
Medication.
Medication such as Clomipramine can be used to reduce rituals and obsessions. 
Stimulants have been used to try and improve attention problems, (Gillberg, 1998) and 
Naltrexone has been effective in treating self- injury, (Wolf- Schein, 1994). 
Medication cannot treat the core impairments found in autism but it aims to try and 
control the behaviours associated with them.
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Other Interventions.
Holding therapy. This stems from a theory that autism was caused by a breakdown of 
the bonding process between the parent and the child, (Tinbergen and Tinbergen, 
1972, cited in Aarons & Gittens, 1992). Holding therapy aims to force the child to 
have contact with the parent by holding them until their distress has subsided and in 
this way aims to increase the bond between them. Although proponents of this type of 
“therapy” say that it is successful, there is only anecdotal evidence that it helps to 
improve the lives or the functioning of those with autism, (Aarons & Gittens, 1992). 
Auditory training. Autistic children have been shown to have over-sensitive hearing, 
which can cause distress. Techniques have been developed with some success to 
desensitise them to certain sounds, (Rimland & Edelson, 1991, cited in Wolf- Schein, 
1994).
Gentle Teaching. This technique emphasises bonding between the autistic and teacher. 
It is similar to holding therapy in that it suggests that difficult behaviours are due to a 
lack of bonding between child and caregiver, (Wolf- Schein, 1994). There is no 
evidence to suggest the usefulness o f this technique.
Exercise. Exercise regimes have been shown to reduce self- stimulatory behaviours, 
(McGimsey & Favell, 1989, cited in Wolf- Schein, 1994).
Conclusions.
Autism is a complex disorder that still has many unanswered questions especially in 
terms of aetiology. It is agreed that autism has an organic cause that can be genetically 
inherited. Cognitive models provide a framework for exploring the triad of 
impairments and other associated impairments. The models should be seen as 
complementing each other rather than being mutually exclusive. With regard to 
intervention, success has been shown in teaching the individuals in structured 
environments, providing communication training and support and training for 
families. The most promising forms of intervention are education within a structured 
environment. Interventions that have been specifically focused on the impairments in 
autism, such as trying to teach theory of mind, have been unsuccessful in their ability 
to generalise to real life situations. Even with intervention, only those individuals in 
the higher functioning group have any hope of living an independent life as adults, 
(Wing, 1997).
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What theories have been advanced to explain childhood phobias? Consider their 
strengths and limitations and the evidence base that would support their use in clinical
practice.
Introduction.
Fears are relatively common in childhood (Miller, 1983) and in most circumstances 
fear is a normal response to a threatening situation. “Normal” fears in childhood vary 
according to the child’s age, ranging from fear of loud noises in early infancy, fears of 
the dark as a toddler, to fears centring around social performance as the individual 
reaches adolescence, (Carr, 1999). These fears may be considered to be developmental 
in that they mirror the stages of changes in cognitive and social development that the 
child passes through, (Ollendick, King and Yule, 1994). The prevalence of fears 
reported by children decrease as they grow older, (McFarlane et al., 1954, cited in 
Strauss & Last, 1993).
Fear itself can be considered to be adaptive in that it serves to protect the individual 
from danger. However the fear may reach such severity or frequency that it can no 
longer be considered to be adaptive.
This paper is concerned with phobias as defined in the DSM IV classification, (APA, 
1994). The DSM IV classification for specific (simple) phobia is based upon the 
following set of criteria:
1. A persistent and excessive fear which is aroused in the presence or in the 
anticipation of a specific stimulus.
2. This produces an anxiety response, which may be expressed by children as crying, 
clinging or tantrums.
3. In contrast to the adult definition, the fear does not necessarily have to be 
recognised by the child as excessive or irrational.
4. The phobic stimulus is avoided or endured with anxiety.
5. The avoidance or distress is maladaptive in that it interferes significantly in the 
individual’s life.
6. In children the fear must have been present for at least six months.
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The DSMIV also specifies the phobia by one of five subtypes, (APA, 1994): fear of 
animals (e.g. spiders), the natural environment (e.g. water), blood- injection- injury 
(e.g. the sight of blood), situational (e.g. flying) and other (e.g. fear o f situations that 
might lead to vomiting).
DSMIV classifies, social phobia as a separate disorder and although it is a disabling 
condition, its prevalence in childhood is rare, (about 1%) compared to between 2.4 
and 9.1% for simple phobias, (e.g. Anderson, Williams, McGee & Silva, 1987; 
McGee, Feehan, Williams, Partridge, Silva & Kelly, 1990). Many of the criteria used 
to classify social phobia are similar to those necessary for specific phobia, however 
the stimulus causing anxiety in social phobia is a social situation where the individual 
fears negative evaluation by others, (APA, 1994).
Strauss and Last (1993) compared groups of children referred to a clinic with either 
simple or social phobia. They found that the children with simple (specific) phobias 
were more likely to be younger with an earlier onset than the social phobic group. 
They did not however, find a gender difference between the two groups, which 
contradicts Anderson et al’s study in which females were over-represented both in 
simple phobia (6:1) and in social phobia (2:1), (Anderson, Williams, McGee & Silva,
1987).
Studies of adult phobics suggest that their difficulties started in childhood and 
adolescence, (Sheehan, Sheehan & Minichello, 1981). It therefore seems logical that 
early intervention in childhood in such cases could alleviate symptoms before they 
became entrenched.
Childhood fears and phobias have been conceptualised by Lang (1977) as having three 
response components: cognitive, physiological and overt behavioural and it is 
important to consider these factors when trying to explain phobias. This paper will 
provide a discussion of the main theories that have been proposed to explain the onset 
of childhood phobias. Their strengths and limitations will then be discussed in the 
light of research testing the validity of the theories themselves and by exploring the 
efficacy of the interventions that have been developed on the basis of those theories.
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Theories of Phobia Acquisition in Childhood.
Psychoanalytic Theory.
Freudian Psychoanalytic theory suggests that the onset of anxieties are closely linked 
to the child’s developmental phases. Unsuccessful negotiation of these stages can lead 
to the development of neuroses. Freud suggested that there are three main danger 
situations that can cause anxiety, a. loss of a loved one, b. castration anxiety and c. 
Superego or social anxiety, (Herbert, 1994). Neuroses (including phobias) have been 
explained as being the symptoms of a defensive attempt to repress forbidden impulses, 
(Herbert, 1994) that have not been successfully resolved. The particular stimulus must 
therefore be avoided because it reminds the child o f the forbidden thoughts, (Herbert,
1994).
The case of Little Hans is probably one of the best known case studies in psychology 
and it became the topic of great debate in relation to childhood phobias, their origins 
and their treatment. In very general terms Freud understood Little Hans’ fear o f horses 
in terms of an arrested development due to his early libidinal attachment to his mother 
and subsequent Oedipus complex, (Eysenck, 1965). His castration anxiety created a 
fear of his father which was transferred onto a fear of horses, (Freud, 1909, cited in 
Carr, 1999). Freud’s formulation of Little Hans’ phobia has been criticised both by 
Eysenck (1965) and by Wolpe and Rachman (1960) for its lack of basis in evidence. 
They dispute many of the assumptions and interpretations made by Freud. However, 
proponents of Psychoanalysis have criticised them for misquoting and ignoring some 
of the crucial elements of the case, (Conway, 1978). Despite the debate as to the 
usefulness of a psychoanalytic conceptualisation of phobias, these approaches are the 
most frequently used non-behavioural interventions for children presenting with 
anxiety, (Kazdin et al., 1990, cited in Roth & Fonagy, 1996). There have however 
been few studies of outcome evaluating this approach, (Shirk & Russell, 1992, cited in 
Roth & Fonagy, 1996). The research that is available suggests that Psychodynamic 
therapy may be more effective with generalised anxieties than with specific phobias, 
(Roth & Fonagy, 1996).
56
Intervention.
Therapeutic intervention is based on the assumption that it is only by uncovering these 
“repressed” memories that conflict can be resolved. There are few studies that have 
examined the efficacy of Psychoanalytic therapy with children with phobic disorders. 
However, there has been a large retrospective study of children with emotional 
disorders who were referred to the Anna Freud Centre. Children with specific phobias 
were reported to have been successfully treated and children under the age of eleven 
were more likely to benefit from the therapy than were older children. It was 
suggested that younger children were more able to benefit from analytic therapy 
because they had not yet fully developed their psychic structures and so were more 
able to use an intervention that was insight-oriented, (Target & Fonagy, 1994). 
However, for some o f the children the therapy was intensive and in some cases 
consisted of 4 to 5 sessions a week for up two years.
The interventions in this study were shown to be effective in at least some individuals 
and there is some evidence that Psychoanalytic is more acceptable to some children 
than cognitive- behavioural therapy, especially in the case of obsessive- eompulsive 
disorder, (Apter et al., 1984, cited in Roth & Fonagy, 1996). It is possible that this 
form of psychotherapy is more acceptable to phobic children but certainly more 
research is needed both to evaluate the therapy and indeed to consider instances in 
which it may be the therapy of choice. There is also some evidence that displacement 
may be used by anxious children, saying that they are worried about something when 
in reality they are worried about something entirely different, (Carr, 1999). In clinical 
practice therefore, knowledge of Psychoanalytic processes may be useful.
However, Psychoanalytic theory and therapy is notoriously difficult to research. The 
theories which will be outlined below are more open to scientific investigation and the 
interventions that stem from them would appear to be more cost effective, requiring 
shorter therapeutic input to produce improvement in symptomatology.
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Behavioural Theories.
An early account of the acquisition of fear through experimental classical conditioning 
is Watson and Rayner’s case study o f Little Albert, (Watson & Rayner, 1920, cited in 
Rachman, 1977). Fear of rabbits was successfully induced in this child by pairing a 
neutral stimulus with a fear- producing stimulus. Fear became the conditioned 
response to the previously neutral stimulus and was generalised to include stimuli with 
similar characteristics. Case studies such as this would seem to provide support for a 
model of fear based on conditioning principles.
Mowrer’s two- process theory of fear and anxiety has been influential and draws on 
the theories o f classical and of operant conditioning. Mowrer suggested that fear can 
either be evoked through the pairing of a stimulus with a painful event (classical) or it 
can be maintained by avoidant behaviour that reduces fear once the stimulus is no 
longer present (operant), (Mowrer, 1960, cited in Herbert, 1994). Support for the 
conditioning theory of phobias comes from reports of adult phobics, many of whom 
suggested that a traumatic conditioning experience instigated their fear, (Merckelbach, 
de Ruiter, Van den Hout & Hoekstra, 1989).
Theories o f personality have been incorporated into Mowrer’s theory in order to 
develop the idea of why some children are more prone to anxiety disorders than 
others. Eysenck, for example, suggested that children who were high on the 
continuum of introversion and neuroticism were biologically more prone to suffer 
from anxiety disorders. He suggested that they are highly susceptible to conditioning 
processes and their autonomic nervous systems are highly reactive, (Eysenck, 1967, 
cited in Herbert, 1994). This latter theory is useful in explaining individual differences 
in the development of anxiety disorders and phobias. However, its use in interventions 
is less clear, unless preventative strategies are targeted at children with such 
characteristics.
Eysenck also suggested that fear that is at first acquired through conditioning can 
increase over time even in the absence of further fear evoking situations through a 
process of “incubation”. Moreover, the fear may become generalised to related 
situations (“stimulus generalization”) and fear may even be evoked through ideas and
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attitudes (“higher- order conditioning”), (Eysenck, 1968, cited in Herbert, 1994). The 
generalisation of fear to stimuli that are similar to the fear-evoking stimuli was also 
proposed by Wolpe and Rachman, (1960).
Rachman and Costello (1961) extended the conditioning theory by qualifying some of 
the fundamentals of the theory. They added three new components to the theory. 1. A 
previously neutral stimuli is more likely to become a signal o f fear if  it has some 
relevance to the situation in which the fear is elicited. 2. The stimulus will also 
become more strongly linked to the conditioned fear if  the pairings are repeated. 3 . 
High intensity fear when paired with a neutral stimulus is more likely to provoke fear. 
Rachman (1977) later suggested that conditioning is increased by confinement.
If conditioning does play a part in the acquisition o f phobias then there must be 
additional factors to account for the presence of phobias in some but not in all 
children, (Doogan & Thomas, 1992). Latent inhibition may account for some o f this 
variability, for example prior experience and exposure to a stimulus has been shovm in 
laboratory studies to reduce the impact of subsequent attempts to condition a fear 
response with that stimulus, (Lubow, 1973).
Rachman’s three pathways theory of childhood phobia acquisition has drawn upon the 
theories of conditioning and social learning but was developed from the failure of 
conditioning theory to account for a number of things:
a. individuals do not always acquire fear in fear- provoking situations.
b. conditioned fears are difficult to produce in laboratory settings, (Bregman, 1934). 
Rachman does not deny that fear can be conditioned under some circumstances in 
laboratory experiments, however, he suggests that this is not how fears are 
normally acquired, (Rachman, 1977).
c. the uneven distribution of different types fears are not in line with the theory of 
equipotentiality and the fact that some fears are more prevalent than others cannot 
be explained merely in terms of conditioning. Some fears are more easily 
conditioned and are more resistant to extinction. Seligman (1971) outlined the idea 
o f preparedness, in that some stimuli are more biologically relevant and are more
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easily acquired. This idea is also relevant in the non- associative theories that will 
be outlined later.
d. Indirect pathways to fear acquisition have been reported and are not accounted for 
by conditioning theory. Phobic individuals do not always report histories of the 
onset of their phobia that support the conditioning theory. Indeed in clinical work 
it has been suggested that it is often difficult to find an obvious precipitant for the 
fear, (Rachman, 1968, cited in Rachman, 1977).
(Adapted from Rachman, 1977).
A theory o f fear acquisition must also account for fears that are provoked by a sub- 
traumatic experience and for fears that develop gradually, (Rachman, 1977). 
Conditioning theory, which relies on the temporal proximity o f the stimulus to the 
aversive response, is unable to explain for example, taste fears that can be aroused in 
individuals even when the stimulus and the aversive response are not close in time, 
(Rachman, 1977).
Rachman proposed three pathways to explain the onset of phobias based on findings 
that could not be accounted for by conditioning theory; direct classical conditioning, 
modelling (vicarious conditioning, i.e. watching others react with fear to a stimulus) 
and the transmission of negative information and instructions, (Rachman, 1977). The 
latter two pathways can evoke fear in the absence of direct contact with the stimulus, 
(Rachman, 1977). Bandura’s social learning theory of modelling and learning by 
observation has been adapted by Rachman to provide theoretical support for this 
pathway. Many of the behaviours and emotions experienced by individuals are 
acquired through vicarious learning, (Rachman, 1977) and this would seem to be 
especially true for young children. Although Rachman based this part of the theory on 
anecdotal evidence, recent research has provided some support for his argument. 
Support for the modelling pathway has come from studies comparing anxieties present 
in mother and child. Fearful children tended to have mothers who expressed their fears 
to them, whilst children whose mothers did not express their fears were less fearful, 
(Muris, Steememan, Merckelbach & Meesters, 1996). This finding was in contrast to 
a later study by Muris et al. (1997) whose results suggested that modelling played less 
of a role in the onset o f specific phobias. They suggested that the difference was due 
to the fact that the 1996 study only enquired about general fearfulness. The third
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pathway (transmission o f information) is also thought to be important in the 
development o f children’s fears because information -  giving by parents and peers is 
an integral part of a child’s development, (Rachman, 1977). Rachman (1977) suggests 
that it is in this way that we are taught to fear dangerous situations and are taught how 
to manage our anxieties about stimuli that provoke fear. However, it has also been 
suggested in the case of severe phobias, a conditioning experience may be more 
important in the onset than negative information, (Milgrom, Mancl, King & 
Weinstein, 1995).
Rachman also incorporated individual differences into his model. He suggested that 
genetic differences in personality may contribute to an individual’s fearfulness (based 
on the work of Eysenck, 1967, cited in Rachman, 1977). Due to personality factors, 
some people may be more prone to developing fears through one pathway (e.g. 
through modelling) whilst others may be more prone to developing fears through 
another (e.g. conditioning), (Rachman, 1977). Rachman also qualifies why, under 
some conditions, an acute onset of the phobia could occur. He suggested that if  the 
traumatic experience occurred at a time of emotional stress or illness then a 
conditioned response would be more likely to occur, (Rachman, 1977).
Recent research findings have strengthened some of Rachman’s ideas. Not all children 
who have experienced traumatic events develop phobias, (Herbert, 1994) and when 
questioned, parents o f phobic children cannot always remember an experience that 
would have triggered the phobia, (Rabbit & Parrish, 1991). An investigation of 
individuals with high and low fears of dogs both reported painful or frightening 
experiences with dogs but this factor did not result in subsequent phobias, (Di Nardo, 
Guzy, Jenkins, Bak, Tomasi and Copland, 1988). Moreover, relatively few people 
suffered phobia responses as a result o f air raids in the second world war, (Lewis, 
1942, cited in Rachman, 1977). Fears of snakes in previously non-fearful monkeys 
have been successfully induced using observational learning, (Cook and Mineka, 
1989).
A large sample study conducted by Ollendick and King (1991a) found evidence for 
Rachman’s three pathways looking at the responses of children between the ages o f
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nine and fourteen. The children were asked questions relating to the three pathways 
and results found all three pathways to be important in fear acquisition. Fifty- six 
percent of the children’s fears were attributed to vicarious learning whilst instructional 
factors and direct conditioning were responsible for 39% and 37% of the fears 
respectively. It was suggested that for some children, a conditioning experience when 
coupled with one of the other pathways was thought to have elicited the fear. This 
study however, surveyed children who had not been referred for treatment o f their 
fears. It is not clear how much weight should be given to such data when thinking 
about clinical fears and phobias. It may be possible that non- clinical fears are 
acquired through different pathways than phobias. For non-clinical, general fears (e.g. 
of nuclear war and fire), Ollendick and King (1991b) found that only a few children 
attributed their fear to a direct conditioning event, whilst modelling and negative 
information were rated highly. However, in a study of dog phobic children, over a 
quarter of parents thought that a conditioning experience had been important factor in 
the onset of the phobia, (King, Clowes-Hollins & Ollendick, 1997).
A more sophisticated study by Muris and his colleagues looked not only at whether 
any of the pathways had been present but also to what extent children thought they 
had been influential in the development of their fear, (Muris, Merckelbach & Collaris,
1997). Children reported information, modelling and a conditioning experience to 
have been present in 8 8 %, 50% and 61% respectively. However, when the children 
were asked to what extent their fear had been influenced by each of the three 
pathways, 40% suggested a conditioning experience whilst information and vicarious 
learning were reported in 27% and 1% of occasions respectively. Thirty-three per cent 
of the children did not know the onset of their fear, (Muris, et al., 1997). Children 
were also asked about their fear of spiders and were categorised into groups of no fear, 
low fear and high fear of spiders. The authors found that there were no differences 
between the three groups in terms of the modelling and negative information that they 
had received concerning spiders. However, the groups did differ in terms of 
conditioning experiences with the high fear group being more likely to report 
conditioning experiences, (Muris et ah, 1997). It is possible that children reported 
conditioning experiences as being the most influential because these events may have 
been more salient. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) suggest that the actual cause may not
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have been as memorable and may not seem as plausible as the cause they identified. It 
may also be the case that retrospective reports are influenced by attributional bias 
rather than being a true reflection o f actual experience, (Withers & Deane, 1995) and 
thus findings from studies such as this should always be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless, this study provided strong support for Rachman’s theory as did King et 
al.’s study of dog phobic children. Although parents endorsed all three pathways, 
transmission of information was not thought to have been an important influence in 
the development of their child’s phobia, (King, Ollendick & Murphy, 1997).
Interventions.
It is clear to see how Rachman’s theory can be utilised in terms of therapeutic 
interventions. Rachman proposed that there would be a difference in the response 
reactions between fears obtained by the different pathways. For classically 
conditioned responses, reactions would be mainly physiological and behavioural, 
whereas phobias evoked through indirect means would produce symptoms that were 
more subjective (Rachman, 1978, cited in King, Eleonora & Ollendick, 1998). 
Interventions such as flooding and systematic desensitisation would appear to be more 
fruitful if  used in phobias that have been conditioned, whilst modelling and cognitive 
restructuring were suggested to be more appropriately used with phobias acquired 
indirectly, through information or through vicarious learning (modelling), (King et al.,
1998).
Contingency management techniques are based on theories of operant conditioning 
and suggest that fear can be reduced by altering or removing the reinforcers o f the 
behaviour. It does not assume that the anxiety must be reduced in order to stop the 
avoidant behaviour. Contingency management involving positive reinforcement, 
shaping and extinction has been shown to be effective in treating phobic disorders, 
(Silverman, Kurtines, Ginsburg, Weems, Rabian & Serafini, 1999).
Exposure techniques are based on classical conditioning theory. Systematic 
desensitization suggests that responses that have been learned through classical 
conditioning processes can be unlearned by pairing the fear-provoking stimuli with a 
response that is incompatible with fear, such as relaxation, (Wolpe, 1958, cited in 
King & Ollendick, 1997). Its efficacy has been demonstrated with children and with 
adolescents, although younger children have difficulty in achieving muscle relaxation
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and find it difficult to imagine the fear inducing stimuli, (King & Ollendick, 1997).
In vivo exposuie has therefore been used to overcome the latter problem and is one 
of the most robust interventions for a variety of phobias, (Menzies & Clarke, 1993b). 
It has been shown to be more effective than eye movement desensitization and 
reprocessing which has been effective in other anxiety disorders, namely in Post- 
traumatic stress disorder, (Muris, Merckelbach, Holdrinet & Sijsenaar, 1998).
Flooding is again based on classical conditioning theory and requires the child to 
repeatedly face their phobic stimulus until they no longer feel anxious. This technique 
has been evaluated and its efficacy shown. However, it is rarely used in clinical 
practice because of the risk that the child’s feared outcome may actually occur, (e.g. 
the feared dog may attack them), (King & Ollendick, 1997) and because o f the intense 
anxiety that it can produce. Flooding has been successfully used in the treatment o f 
school phobia, producing better outcomes than softer approaches, (Roth & Fonagy, 
1996).
Modelling of appropriate non-fearful responses by another, in the presence o f the 
fear- provoking stimulus is based on the assumption that behaviour can be learned 
through the observation of others. It has been suggested that the efficacy o f this 
technique can be improved if  the child participates in the interaction once they have 
observed the model, (MacDonald, 1975).
Emotive imagery is a cognitive technique but since it is linked to systematic 
desensitisation it will be discussed here. This technique involves the child imagining 
themselves in a story with their favourite superhero. Within the story the child faces 
graded exposure to their phobic stimulus whilst being instructed to relax. There have 
been few studies evaluating this intervention but those that have been conducted 
suggest that the technique is potentially effective, (Lazarus & Abramovitz, 1962).
Behavioural treatments in general have received more evidence based support for their 
use and have larger effect sized than non- behavioural interventions, (Roth & Fonagy, 
1996). However, in spite of all of the evidence supporting Rachman’s model it has 
been suggested that it still cannot account for the onset o f all phobias, (King et al.
1998). The following section describes a theory of phobia acquisition based on an 
evolutionary perspective.
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Non-Associative Theories.
Seligman (1971) proposed the idea that some fears were biologically determined. In 
evolutionary terms, certain characteristics were adaptive and were passed through 
generations through natural selection because they protected individuals from harm.
Menzies and Clark (1993 a) suggest that childhood fear is not based on learning or 
conditioning experiences but that it is, in a sense innate. Children who have previously 
had a normal development will show fear on their first contact with an evolutionary 
relevant stimulus because they are innately programmed to do so. Support for this idea 
has come from studies that have demonstrated that conditioned responses to snakes 
(which could be considered to be biologically relevant in that some are poisonous) 
were more resistant to attempts to extinguish them than were conditioned responses to 
apparently neutral stimuli, (e.g. faces) (Ohman, Erixon & Lofberg, 1975). The theory 
also suggests that the fear should reduce over time if exposure to the stimulus occurs 
in the absence o f a traumatic experience. If this does not occur then the fear will 
persist, (King et al. 1997).
Menzies and Clarke (1993a) found that 56% of the parents in their sample believed 
that their child had always been afraid o f water and that there had not been a 
conditioning experience. However, Rachman’s three pathways were also endorsed by 
parents in the study. Merckelbach, Muris and Schouten (1996) again found support 
for Rachman’s pathways as well as support for a weaker version o f the non- 
associative theory. Whilst they found that 46% of the children had always been afraid 
of spiders (supporting a non-associative theory) they also found that 41% said that 
their fear was due to a conditioning event. It is also important to note that children 
who said that they had always been afraid also reported modelling, negative 
information and conditioning experiences as being important. They suggest that in the 
cases where fear has always been present, innate fears may be strengthened by these 
three other factors, (Merckelbach, et al. 1996). Indeed, innate fear may only be 
triggered when the individual is faced with the stimulus. The study was particularly 
useful in that it compared reports from children and adults and found good agreement 
between them. This lends support for the usefulness o f data collected from parents
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alone in other studies, but it is probably fair to say that studies looking at childhood 
fears should investigate accounts given by the children themselves.
Rather than replacing Rachman’s model, the non-associative account should probably 
be considered to be a fourth pathway.
There are no interventions that lead directly from the non-associative account of 
phobia acquisition, although if other pathways to fear are proposed to be present in 
conjunction with the innate fear then the behavioural strategies already mentioned can 
be used.
Non-associative theories do not explain why some children develop phobias and some 
do not. If the predisposition to fear certain stimuli is innate then the prevalence of 
phobias would be expected to be far greater than it is, (Merckelbach, et al., 1996). 
Cognitive theories and genetic theories of personality may shed some light on these 
individual differences and will be examined below.
Cognitive Theories.
As mentioned previously, different types of phobias develop at different points in the 
child and adolescent’s development. Behavioural theories do not account for these 
findings. It has been suggested that the stage of the child’s cognitive development is 
important in determining the type of fear. As the child’s cognitive abilities become 
more advanced, their objects of fear move from being centred in the immediate 
environment (e.g. separation from parents) to more global and imaginary fears (e.g. 
monsters) and finally to realistic fears, (e.g. injury).
Cognitions play an important role in the mediation of emotions. Lazarus promotes the 
importance of thoughts in the perception of threat and in the individual’s ability to 
cope with that threat, (Lazarus, 1984). These two appraisals may result in anxiety and 
a phobic response if the child perceives a situation as dangerous and unmanageable. 
Beck’s cognitive theory suggests that threat schemas are developed in children when 
they are faced with fear inducing situations. These schemas produce negative 
automatic thoughts when aroused and lead to feelings of anxiety. Cognitive distortions
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or biases may also be present, catising the individual to focus on situations that they 
perceive as being dangerous and not being aware of signals suggesting safety, (Carr,
1999). The negative automatie thoughts and distortions serve to maintain the fears. 
Attentional biases of this nature have been studied in spider phobics on a modified 
Stroop task. These phobics were distracted from the task by threatening words 
contained within the task, slowing their performance, (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990). 
Phobics have also been shown to overestimate the link between the phobic stimulus 
and an aversive outcome, (Tomarken, Sutton & Mineka, 1995) and believe that 
because they feel anxious, the stimulus is dangerous and should be feared, (Beck, 
1976). The theories o f cognitive biases suggest that all children have some attentional 
biases towards fear provoking stimuli but that these biases diminish with age. As a 
result, many people grow out of their childhood fears whilst an inability to inhibit the 
processing of stimuli as being tlireatening leads to persistent fears, (Kindt, Bierman & 
Brosschot, 1996, cited in Merckelbach et al. 1996).
Intervention.
Cognitive techniques aim to challenge the negative thoughts that the individual has 
about the phobic stimulus and ultimately aim to change the dysfunctional schemas. 
Self- control interventions that teach the child to self-monitor and self- reward have 
been shown to be effective in reducing anxiety in children’s phobias, (Silverman et al.
1999).
Positive self-talk has been used effectively with children in order to try and alter their 
negative thoughts and increases their mastery (e.g. I can cope with this). It has been 
shown to be effective in a child as young as five, (Matthey, 1988) who had a fear of 
thunderstorms.
Cognitive techniques have often been used in conjunction with behavioural 
interventions such as systematic desensitisation and relaxation, in order to try and 
improve the child’s coping skills whilst they are in contact with their feared stimulus, 
(Ollendick, 1995).
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Genetic and Biological Theories. '
Twins studies have provided some evidence as to the heritability of phobic fear. The 
studies tend to suggest that genetic factors have some role in the etiology of phobias. 
However, this role is probably a predisposition to anxiety rather than a pathway to the 
development of a specific phobia, (Merckelbach, de Jong, Muris, van den Hout, 
1996). It has been suggested that the influence of genetic factors increases with age 
and that personality characteristics such as behavioural inhibition (a tendency to be 
anxious and to withdraw in unfamiliar situations) will predispose some children to 
develop phobias, (Stevenson, Batten & Cherner, 1992).
Studies of water phobia in children and adults have found a link between parent child 
and sibling fear of water, (Graham & Gaffan, 1997). They suggest that where both 
parent and child had a fear of water, genetic influences were just as likely as 
modelling in the onset of the fear, (Graham & Gaffan, 1997). Another study has also 
suggested that fears and anxieties are moderately heritable but that retrospective 
accounts of lifetime fears are unreliable, (Kendler, Karkowski & Prescott, 1999). The 
latter finding obviously has implications for future research.
High levels of the neurohormone adrenocorticotrope, may predispose individuals to be 
more susceptible to conditioning processes, (Kelley, 1987, cited in Merckelbach et al., 
1996).
These findings may partly account for some of the individual differences in the 
acquisition of fears. However, these theories do not easily translate into psychological 
intervention, though they do provide some evidence for pharmacological intervention 
if  the severity of the phobia warrants such treatment.
The presence of anxiety within the family system does provide a rationale for family 
interventions. In fact, parental involvement in the majority of the interventions already 
mentioned is extremely important. Family interactions are a major influence in a 
child’s life and their patterns of behaviour and beliefs are greatly affected by the 
family in which they live, (Bolton, 1994). Interventions could include encouraging 
problem solving within the family and educating the family about the subjective
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experience of anxiety and by doing so the parents can then contain the child’s anxiety, 
(Bolton, 1994). Parents can become co-therapists so that responsibility can be 
gradually handed to them and then to the child, (Ginsburg, Silverman & Kurtines,
1995).
Conclusions.
A number of theories have been discussed that have attempted to explain the onset of 
childhood phobias, each one building on the ideas o f previous work and each theory 
has been supported to a greater or to a lesser extent by research findings.
The acquisition of phobias is a complex process and it is likely to include elements 
described by each of the theories. Rachman’s comprehensive theory is embellished 
and more complete if  findings from the psychoanalytic literature, cognitive, biological 
and personality theories are included. Interventions using exposure have been shown 
to be the most effective in treating phobias, (Roth & Fonagy, 1996) and whilst 
cognitions are important in phobias, particularly in their maintenance, cognitive 
techniques have not been demonstrated to increase the effectiveness of exposure, 
(Roth & Fonagy, 1996). Whatever the causal pathways of phobia onset, it appears that 
in-vivo exposure, based on classical conditioning, is the essential ingredient in 
ameliorating symptoms in children. This would seem to imply that phobias are mainly 
acquired through learning. However, there seems no doubt that factors relating to the 
individual and to the family, to society and to the context within which they live also 
provide important contributions in phobia onset and maintenance.
Many o f the studies used to support the models have suffered from small sample sizes, 
have lacked control groups, been of a retrospective nature (which are open to memory 
bias. King et al., 1998), have relied on self-report measures or have used participants 
that presented with non-clinical fears. Further studies taking some of these factors into 
account are needed to increase the empirical status of both the theories and the 
interventions.
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Discuss the difficulties in distinguishing depression and early stage dementia and 
evaluate the ways in which these difficulties might be addressed.
Introduction.
The differential diagnosis of depression and dementia is a complex issue that has 
generated a number of controversies and dilemmas. This paper is concerned with 
exploring some of these dilemmas and with establishing, as far as possible, the more 
robust findings from the research and clinical literature that have been proposed as 
being useful in differentially diagnosing depression form dementia. In order to do this, 
it is necessary to look at the definitions of both depression and dementia and their 
prevalence in the population and also to look at some of the difficulties with 
diagnosing the disorders in the older adult population. The focus o f this will be on 
neuropsychological tests but findings from some neuroimaging studies will also be 
discussed.
The focus of this paper will be on Dementia of the Alzheimer's type (AD), since it is 
the most prevalent of the dementias, accounting for approximately 65-72% of cases 
(Rosenstein, 1998). Where the term dementia is used in this paper, it should be taken 
to mean Dementia of the Alzheimer's type. The focus will also be on older adults 
presenting with these difficulties. Whilst dementia may be found in younger adults, 
the prevalence in older adults is far greater and some o f the difficulties in diagnosis 
are of particular relevance to older adults.
Before discussing some of the factors mentioned above it is important to consider why 
the accurate diagnosis of dementia or depression is important. Inaccurate diagnosis of 
dementia is relatively common and has been reported to vary in rates from 1 0 % to 
50% from diagnoses made in the general medical population (Gurland and Toner, 
1983). Within these errors are false negatives (failing to diagnose dementia when it is 
indeed present) and false positives, (diagnosing dementia when it is not present). The 
over- diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease in particular is of growing concern and in one 
study the misdiagnosis rate was 25%, with the majority of these individuals diagnosed 
to be suffering with depression at follow-up (Garcia, Reding & Blass, 1981).
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Depression in older adults can be successfully treated using antidepressant 
medication, and psychotherapy has been shown to be as effective in the treatment o f 
older adults as it is with younger adults. However successful treatment obviously 
relies on accurate diagnosis. A potentially more detrimental and costly misdiagnosis 
would involve individuals being diagnosed with an irreversible dementing illness 
which requires hospitalisation or admission to a nursing home. Such action may result 
in further deterioration in the individual's behaviour and ability to engage in daily 
activities and may not alert health professionals to potential suicide risk (Kaszniak & 
Christenson, 1994). Conversely, the misdiagnosis of dementia as depression may lead 
to individuals being needlessly treated with antidepressants which may have side 
effects that exacerbate memory impairment (Benedict & Nacoste, 1990). Lack of a 
careful and accurate diagnosis may lead to false information about prognosis and will 
not allow planning for future management or will result in management that is not 
warranted and not appropriate.
Diagnostic C riteria and Difficulties in Diagnosis.
Dementia.
Dementia is characterised by the development of multiple cognitive deficits. DSM IV 
criteria for the diagnosis of dementia of the Alzheimer's type must include memory 
impairment and one or more of the following; aphasia, apraxia, agnosia and/or 
disturbance in executive functioning. The deficits must cause significant impairment 
in social or occupational functioning and must represent a decline from premorbid 
levels of functioning. It is characterised by gradual onset and continuous decline. 
DSM IV allows for the diagnosis of dementia with depressed mood (APA, 1994). A 
diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease can only be made with certainty post- mortem when 
neuritic plaques and neurofibrillary tangles are seen on autopsy, (Kaszniak & 
Cliristenson, 1994).
It has been estimated that 10-15% of people over the age of 65 years have mild to 
moderate symptoms of dementia a further 6 % suffer from severe dementia. The 
prevalence of AD increases with age and in those over 85 years old estimates o f AD in 
the total population range between 26% and 47.2% (Rosenstein, 1998).
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Depression.
DSMIV criteria for a major depressive disorder must include five or more of the 
symptoms listed below but must include either depressed mood or loss of interest or 
pleasure;
1 . depressed mood
2 . diminished interest or pleasure in all or most activities
3. significant weight loss or gain or decrease or increase in appetite
4. insomnia or hypersomnia
5. psychomotor agitation or retardation
6 . fatigue or loss of energy
7. feelings of worthlessness
8 . diminished ability to think or concentrate
9. recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation.
(Adapted from APA, 1994).
Previous versions of the Diagnostic Classification Manual precluded a diagnosis o f 
depression if dementia was present. A feature o f the DSMIII classification was that 
organic factors should be excluded from causing or maintaining the mood disorder.
The primary difficulty in differentially diagnosing dementia from depression, is that 
the symptoms which are indicative of depression, are also some of the cognitive and 
behavioural changes that have been noted in the presentation o f dementia itself 
(Kaszniak & Christenson, 1994).
Depression itself is difficult to diagnose in the older adult age group since it is likely 
to present differently than it does in younger adults. Older adults may complain more 
frequently of somatic symptoms and are less likely to report low mood (Benedict &
Nacoste, 1990). Some of the rating scales that have been used to diagnose depression
in adults are not particularly useful when assessing older adults. Whilst depressed 
older adults are likely to present with more somatic symptoms, physical illnesses in 
the elderly may elevate scores on some depression measures which may result in false 
positive cases. Therefore, whilst it is possible to screen for depression using such
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scales, they are likely to be o f  less clinical and diagnostic usefulness than they are 
with younger adults.
Studies have shown that older adults with depression are more likely than younger 
depressed adults to have brain abnormalities that are evident using neuroimaging and 
are therefore more likely to display deficits on neuropsychological testing which 
resemble cognitive decline (Caine, Lyness & King, 1993). Studies have failed to show 
conclusively that cognitive dysfunction is more likely to be present in older than in 
younger people with depression. Rather than age, factors such as greater severity of 
the depression, inpatient status and lower levels of premorbid social and intellectual 
functioning, are more predictive of an association between depression and cognitive 
impairment (Kaszniak & Christenson, 1994).
With the clinical picture of depression in older adults being very varied and with the 
lack of a biological marker for depression, it has been suggested that the clinical 
interview is still the best way o f reaching a diagnosis. However, even using the criteria 
outlined in the DSMIV, a number of the symptoms of depression may be associated 
with the ageing process itself. For example, changes in sleep patterns and levels o f 
energy and loss of appetite have been associated with depression, but have also been 
noted in older adults who are not suffering with depression and who are merely 
exhibiting normal signs of ageing (Klerman, 1983).
Up to 40% of people over the age of 60 report depressive symptoms and about 5% 
would meet the criteria for depression (Romanoski, Folstein & Nestadt, 1992). Studies 
have indicated that about 2 0 % of older adults with depression have severe cognitive 
impairment (La Rue, D'Elia, Clark, Spar & Jaryik, 1986).
Co-existin2  depression and dementia.
Some authors have suggested that when depression is present in someone with 
Alzheimer's disease it is due to the emotional reaction of the individual to the 
cognitive problems that they are experiencing (Krai, 1983). Individuals presenting 
with a primary dementia with secondary depressive symptoms will continue to show 
cognitive decline even after successful treatment of their depressive symptoms.
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Follow-Up studies of patients who were initially thought to be suffering from 
depression with very few cognitive deficits have provided some evidence to suggest 
that depressive symptoms may in fact be a prodromal sign of dementia. Reding, 
Haycox and Blass (1985) followed-up patients with depression without cognitive 
impairment after three years, at which time over half of the (5 7 %) were found to be 
suffering from dementia. Whilst some cognitive improvement is seen in depressed 
patients following the treatment of their depression, findings from some follow-up 
studies suggest that people should be reassessed in the future. This is to ensure that 
they do not fall into the large group of patients who go on to develop cognitive 
impairment due to a dementia. It is also likely that whilst there is improvement in 
some cognitive abilities, particularly verbal abilities, non-verbal abilities may not 
return to normal (McNeil, 1999).
In the early stages of Alzheimer's disease a number o f changes occur that are part of 
this disease process but which are similar to symptoms o f depression. For example, 
agitation, memory and concentration difficulties are not necessarily indicative of 
depression in older adults who have cognitive difficulties (Burke, Rubin, Morris & 
Berg, 1988). It is important to consider mood related symptoms, however, people with 
Alzheimer's disease may under-report these symptoms. One way of overcoming this is 
to collect information from relatives or carers. However, this too is not without 
limitations as carers may over-report such symptoms (Burke et ah, 1988). Screening 
for depression in cognitively impaired older adults should therefore draw on 
information from a variety o f sources including the person suffering with Alzheimer's, 
carers, and from clinical observations.
It is now being recognised that whilst there is often a differential diagnosis to be 
made, dementia and depression can coexist. However, once a diagnosis o f dementia 
has been made, clinicians are less likely to notice symptoms of depression as they can 
be masked by the cognitive and behavioural changes that occur as a result o f the 
decline associated with the dementia (Kaszniak & Christenson, 1994). A study by 
Migliorelli and colleagues suggested that dysthyrriia had a later onset in their patients 
with AD than did major depression. They concluded that dysthymia may be a
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response to the perceived cognitive impairments whilst major depression in AD 
patients may be due to biological changes (Migliorelli et al. 1995).
The assessment of depression in people with AD is made difficult by the fact that 
there are almost no validated tools or available norms for its measurement (Teri & 
Wagner, 1992).
Treatment of depression in an individual with co-existing dementia can have 
significant effects on mood, functional ability and can have an impact on some 
cognitive abilities (Greenwald et ah, 1989). Whilst the individual will continue to 
have dementia the extra disabilities associated with depression can be alleviated, such 
as improvements in social interactions (Brock & Simpson, 1990). Depression in 
people with Alzheimer's disease has been linked to an increase in prevalence of 
delusions (Rabins, Merchant & Nestadt, 1984), an increase in restlessness and 
agitation (Reifler, Larson & Teri 1987) and greater carer stress (Teri & Wagner, 
1992).
The Dementia Syndrome o f  Depression (DSD).
Depression has often been linked with complaints of memory disturbance in older 
adults. Whilst some individuals with depression have only mild cognitive deficits, 
there are a subgroup of depressed individuals who present with severe cognitive 
impairment. The term Pseudodementia was coined by Kiloh (1961) to describe the 
phenomenon of cognitive impairment which subsequently improves when the 
depression has been treated. However, this term has become controversial and 
generated substantial debate, because it implies that the cognitive impairment is not 
real, yet people suffering from "pseudodementia" are often significantly impaired 
(McCallister & Price, 1982). More appropriate terms have been suggested such as 
depression-related cognitive dysfunction and the dementia syndrome of depression.
Recently, it has been suggested that those with DSD may have a pre-existing dementia 
that mainly involves non-verbal abilities. The long-term prognosis for individuals with 
DSD is poorer than for those with typical depression (McNeil, 1999) and indeed may 
be a prodromal symptom of AD.
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In a recent study by Migliorelli and colleagues (1995) 51% o f their sample had 
depression as well as probable AD. Prevalence rates from other studies have ranged 
ftom between 17% and 29% (Kaszniak & Christenson, 1994).
The dementia syndrome of depression (DSD) has been reported to be present in up to 
20 /o o f elderly outpatients and 50% of inpatients with cognitive impairment (McNeil,
1996). Follow-up studies have reported varying rates o f progression to frank dementia 
in these individuals, which range from 9-91% (McNeil, 1999).
Factors useful in the Differential Diagnosis of Dementia and Depression 
Clinical History and Behavioural Features.
The history of the illness and slight differences between the behavioural features of 
AD and DSD may be useful in differential diagnosis. With the DSD, patients are 
likely to have rapid onset of symptoms and seek medical attention shortly after their 
onset. They will usually haveahistory of psychiatric difficulties, complain ftequently
of cognitive deficits and will minimise their accomplishments. The mood component 
of their symptoms will be persistent. Those with Alzheimer's disease, however, will 
have a slightly different presentation with a slow onset and a longer duration before 
seeking help. They are less likely to have a history o f psychiatric difficulties and their 
mood is likely to be more easily influenced by their environment (adapted from 
Kaszniak & Christenson, 1994). However, recent studies have implicated psychiatric 
history as a risk factor for both depression with cognitive impairment and AD 
particularly if  there is secondary depression (Crowe & Hoogenraad, 2000). It has been 
suggested that a past history o f depression (especially recent onset prior to cognitive 
changes), variability in cognitive functioning and negativism may all be indicators that 
the cognitive impairment is associated with depression rather than being due to a 
dementia (Korczyn, 1991). It has also been suggested that those with the dementia 
syndrome o f depression are more severely depressed, have more difficulty sleeping 
and are more anxious than patients with primary dementia with associated depression 
(Brock & Simpson, 1990). It is important to obtain a full history o f recent life events 
as this could potentially distinguish between depression and AD by exploring the 
context in which symptoms first appear. The quality o f the mood disorder can also
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help distinguish AD from DSD. Affect in dementia is likely to be labile whereas those 
with depression do not tend to experience mood fluctuations (Kixmiller, 1991).
Lack of awareness of cognitive difficulties has often been cited as being a feature of 
AD when compared to increased awareness in depression with cognitive impairment. 
Reed and colleagues found that whilst 27.5% of their sample were unaware o f their 
impairments, 25% had full awareness o f their difficulties and 47.5% had some 
awareness (Reed, Jagust & Coulter, 1993). This study looked at those with probable 
and possible AD and it is likely that differences between studies are in part due to 
samples that include stages of dementia with differing levels of cognitive impairment. 
In the latter stages o f dementia it is unusual for those suffering to be aware or to 
complain of cognitive difficulties whilst depressed individuals will consistently 
complain of difficulties (Holt, 1993). Differences between studies may be due to 
samples of patients with differing severity of impairment.
Other differences in clinical presentations between depressive pseudodementia and 
AD included greater temporal and topographical disorientation and difficulties in 
dressing in those with dementia, (Reynolds, Hoch & Kupfer, 1988). Orientation is also 
an important feature in AD and whilst people with depression may be disorientated, it 
is more inconsistent than the disorientation seen by people with AD (Lezak, 1995).
Neuropsvchological Assessment.
Some of the main differences on neuropsychological tests between depression, DSD 
and AD will be presented below before discussing in more detail the specific 
cognitive impairments that may aid in differential diagnosis.
Neuropsvcholosy and Depression.
Lack of motivation has been implicated in affecting depressed individuals' 
performance on cognitive tests, however it is unlikely that it can explain all o f the 
deficits seen in those with depression (Elliott, 1998).
Cognitive impairments in depression have been reported to be across a wide range of 
cognitive abilities though they may be more pronounced in executive abilities (Elliott,
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1998). Depressed individuals have been shown to have greater difficulty on 
neuropsychological tests that require more effort and are less automatic. This being 
the case, they tend to perform better on tests of recognition memory rather than on 
free recall. Individuals with dementia are likely to be similarly impaired on both 
recognition and free recall tasks.
Information processing studies have shown that people with depression are more 
likely to be able to recall unpleasant versus pleasant stimuli (Blaney, 1986). In 
individuals with dementia this mood congruent memory bias is unlikely to be present.
It has often been thought that depressed individuals with cognitive impairment could 
be distinguished from those with AD because they were more likely to respond with 
"don't know" answers. However such responses have been shown to occur just as 
often in those with AD (Jorm, 1986).
The severity of the depression has been considered likely to have an impact on the 
impairment seen on testing. However, the findings are equivocal and probably 
represent differences in sampling and measurement in the studies. Hospitalisation also 
has a significant effect on the performance of depressed individuals on 
neuropsychological tests, with outpatients performing better than inpatients even when 
severity of depression is controlled for (Elliott, 1998). It is possible that the inpatient 
sample have been hospitalised because of their severe cognitive impairments but it is 
also likely that they are being more heavily medicated than the outpatients (Elliott,
1998).
Neuropsvcholosv and the Dementia Syndrome o f  Depression.
Whilst there have been a number of studies comparing dementia sufferers with those 
with depression, there has been less research carried out on more severely affected 
depressed individuals who fall into the dementia syndrome of depression category 
(DSD). However, some of the main differences are listed below, though some o f these 
are controversial and have not always been replicated. In DSD recognition memory is 
usually intact and performance on automatic encoding tasks is usually not impaired. 
Performance on tasks of similar levels of difficulty is not always consistent whereas
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those with AD would consistently perform poorly. Individuals with DSD are usually 
aware of their impairment whilst those with AD are not. Those with DSD in contrast 
to those with AD find prompting and semantic organisation of material helpful in 
improving their performance on neuropsychological tests.
Rate of forgetting has been considered useful in differentiating AD from depression, 
since depressed patients do not show the rapid and marked forgetting that occurs in 
those with AD (Lezak, 1995).
Neurovsvcholoey and Alzheimer's Disease.
In Alzheimer's disease there is often disproportionate damage to the temporal and 
parietal lobes and this will have an effect on the types of impairment seen on 
neuropsychological testing. For example, memory impairment, anomia and 
visuoconstructional deficits are often seen in the early stages of AD (Rosenstein, 
1998).
General Intellectual Functioning.
Clinicians often use discrepancies between current functioning and premorbid 
functioning as indicators o f cognitive decline. Often this has been performed looking 
at an individual's performance on different subtests of the WAIS. The Vocabulary 
subtest has been considered to be a "hold" test, which is resistant to the dementia 
process and which is quite a good measure o f general intelligence (O'Carroll, Curran, 
Ross, Murray, Riddle, Moffoot, Ebmeier & Goodwin, 1994). However, it is no longer 
thought to be completely immune to the effects of decline in dementia and can result 
in an underestimation of premorbid abilities (Crawford, 1989). The National Adult 
Reading Test has become a widely used tool for estimating premorbid intelligence 
based upon scores calculated from the reading of irregular words which is a skill 
which is relatively preserved even in those individuals with dementia. However, the 
practice of using these scores and comparing them with scores on the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scales has been considered to be of little use in people with dementia. 
This is because generalised organic changes have not been shown to have a great 
influence on general levels o f intelligence (Schlosser & Ivison, 1989). Since a 
deterioration in memory functioning is indicative of dementia some authors have used
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memory functioning as an indicator of decline from premorbid levels since 
performance on memory tests is highly related to intellectual ability in normal 
individuals (Schlosser & Ivison, 1989). O'Carroll and colleagues (1994) used this idea 
as a basis for their research trying to differentiate major depression from AD. 
However, the analyses they used based on use of the NART, WAIS-R and Wechsler 
Memory Scale, did not aid in this differentiation. The group means were significantly 
different between the groups, however, the overlap was so great that the results were 
not of clinical significance. They conclude that the memory deficits and psychomotor 
impairments on timed tasks have previously been underestimated in people with major 
depression, since their sample was severely cognitively impaired and differential 
diagnosis based on the tests that they used in their study was not possible.
Memory.
Complaints of memory difficulties are more frequent in older adults than in younger 
adults. Depressed older adults tend to complain more o f memory difficulties though in 
reality their performance on memory tests is unlikely to reveal deficits (Larrabee & 
Levin, 1986). On the other hand, those older adults with Alzheimer's disease usually 
do not report major memory difficulties, whilst their performance on memory tests 
reveals marked impairment (McGlyn & Kaszniak, 1991). This disparity between 
perceived impairment and objective performance could help in distinguishing 
Alzheimer's from depression. However, individuals with the dementia syndrome of 
depression are more cognitively impaired than those who are suffering from 
depression and may behave in more similar ways to those with AD.
Memory impairment is one of the main criteria for Alzheimer's disease. The specific 
deficits that have been implicated are difficulties in explicit memory for example story 
learning and problems with implicit memory for verbal and visuospatial material. It 
has been suggested that this is due to problems with encoding rather than being due to 
difficulties in the retrieval of stored information (Carlesimo & Oscar- Berman, 1992). 
Further evidence for this comes in part from studies that have aimed to aid encoding 
by elaborating and repeating the encoding process. Individuals with AD are not helped 
by methods designed to aid encoding, whereas normal older adults and depressed 
adults are (Knopman & Ryberg, 1989).
87
The Delayed Word Recall Test has been useful in distinguishing AD clients from 
normal older adults, but the test was not useful in discriminating between AD 
individuals and older adults with major depression (O'Carroll, Conway, Ryman & 
Prentice, 1997). They found that the test was not specific enough to differentiate 
between groups as there was a large overlap between the groups' performances, even 
though the mean scores were significantly different. Whilst the DWR was sensitive, it 
was not specific enough to be of clinical use (O'Carroll et al. 1997). Another study 
using the DWR had shown the DWR Test to be highly sensitive and specific in 
differentiating people with depression from people with Alzheimer's disease (Coen, 
Kirby, Swanwick, Maguire, Walsh, Coakley, O'Neill & Lawlor, 1997). The difference 
in findings is likely to reflect the difference in client samples. The former study used 
individuals meeting the criteria for a major depressive episode according to DSMIV 
whilst the latter also included individuals with dysthymic disorder and sampled 
depressed people living in the community. The mean severity o f the depression 
measured by the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale was higher in the O'Carroll study 
and this could also have influenced the results. It is not clear whether O'Carroll's 
sample was a community sample but this is an important factor when comparing 
results o f studies as inpatient samples perform more poorly on cognitive tests. These 
two studies highlight the difficulties in drawing consistent findings from studies and 
point to the likelihood that results from studies may be highly specific to the particular 
group that was being studied and may not easily generalise to individuals with slightly 
different characteristics.
Some studies have shown that older adults with depression perform better than 
individuals with AD on recognition memory tasks (Miller & Lewis, 1977). However, 
a more recent review of the literature suggests that this is not the case and that 
depressed individuals do not differ from AD patients on tests of recognition and 
perform no better on verbal or visual tests of memory (Christensen, Griffiths, 
Mackinnon & Jacomb, 1997). This review suggested that depression affects a wide 
range of cognitive abilities with very few being spared. However, they did suggest 
that since depressed individuals performed as well as non-depressed individuals on 
memory tasks with depressive content, these may be important in making a
differential diagnosis between the dementia syndrome o f depression and AD. There do 
appear to be differences between the groups on tests of episodic and semantic memory 
(Niederehe, 1986) though to what extent they can differentiate these two groups 
remains unclear.
A meta-analysis of memory tests that had been thought to be useful in differential 
diagnosis suggested that memory tests that use delayed retrieval after a distraction 
may be the most useful (Lachner & Engel, 1994).
Visuospatial Functions and Praxis.
Visuoconstructional ability is reduced in AD patients as measured by copying tasks in 
memory test batteries, (Cahn et ah, 1995). Clock drawing tests have been used to 
distinguish patients with depression form those with AD. Clock drawing is also 
sensitive to praxis, which is a feature o f AD, but not o f depression and to deficits in 
attention and executive functions (Herrman, Kidron, Shulman, Kaplan, Binns, Leach 
& Freedman, 1998). Hermann and colleagues found that clock drawing was not 
impaired in their elderly depressed sample but those with AD were significantly 
impaired. The authors suggest that the test would be useful as a screening tool to 
detect cognitive impairment in depressed older adults who are thought to have 
underlying dementia. However, the depressed sample in this study were only mildly 
depressed and the test may not distinguish AD patients from individuals who are 
more severely depressed. The limitations of such findings are highlighted in a similar 
study looking at performance on visuospatial tasks that attempted to differentiate 
moderate and severely depressed individuals from AD patients with mild to moderate 
impairments. The test battery which was concerned with visuospatial functioning and 
performance on simple psychomotor tasks, was unable to differentiate the clinical 
groups. Whilst they were significantly different to the older adult controls, they were 
not significantly different from each other (Hofman, Seifritz, Krauchi, Hock, Hampel, 
Neugebauer & Muller-Spahn, 2000).
Lansuase functions.
Impairments in AD have been shown in verbal fluency and in particular in category 
fluency. The latter is particularly sensitive to deficits in AD patients and demonstrates
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the fact that impairments in semantic memory may be an early feature of AD 
(Monsch, Bondi, Butters, Salmon, Katzman & Thai, 1992). Naming of objects has 
also been found to be impaired on the Boston Naming Test and this has been useful in 
diagnosing AD (Cahn et al, 1995). Whilst language comprehension and reading has 
been shown to be impaired in those with AD, it is still possible to predict premorbid 
functioning using the NART-R as decline as measured by the actual scores in minimal 
(Rosenstein, 1998).
The structure and content of speech whilst becoming impaired in dementia, remains 
intact in depression. However, this may not aid the early differential diagnosis as 
language function is usually one o f the last functions to be affected (Lezak, 1995).
Executive Functionins.
People with AD have been reported to be impaired on tests that are sensitive to 
executive functions. Perseveration errors are frequent on the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test and fewer categories are obtained (Bondi, Monsch, Butters, Salmon & Paulsen,
1993) which suggests that those with AD have difficulties with problem solving and 
cognitive flexibility. However, other studies have reported that some executive 
functions are spared in AD (Elliott, 1998). Inconclusive findings mean that this 
particular cognitive function is not useful in differential diagnosis.
Cortical Versus Subcortical Deficits.
One of the most promising lines of investigation has attempted to differentiate 
depression with cognitive impairment form AD using a pattern of deficit seen in 
cortical versus subcortical dementias.
Studies have recently begun to consider the similarities of individuals with DSD with 
the deficits seen in the subcortical dementias. Like subcortical dementias, they do not 
differ from normal controls on tests of language, delayed word recognition, 
visuospatial function tests and ideomotor praxis (King & Caine, 1990) unlike people 
with AD. Crowe and Hoogengraad (2000) reported results from their study to suggest 
that AD and depression with cognitive deficits could be distinguished on this basis
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with the AD group showing significantly more deficits on tests of language, praxis 
and gnosis. -
Neuroimaging and Neurology.
Neuritic plaques and neurofibrillary tangles diagnose Alzheimer's disease and have 
been found to a greater extent in people who had Alzheimer's disease and major 
depression than in those without depression. This suggests that neuropathology is 
likely to play a role in some of the depressive symptoms in AD (Emery & Oxman, 
1992). Whilst it can diagnose AD, the changes are not specific to AD and it therefore 
cannot categorically differentiate DSD from AD even post mortem.
CT scanning has been used to attempt to try and differentiate AD from depressed 
individuals. Whilst some studies have reported normal scans in depressed patients 
(Wells, 1979) recent studies suggest that the scans of depressed patients may be more 
similar to AD patients than to elderly controls (Pearlson et al., 1989). Scans showing 
brain structure therefore point to overlap between AD and depression in the elderly 
rather than being particularly useful for differentiating between them (Emery & 
Oxman, 1992).
Magnetic resonance imaging studies have shown that elderly patients with depression 
are likely to show organic damage, namely white matter lesions (Baldwin, Benbow, 
Marriott & Tomensen, 1993). However, temporal lobe atrophy has been shown to 
have good discriminative ability between patients with AD and patients with 
depression with and without associated cognitive impairment (O'Brien, Desmond, 
Ames, Schweitzer, Tuckwell & Tress, 1994). This study examined severely depressed 
and mildly impaired AD patients and its usefulness in differential diagnosis is 
therefore extremely important.
Studies looking at the functions of the brain using scans have shown that some people 
with depression have abnormal blood flow in their frontal cortex (George, Ketter & 
Post, 1993). This accounts for some of the findings of impairment in executive 
functioning and may also account for some of the difficulties noted in memory tasks 
which are effortful (Elliott, 1998). PET scans have also shown that patients with
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dementia show glucose hypomètabolism in temperoparietal regions which does not 
occur in patients with depression (Small et al. 1989).
Conclusions.
The main difficulties in distinguishing depression from dementia are the symptom 
overlap, the lack o f a biological marker and the fact that depression may be a 
prodromal symptom of dementia. The similarities and overlaps in the data obtained 
between groups means that differential diagnosis remains difficult.
It is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from the data reviewed here because of 
the inconsistencies between the studies in terms of the diagnostic criteria and 
assessment tools used to define the disorders. Some of the samples have included 
people who are only mildly depressed or have differentiated groups of patients with 
moderate to severe AD, when the major difficulty in this differential diagnosis occurs 
with mildly demented and severely depressed individuals (Lachner & Engel, 1994). 
Other methodological limitations of studies include the use of retrospective design and 
the reliance of medical notes for a diagnosis of depression (Devanand et ah, 1996).
A diagnosis of AD can only be made post- mortem and the dementia syndrome of 
depression is diagnosed retrospectively if cognitive deficits abate following 
antidepressant treatment. It is possible that cross sectional studies may not be 
comparing the groups that they believe they are, particularly because the misdiagnosis 
rates that have already been reported. If depression is a prodromal sign of AD, 
cognitive tests may be picking up the very early signs of dementia rather than the 
deficits associated with depression. It has also been suggested that early mild 
dementia cannot be reliably diagnosed using any clinical methods currently available 
(Rosenman, 1991).
A new scale is being developed which has good preliminary results in accurately 
differentiating "pseudodementia" from dementia (Yousef, Ryan, Lambert, Pitt & 
Kellett, 1998). The authors suggest that the contradictions in the literature are as a 
result of the lack of diagnostic criteria for "pseudodementia". The scale draws together
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a number of aspects that have been shown to be useful in differential diagnosis, such 
as visuospatial ability, clinical history and insight.
Another promising avenue o f enquiry involves combining test results rather than 
looking at the diagnostic power of each one individually. By combining tests of 
language, praxis, calculation, memory and abstraction, good discriminative power was 
achieved (Chaves & Izquierdo, 1992).
Considering all o f the evidence presented, it is clear that any attempt at differential 
diagnosis should involve a comprehensive clinical interview, neurological 
investigations and neuropsychological testing. None o f the currently available aids to 
diagnosis are conclusive and diagnosis must therefore be made on a balance of 
probability.
Difficulties of diagnosis, particularly between Alzheimer's disease and depressed 
individuals with severe cognitive impairment remain. Whilst some o f the tools 
mentioned in this paper can hint at a likely diagnosis, it has been suggested that only 
time and re-examination will clarify the picture (Lezak, 1995).
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Discuss the concept of Borderline Personality Disorder and critically evaluate the 
theoretical underpinnings and evidence for efficacy of the treatments for this Disorder.
Introduction.
This essay will discuss some of the theories that have been proposed to explain 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) as well as some of the interventions that have 
been developed in the light of these theories. The focus will be on Dialectical 
Behaviour Therapy and pharmacological treatments since these are the areas in which 
most research has been conducted. Prior to this, it is important to discuss some of the 
diagnostic and conceptual difficulties and their implications for research and 
intervention. Is BPD a discrete disorder or is it, as some authors would suggest a 
broad category of personality disturbance, which overlaps to a large extent with other 
diagnoses or personality disorders?
Concept and Diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder.
Diagnosis.
Historically, borderline personality disorder was seen to lie on the "border" o f 
schizophrenia, such that it was seen as a variant o f schizophrenia (McGlashan, 1983). 
It was also used to describe people with personality disorders who ranged in severity 
from the neurotic and psychotic (McGlashan, 1983).
The concept of Borderline Personality Disorder.
Diagnostic classifications in general have often generated a lot of controversy and 
debate, none more so than those that attempt to label personality disorders. The main 
criticisms that have been raised against the diagnosis of personality disorders are; the 
lack of consistency in their diagnosis, their overlap with other disorders, the fact that 
many different personality disorders may be present in the same individual at the same 
time and their instability over time (Tyrer, 1992). Due to these concerns, different 
authors have advocated a different approach to the classification of personality. Tyrer 
(1992) suggests that the presence of more than one personality disorder in the same 
individual should not be described as being a "comorbid" presentation, because it is 
more likely to reflect the fact that the diagnostic criteria overlap to such a great extent.
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Tyrer (1992) advocates the use o f a broader classification system in v^hich the 
personality disorders are grouped into a) the erratic/ dramatic cluster, b) odd eccentric 
cluster and c) anxious/ fearful cluster. He argues that the disorders within each of the 
clusters are not sufficiently clinically distinct to warrant separate classifications. 
Borderline personality disorder would fall within the erratic dramatic cluster. Tyrer 
(1992) suggests that the "flamboyant" group is separate from the other clusters in 
terms of dangerousness and in the less favourable response to treatment, particularly 
in the short- term.
Other authors have attempted to break down the broad classification of BPD in order 
to provide clearer definitions, also relating them to prognosis and amenability to 
treatment. For example, Kemberg (1967) defined subtypes of BPD including infantile, 
narcissistic, hypomanie, and paranoid, suggesting that the latter two tended to respond 
unfavourably to psychoanalytic psychotherapy, whereas the former two had a better 
prognosis with such treatments. Classifications such as this would appear to be more 
clinically useful in terms of choice of intervention, than classification systems that 
serve to describe personality disorders in broad terms. A follow-up study o f BPD 
patients in New York found that those with antisocial traits who were 
characterologically hostile had poorer prognosis in terms of social and occupational 
fimctioning (Stone, 1994). These antisocial traits were more common amongst the 
male borderline patients (Stone, 1994).
The current diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder from the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (4^  ^Edition, DSMIV) can be 
found in the following table (APA, 1994).
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Diagnostic Criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder. From DSMIV CAPA. 1994). 
Pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self- image and affect 
and impulsivity. Begins in early adulthood and is characterised by five or more of the 
following:
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.
2. Pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships - alternate between 
idealization and devaluation.
3. Unstable self- image or sense o f self.
4. Impulsivity in two potentially self-damaging areas (e.g. gambling, substance 
abuse)
5. Recurrent suicidal behaviour or threats, or self- mutilation.
6. Affective instability due to marked reactivity of mood.
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness.
8. Inappropriate, intense or inability to control anger.
9. Transient, stress related paranoid ideation or dissociative symptoms.
Prevalence.
It has been estimated that BPD occurs in about 2% of the general population, 10% of 
psychiatric outpatients and about 20% of psychiatric inpatients (APA, 1994). It is one 
of the most diagnosed personality disorders in both inpatient and outpatient settings 
(Widiger & Trull, 1993) with between 30% and 60% of people diagnosed with 
personality disorders, having BPD (APA, 1994). About 75% of those diagnosed with 
BPD are females (APA, 1994).
Comorbiditv with Other Disorders.
Studies have reported high percentages of BPD patients who have comorbid disorders 
with a diagnosis of pure BPD being rare (Trull, Sher, Minks-Brown, Durbin & Burr, 
2000). In one such study, 91% of the BPD patients had an additional diagnosis and 
42% had two or more (Fryer, Frances, Sullivan, Hurt & Clarkin, 1988). Their control 
group of patients with other personality disorders revealed a similar level of 
comorbidity and highlights the overlapping nature o f many of the diagnostic criteria 
between personality disorders and Axis I disorders (Fryer et al. 1988).
05
Comorbiditv with Affective disorders.
The Fryer et al study (1988), like others (e.g. Akiskal, 1981), found an association 
between all groups of personality disorders and affective disorders. It has been 
suggested that those with comorbid Axis I diagnoses have a more negative prognosis 
(Shea, Widiger & Klein, 1992). Support for this idea also comes from a study looking 
at the association between personality disorder and neurotic disorder. O f their sample 
o f people with either generalised anxiety, panic disorder or dysthymic disorder, 36% 
had a personality disorder. Those patients with a personality disorder had more severe 
symptoms of affective disorder than those without a personality disorder diagnosis 
(Tyrer, Seivewright, Ferguson, Murphy, Darling, Brothwell, Kingdon & Johnson, 
1990). They also found that personality disorder was more commonly found amongst 
the group with dysthymic disorder and that when they co-occurred, the individual 
showed a poorer response to treatment (Tyrer et al. 1990).
Depression and BPD are closely linked, with a high percentage of people with BPD 
displaying depressive features (Gunderson & Phillips, 1991). Pope and colleagues 
reported that 48% of their sample with BPD also met the criteria for affective disorder 
according to DSM-III (Pope, Jonas, Hudson, Cohen & Gunderson, 1983). However, 
research suggests that this relationship is non-specific and that whilst the two 
disorders co-exist, they are otherwise not related (Gunderson & Phillips, 1991). They 
further argue that it is more likely to be impulse regulation that is primary in BPD 
rather than affective dysregulation (Gunderson & Phillips, 1991). More recent 
research has suggested that depressive features in BPD are qualitatively different from 
those in depressed patients without BPD. De Bonis and colleagues compared views of 
the self and others o f depressed subjects with and without BPD. Their BPD 
participants had more negative views about the self in conjunction with both positive 
and negative views about others (De Bonis, De Boeck, Lida-Pulik, Hourtane & Feline, 
1998). Their findings were consistent with models of BPD that serve to explain the 
difficulties in interpersonal relationships, with individuals with BPD showing marked 
shifts in their attitudes towards others (de Bonis et ah, 1998).
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Comorbiditv with Substance Usé Disorders.
Unsurprisingly, patients with BPD often have a concurrent diagnosis of Substance 
use. Almost 60% of patients with personality disorders in one study had a substance 
use disorder, with BPD being significantly associated with current substance use. The 
study found that patients with a personality disorder as well as a substance use 
disorder were more globally impaired, though the presence o f a comorbid personality 
disorder diagnosis did not effect the chronicity of the substance use (Skodol, Oldham 
& Gallaher, 1999). The reason for this high rate of comorbidity probably relates to the 
connection between substance use and anxiety disorders and with disorders concerned 
with impulsivity (Skodol et ah, 1999). The fact that substance use can be used as one 
o f the criteria for the diagnosis of BPD is another example of the overlap in diagnostic 
criteria between disorders. One study has shown that if  substance abuse was 
disregarded, a large proportion of the BPD sample subsequently failed to meet the 
diagnostic criteria for BPD (Dulit, Fyer, Haas, Sullivan & Frances, 1990). The 
relationship between substance use and BPD is further complicated by the fact that 
impulsivity and emotional lability can be caused by the substance use itself because it 
can result in a decrease in serotonin functioning (Trull et ah, 2000). It has also been 
suggested that people with BPD who have emotional problems may use substances in 
an attempt to self-medicate and to cope with feelings of abandonment (Dulit et ah 
1990).
Comorbiditv with other Personalitv disorders.
Those patients who fulfil the criteria for BPD often meet criteria for another 
personality disorder, again adding weight to the argument that rather than being a 
separate diagnostic category, BPD represents a diverse group of patients with a wide 
range of personality dysfunction, as proposed by Kemberg (1967). In one study, 82% 
of an outpatient sample diagnosed with BPD met the criteria for an additional 
personality disorder (Numberg, Raskin, Levine, Pollack, Siegel & Prince, 1991). The 
authors found that BPD was not associated with any one of the other personality 
disorders in particular, suggesting that BPD represents a general category of 
personality dysfunction having blurred boundaries with other axis II disorders 
(Numberg et ah, 1991).
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Suicide in BPD.
Completed suicide occurs in between 8 and 10% of people diagnosed with BPD. Self- 
mutilation and suicide threats are very common (APA, 1994). The risk of suicide in 
patients with BPD is greater than that which would be accounted for by the coexisting 
Axis I disorders alone, for example the risks associated with depression and substance 
use (Brodsky, Malone, Ellis, Dulit & Mann, 1997).
Prognosis.
Follow-up studies have sought to establish the long-term prognosis of borderline 
personality disorder as well as to determine which factors appear to predict outcome. 
Some long -term studies have suggested that the impact of BPD on everyday 
functioning lessens with time, so that by the time they reach the age o f forty or fifty 
years old, those who had previously received a diagnosis of BPD were able to 
function normally (Paris, Brown & Nowlis, 1987; McGlashan, 1986). Whilst some 
improvements in everyday functioning was seen, Paris et al. reported that between 
25% and 50% of their sample continued to meet the criteria for diagnosis of BPD after 
fifteen years. In a more recent seven -year follow-up study, roughly half o f the sample 
initially meeting criteria for BPD no longer met criteria, whilst the other half were 
reported to show persistent BPD. The persistent group had more co-existing 
personality disorders than the recovered group (Links, Heslegrave & van Reekum,
1998). In another study, 80% of people with persistent BPD met a diagnosis for 
another personality disorder on follow-up, the most common additional diagnosis 
being histrionic personality disorder (Pope, Jonas, Hudson, Cohen & Gunderson, 
1983). The findings from the Links et al study (1998) suggest a greater severity of 
personality disturbance in general is associated with a poorer prognosis. Those with 
persistent BPD at follow-up, were significantly more likely to meet criteria for an 
additional personality disorder diagnosis than did those whose BPD had remitted, with 
avoidant and self-defeating being the most common (Links et ah, 1998). The presence 
of an additional diagnosis at follow-up was predicted by more "paranoid" features at 
the initial assessment, for example, being distrustful and suspicious. The presence o f a 
coexisting personality disorder at initial assessment did not in itself predict the same 
presentation of coexisting psychopathology at follow-up (Links et ah, 1998). The 
study also suggested that initial assessment levels of severity predicted persistent
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levels of BPD psychopathology at follow-up. However, the poor prognosis seen in 
half of the patients with BPD was tempered by the finding that half of their subjects 
no longer met criteria for BPD at follow-up (Links et ah, 1998). This latter finding 
suggests that BPD is not a stable personality description but is rather a description o f 
behaviours that may change over time.
Aetiology and Theories of the Development of BPD.
Familv Studies.
There appears to be a familial link to the disorder, with people with first degree 
relatives who had BPD being five times more likely to receive this diagnosis than the 
general population (APA, 1994). Family studies have also consistently found a higher 
rate of affective disorders and substance use disorders in the families of people with 
BPD (e.g. Links, Steiner, Offord & Eppel, 1988).
Psvchoanalvtic Theories.
The majority o f psychoanalytic theories of BPD are concerned with child 
development. Kohut (1984) described a model of "trauma -arrest" which has been 
expanded to explain the development of BPD. The model suggests that unempathic 
responses from others at an early age results in an arrested development at a primitive 
level where the individual uses primitive se lf  object relationships in order to achieve 
"self-cohesion". Self-cohesion would usually occur through interaction with an 
empathie caring mother. The BPD adult therefore uses, for example, grandiosity and 
rage to achieve "self-cohesion" and to protect self-esteem. It has also been suggested 
that children from such deprived backgrounds are not able to develop a complete 
sense of self and this results in the subjective feeling of emptiness within the adult 
with BPD (Kohut, 1984).
Kemberg's model (1976) emphasises the inevitability of psychic conflict in early 
development, which produces anxiety, guilt and shame. He also highlights the 
importance of intense destructive and aggressive impulses present in people with 
BPD. Kemberg suggested that people with BPD use primitive defences in an attempt 
to separate images o f the self and others that contradict each other in order to protect
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positive images of the self from being overwhelmed by negative ones. He suggests 
that the person with BPD is in an unresolved state of conflict and that this results in 
conflicts within the transference within therapy. These conflicts should be interpreted 
in therapy (Kemberg, 1976).
Another psychoanalytic theory describes the child's perception o f the. world and the 
caregiver as hostile. In order to protect the self from this harsh reality the child inhibits 
their capacity to think about the mental states of other people. This leaves the child 
and later the adult with a vulnerability to experiencing psychic conflict (Higgitt & 
Fonagy, 1993). A lack of this "theory o f mind" means that psychotherapy with 
individuals with BPD is very difficult since it requires an ability to understand the 
feelings and thoughts of others (Higgitt & Fonagy, 1993).
Mahler and colleagues (Mahler, Pine & Bergmann, 1975) observed the interactions 
between mothers and their toddlers (aged between 18 and 24 months). They noticed 
that for the inajority of interactions, toddlers were able to explore their environments, 
returning to their mothers when they needed comfort and reassurance. They suggested 
that at this critical period o f personality development, toddlers learned’ object 
constancy and the capacity for ambivalence. Those toddlers whose mothers interacted 
with them in a hostile or withdrawn way, alternated between being clingy and 
withdrawn. Mahler et al. (1975) suggested that the toddlers were acting like people 
with BPD and suggested that such interactions could lead to the development o f this 
personality disorder. These children were not however followed-up, which does not 
allow this theory to be tested. Caution should also be expressed as to the extent to 
which child and adult behaviour can be compared.
Trauma and abuse.
Physical and sexual abuse histories have commonly been found in patients diagnosed 
with BPD, though it is the higher rates of sexual abuse that differentiate this group o f 
patients from people with other personality disorders or from those suffering with 
depression (Zanami & Frankenburg, 1997). In one study, 91% of patients with BPD 
reported having been abused in childhood and 92% reported having been neglected 
(Zanami, Williams, Lewis, Reich, Soledad, Marino, Levin, Yong & Frankenburg,
110
1997). Whilst the experience o f childhood sexual abuse appears to be important in the 
development of BPD, it is not its cause, since not all people with BPD have suffered 
sexual abuse (Paris, 1997). Rather it has been suggested that features associated with 
abuse (denying the person's thoughts or feelings, withdrawing from them emotionally 
and treating them inconsistently) are risk factors for developing BPD (Zanami et al. 
1997). Some of the features of BPD, for example mistrust and dissociation, may occur 
following trauma (Trull et ah, 2000) and have been suggested to be the person's way 
of adapting to and coping with abusive experiences (Perry & Herman, 1993).
The limitations of studies looking at childhood trauma are predominantly concerned 
with their retrospective nature. However, this does not detract from the consistent 
reports that BPD is associated with a history of abuse, neglect, parental marital 
discord and the absence of a supportive and caring relationship (Berelowitz & 
Tamopolsky, 1993).
A biopsychosocial model has been proposed that suggests that brain development is 
dismpted in people with BPD due to adverse developmental circumstances, for 
example trauma. These circumstances mean that neural networks, which connect the 
prefrontal cortex, do not mature since their development depends on experience 
(Meares, Stevenson & Gordon, 1999). The authors suggest that given the right 
circumstances, maturation can take place at a later date and the associated symptoms 
could therefore be considered to be reversible (Meares et al. 1999).
Neurological and Neuronsvchological Theories.
Borderline personality disorder criteria stress the importance of impulsivity (APA,
1994). It is not surprising therefore that people with BPD have been shown to score 
highly on measures designed to assess this (Ball, Tennen, Poling, Kranzler & 
Rousaville, 1997). Impulsivity has been described as a drive to obtain pleasure 
coupled with an inability to delay repetitive behaviours (Hollander & Rosen, 2000). 
Impulsivity has been shown to have a neurochemical basis with its link to reduced 
serotonergic functioning. Treatment with medications that increase this functioning 
have been shown to decrease the behaviours in BPD associated with impulsivity, for 
example aggression and suicide attempts (Figueroa & Silk, 1997).
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Impulsivity has also been linked with decreased frontal lobe activity (Hollander & 
Rosen, 2000). Magnetic Resonance Imaging studies have reported significantly 
smaller frontal lobes in patients with BPD when compared with controls (Lyoo, Han 
& Cho, 1998). This compares with functional studies of the brain using PET scans 
which have also shown there to be abnormalities in the frontal and in the, temporal 
lobes of the brain (De la Fuente, Goldman, Stanus, Vizuete, Morlan, Bobes & 
Mendelwicz, 1997). The glucose hypometabolism found in the study was similar to 
that which has been reported in PET studies of people with schizophrenia. De la 
Fuente et al. (1997) concluded that this could account for the reality distortion that can 
be experienced by people with BPD, particularly under times of stress.
Gender differences in the manifestation of impulsive behaviours would appear to 
reflect the differences found in the prevalence o f personality disorders. Women who 
are impulsive tend to display behaviours such as binge eating and self- harm (aspects 
o f BPD). Males are more likely to display impulsive behaviours such as intermittent 
explosive disorder, gambling and sexual addiction (Hollander, 1998) which, it could 
be argued, are more likely to be diagnosed as an anti-social personality disorder.
Electroencephalogram (EEG) studies have reported abnormal diffuse slow wave 
activity in people with BPD (De la Fuente, Tugendhaft & Mavroudakis, 1998). This is 
likely to reflect organic dysfunction. It has been suggested that people diagnosed with 
BPD may have a low threshold for arousal in the limbic system, which could account 
for the behavioural dyscontrol seen in this group (De la Fuente et ah, 1998).
Deficits have also been shown on neuropsychological tests that measure fronto- 
temporo lobe function (Swirsky-Sacchetti, Gorton, Samuel, Sobel, Genetta Wadley, & 
Burleigh, 1993).
Affective instability in BPD patients has been associated with neuroticism (Trull, 
1992) which has been linked to norepinephrine activity (Siever & Davis, 1991). To 
date, it is unclear whether these traits lead to BPD or whether they result from BPD 
(Trull et al. 2000).
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Neurobiology may be affected in people who have suffered trauma in childhood, 
producing noradrenergic hypersensitivity affecting the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal 
axis (Figueroa & Silk, 1997). This could explain the processes by which experience of 
childhood trauma could be a risk factor in the development of BPD and in subsequent 
behavioural disturbance.
Cognitive Theories.
Cognitive theories of personality disorders suggest that children and adults attempt to 
make sense of their worlds and the complexity of the information presented to them 
by developing schemas.. These schemas allow the child (or adult) to make sense of 
their circumstances and enable them to make judgements about how to react in a given 
situation. These schemas develop over time and may lie dormant until a threshold is 
reached in order for them to be activated. Once activated they influence how a person 
perceives their current situation. They contain beliefs that represent how a person 
views themselves, their world and other people. It has been suggested that people with 
personality disorders have rigid negative beliefs (for example that all people are 
untrustworthy) (Beck, 1996). It is plausible that early aversive experiences, such as 
the abusive histories, which the majority of people diagnosed with BPD describe, 
could result in the development of such schemas.
Beck (1996) has also suggested the importance of core beliefs about the self being 
pertinent to personality disorder. Core beliefs concerning helplessness and 
unlovability are hypothesised to be particularly important. Because these schemas 
would cause distress people with personality disorders may attempt to use strategies 
which serve to prevent these schemas being activated (Beck, 1996). Attempts to 
suppress the activation o f schemas containing core beliefs such as "I am vulnerable" 
may lead to the dysfunctional and disruptive behaviours seen in people with 
borderline personality disorder.
Beck (1990) suggested that standard cognitive therapy as developed for use with 
depression is not effective with personality disordered clients. However, whilst there 
have been few controlled trials looking at the efficacy of cognitive therapy with
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personality disorder, case studies suggest that it could be a useful approach with 
people with personality disorders, though it is likely to require lengthy intervention 
(Beck, 1996). The therapy aims to tackle the negative core beliefs by exploring how 
these may have developed and how they are activated. Attempts are also made in 
therapy to alter these dysfunctional beliefs.
Young (1994) has developed a schema focused approach to working with people with 
personality disorders. Schema focused therapy employs cognitive and behavioural 
techniques as well as interpersonal and experiential techniques, making more use of 
therapeutic relationship and emphasising affective experience. However, there have 
been no controlled trials looking at its efficacy compared with other forms of therapy, 
though clinical experience has suggested favourable results (McGinn & Young, 1996).
Treatm ent Studies.
Pharmacologv.
Some pharmacological treatments of people with Borderline personality disorder 
attempt to treat the characteristic impulsivity through the use o f serotonin agonists. 
Clinical trials have shown significant decreases in aggressive behaviour using 
serotonin agonists (Hollander & Rosen, 2000) and decreases in impulsive- aggressive 
behaviour when fluoxetine (an antidepressant) is used (Coccaro & Kavoussi, 1997). 
Impulsivity has been shown to be a stable trait in BPD and is an important predictive 
factor in the persistence of the disorder. Effective treatment o f impulsivity may 
therefore greatly impact on the course of BPD (Links, Heslegrave & van Reekum,
1999) and is likely to reduce a number of the seriously harmful acts (e.g. self-harm) 
displayed by people with BPD.
Antipsychotic medications such as Haloperidol have been shown to be effective in 
reducing depression, anxiety, anger, impulsiveness as well as paranoid ideation 
(Soloff, George, Nathan, Schulz, Ulrich & Perel, 1986).
Whilst pharmacotherapy with BPD patients appears to be useful, problems with 
compliance and abuse of the medications is common (Dimeff, McDavid & Linehan,
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1999). Dimeff et al. (1999) warn against giving "lethal drugs to lethal people" (p. 130) 
and suggest that whilst drug treatments appear to help some people, they are not the 
absolute answer to the treatment of BPD.
Psvchotherapv Interventions.
There have been few controlled studies looking at the outcome of psychotherapy for 
patients with BPD. Psychoanalytic therapy of BPD places a strong emphasis on the 
therapeutic alliance and on helping the patient to strengthen their ego. Twice weekly 
dynamic therapy over one year has been reported to be effective in an outpatient 
setting, with significant improvements being found in 30 of the 48 patients treated, 
with 30% of the patients no longer meeting criteria for diagnosis at follow-up 
(Stevenson & Meares, 1992). Good results have also been reported from inpatient 
units where patients took part in individual and group psychotherapy within a 
therapeutic community for between 6 to 12 months. Improvements were reported at 
two-year follow-up, particularly in terms of a reduction in suicidal behaviour (Tucker, 
Bauer, Wagner, Harlam & Sher, 1987).
Supportive psychotherapy, which aims to work towards clear goals, improving the 
person's adaptive functioning through an educative and supportive interpersonal 
relationship, has yielded favourable results in follow-up studies and benefits fi*om 
being less time intensive than analytic psychotherapy (Higgitt & Fonagy, 1993).
Group psychotherapy for patients with BPD has also been shown to be effective 
(Gunderson, 1984). Detailed analysis of the components which appear to be helpful 
for borderline patients are their development of self-understanding through the group 
process and the group's ability to soothe patients, whilst being able to contain their 
anger (Higgitt & Fonagy, 1993). It has been suggested that a combination o f group 
and individual therapy may work more effectively, by combining the value o f group 
processes and support with individual work based on a more individualised 
formulation (Higgitt & Fonagy, 1993).
The efficacy of group psychotherapy was reported in a treatment trial, which 
compared usual day hospital treatment with an extended group analytic therapy on
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discharge from the day hospital: The group of patients who received both types of 
therapy had better scores of global health and lower levels of symptoms than the 
control group (Wilberg, Friis, Karterud, Mehlum, Umes & Vaglum, 1998). The initial 
day hospital treatment targeted symptom reduction and engagement in therapy. The 
authors concluded that longer-term treatment is required when treating patients with 
BPD and whilst they are unlikely to be motivated in therapy that requires long periods 
of stay in hospital, they benefited from outpatient group therapy (Wilberg et ah, 
1998). The Cassel personality disorder study echoed these findings, suggesting that 
community based interventions in combination with inpatient hospitalisation was 
more effective in reducing symptom severity and increasing general health than a 
purely inpatient model of treatment (Chisea & Fonagy, 2000).
Cognitive analytic therapy (CAT) has also been demonstrated to have a relatively 
beneficial effect with patients with BPD in a relatively short period o f time (24 
sessions) with a low drop-out rate (Ryle & Golynkina, 2000). The authors compared 
the improved patients in their study with those who did not improve. The latter group 
had a greater severity of borderline features as well as histories o f self-harm, 
substance use and were more likely to be unemployed (Ryle & Golynkina, 2000). This 
would suggest that whilst CAT has some efficacy with less disturbed patients, more 
complex cases may still require longer- term treatments.
Dialectical Behaviour Therapv.
Dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT) is based on principles o f cognitive-behaviour 
therapy. It is a behaviourally orientated outpatient psychotherapy programme for 
people who are chronically suicidal with borderline personality disorder (Linehan, 
Armstrong, Suarez & Heard, 1991). It aims primarily to reduce parasuicide and life 
threatening behaviours. Its second aim is to decrease those behaviours that may 
interfere with therapy and its final aim is to reduce behaviours that interfere with the 
individual's quality of life (for example, lengthy hospitalisations). Linehan and 
colleagues reported a randomised control clinical trial comparing the efficacy of DBT 
with treatment as usual in the community. The DBT treatment took place over the 
course o f a year and included weekly group and individual therapy. The treatment is 
manualised and includes behavioural skills training, contingency management.
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cognitive modification and exposure to emotional cues (particularly when dealing 
with past trauma) (Linehan et ah, 1991). The intervention is conducted within a 
supportive, accepting and empathie milieu (Linehan et ah, 1991). The group therapy is 
skills based using psychoeducation to develop interpersonal skills, distress acceptance 
skills and emotion regulation skills. Individual therapy includes detailed behavioural 
analysis o f self-harming and . parasuicidal behaviour and the examination of more 
functional coping strategies (Linehan et ah, 1991).
The controlled trial reported DBT to be significantly more effective than the control 
treatment in reducing parasuicide behaviour frequency in the BPD patients as well as 
reducing the medical risk when it did occur. The dropout rate from therapy was also 
significantly lower in the DBT group. Regarding the aim to improve quality of life, 
the DBT group had significantly fewer days spent in inpatient units (Linehan et ah, 
1991). The groups did not differ after treatment on measures of depression, 
hopelessness, suicide ideation or reasons for living (Linehan et ah, 1991). The 
reduction in suicidal behaviour was therefore not related to changes in depression but 
may have been more o f a function of the skills training aspect o f the therapy, since 
this was the only aspect o f therapy that differed significantly from that offered to the 
control group. The results of a study comparing cognitive- behavioural intervention 
for depression with people with coexisting BPD showed superiority in terms o f 
effectiveness over interpersonal therapy (Shea, Pilkonis & Beckham, 1990) which 
may also be a function of the component o f CBT that involves developing new coping 
skills.
In a recent study, a three- month inpatient stay was added to the original manualised 
treatment package prior to commencing DBT. Follow-up results o f this study again 
showed a reduction in parasuicidal behaviour but in this study there were also 
decreases in symptoms of depression, dissociation, anxiety and stress (Bohus, Haaf, 
Stiglmayr, Pohl, Bohme & Linehan, 2000).
Whilst DBT was initially developed to tackle parasuicidal behaviours, Linehan 
suggests that it can also be used to tackle other dysfunctional behaviours, such as 
binge eating and substance abuse (Koemer & Linehan, 2000).
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There have been few controlled trials studying the effect of psychotherapy on patients 
with BPD. Dialectical behaviour therapy is the intervention that has received the most 
research into its effectiveness. However, this research is still in its infancy and it is not 
clear at present which particular components in DBT are important in producing 
change or whether the treatment gains are maintained at longer-term follow-up. 
Further randomised controlled trials are being conducted which are comparing the 
effectiveness of DBT against other forms of psychotherapy, (Koemer & Linehan, 
2000).
Conclusions.
Patients with BPD are a heterogeneous group whose main features, in common with 
many other disorders are impulsivity and instability. The diagnostic criteria overlap 
with other psychiatric disorders suggests that it should not be considered to be a 
completely separate entity. Not only does the comorbidity issue have implications for 
interventions and response to treatment, but it should also be carefully considered 
when groups of patients between research studies are being compared.
There is no doubt that patients diagnosed with BPD are severely functionally 
impaired, more so than people with other personality disorder diagnoses and they 
utilise a disproportionate amount of health care services (Hueston, Mainous & 
Schilling, 1996). Clinical trials to explore the efficacy of treatment packages are 
therefore important in terms of reducing health service expenditure.
There is still pessimism regarding the treatment o f people with borderline personality 
disorder. Whilst there does appear to be a group of less severely disturbed patients 
who can benefit from psychotherapy, this approach does not suit each individual. 
However, Higgitt and Fonagy (1993) suggest that not everyone with BPD will be 
suitable for therapy and "suitability (or otherwise) for treatment will most commonly 
become self-evident only after several months o f heartache, of struggling with 
negative therapeutic reaction, o f massive distress during breaks, of insistent demands 
for special treatment, o f severe resistances including the constant devaluation o f the 
therapist and periodic narcissistic rage, of serious self-destructive behaviours, non­
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adherence to medical recommendations, of suicidal gestures, and sometimes physical 
violence." (p.253).
From the above list it is evident that psychological intervention with patients with 
BPD is not for the faint-hearted. However, thanks to those who have struggled to 
engage people with BPD in therapy, effective methods for treating this severe disorder 
are being developed. The prognosis for patients with BPD seems therefore to be 
improving.
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Summary of Clinical Experience.
Adult Mental Health: Dates:14.10.98 - 2.4.99
Supervisor: Dr Metka Shawe- Taylor, Consultant Clinical Psychologist
Location: Clarendon House, Community Mental Health Team, Dorking, Surrey
Oaklands NHS Trust
Experience: Generic CMHT work, including depression, manic-depression, para-
suicide, generalised anxiety, health anxiety, panic disorder, social 
phobia, simple phobia, eating disorder, personality disorder and 
enduring mental health problems.
Majority of work was individual intervention. However, couple therapy 
was conducted for marital and sexual relationship difficulties. 
Community Forensic team - assessment and therapy - outpatient and 
inpatient.
Psychometric assessments: Supervisor observed administration o f WAIS-R.
Independent administration of Wide Ranging Achievement Test 
(WRAT), verbal fluency, NART and personality assessment.
Teaching: Devised and facilitated a workshop on CBT for anger management for
a Diploma course in CBT.
Research: Audit o f referrals to the mentally disordered offenders service. I set up
and entered this data onto a database, which could then be used by the 
team.
Meetings: Hospital ward rounds, team meetings and psychology meetings were
attended. Meetings were held with other team members to discuss their 
roles within the team. Visits to the drug and alcohol service, eating 
disorders service and psychotherapy services.
Main model: Cognitive Behaviour Therapy
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People with Learning Disabilities. Dates: 21.4.99 -1.10.99.
Supervisor: Allan Davis, Consultant Clinical Psychologist
Location: Archery House, Daitford, Thames Gateway NHS Trust
Experience: Core experience o f working with adults with a learning disability,
across the age ranges, degree, o f disability and type of presenting
problem common to this client group. Additional experience of 
working with people with additional physical handicaps, mental health 
problems and severe challenging behaviour.
Work was carried out within a range o f settings, including social 
services day care, health service day care, residential services and 
clients living independently.
Interventions included face to face interventions with clients as well as 
interventions with staff members.
Co - facilitated a group "This Is your Life" covering aspects such as, 
self esteem, emotional awareness and identity.
Functional analyses and observational assessments conducted.
Psychometric assessment: An assessment was carried out at a prison (WAIS-R).
BP VS, Dementia assessment and Wheelan and Speake used as part of 
ongoing work.
Teaching: Attended a workshop conducted by supervisor for parents of children
with challenging behaviour.
Informal teaching to staff members on the rationale for behavioural 
interventions.
Research: Observations o f staff and client interactions and engagement of clients
in purposeful activity or stereotyped behaviours - clinical audit.
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Meetings: Attendance at the multi-disciplinary team meetings and psychology
department meetings.
Main Model: Behaviour Therapy
Child and Family. Dates: 13.10.99- 24.03.99.
Supervisor: Dr Fiona John, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
Location: Department of Child and Family Psychological Medicine,. St Peter's
Hospital, Chertsey, Ashford and St Peters NHS Trust
Experience: Generic work including anxiety, soiling, sleep difficulties, tics,
dyspraxia, physical illness and specialist work in eating disorders, 
(Bulimia Nervosa). Individual and family work and co-working with 
other professionals. I was a member of the reflecting team in the family 
therapy clinic. I attended the case discussions and assessed clients as 
part of the eating disorders clinic.
Psychometric Assessment: WISCIII, WORD, Advanced Theory of mind tests, used
to assess possible Asperger's syndrome. Assessment o f child with 
foetal alcohol syndrome and possible ADHD.
Teaching: Seminar presented to the C&F department on childhood phobias and 
their treatment.
Psychometric test training and discussion - presentation of tests to other 
members of the psychology department.
Research: Research interviews with children with diabetes as part o f a larger
study.
Meetings: Child Special Interest Group - Childhood depression. Assessment and
therapeutic intervention.
Risk responsibility and collaboration: working systemically with 
family violence.
One -day workshop on working with traumatised children.
Attended seminar on Anorexia Nervosa.
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Attended training day on interventions with young sex offenders. 
Attended training day on clinical governance and the scientist 
practitioner model.
Team meetings, psychology meetings and psychotherapy supervision 
meetings were attended.
Main model: Systemic, social learning theory, psychodynamic, CBT and 
motivational enhancement.
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Older Adults. Dates: 13.04.00 - 29.09.00.
Supervisor: Dr Ian Kneebone, Consultant Clinical Psychologist
Location: Haslemere Hospital, Famham Hospital and Milford Hospital, Surrey
Hampshire Borders NHS Trust.
Experience: Clients with predominantly medical illness e.g. stroke. Many had either
pre-existing mental health needs or were experiencing difficulties 
triggered by their physical illness, e.g. Post-stroke depression. 
Assessments of dementia and work with a couple following the 
probable diagnosis. Therapy with a man with pre-existing psychosis 
who had suffered a stroke. Patients seen as inpatients, outpatients and 
day hospital patients. Also carried out interventions with people caring 
for people with dementia or post stroke.
Assessment of suicide risk.
Life review, bereavement, adjustment to physical disability
Work with the Alzheimer's disease society - devised and facilitated
reminiscence group.
Psychometric Assessment: CAMDEX, ME AMS, Basdec, Geriatric depression
scale, HAD S.
Assessment for dementia.
Teaching: Stroke information day for family and carers - I presented the
cognitive, emotional and behavioural changes following stroke. 
Presentation on a method of referral o f patients with medical problems 
to psychology services.
Presentation to psychology research group on PTSD.
Research: Researched literature on a decision making tool for referrals to
psychology for a presentation to the stroke unit team.
Meetings: Attended the "Stroke study day".
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Attended presentation on a risk assessment initiative.
Attended MDT meetings, psychology meetings and psychology 
research group meetings.
Main model: Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy.
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Specialist Placement - Neuropsychology: Dates: 11.10.00 -23.03.01
Supervisor: Dr Drew Alcott, Consultant Clinical Neuropsychologist
Placement Location: Woking Community Hospital, Boumewood Community , and 
Mental Health Trust and Unsted Park Rehabilitation Hospital, 
Godalming, Surrey.
Experience: Neuropsychological assessment and inteiwention with people with
acquired brain injury. Selection, administration and interpretation o f a 
wide range of neuropsychological tests. Knowledge gained of models 
of cognitive rehabilitation. Intervention with clients adjusting to the 
effects of a traumatic brain. Also intervention with PTSD and 
depression. Functional analysis of challenging behaviour. Work with 
rehabilitation staff on behavioural management o f inappropriate 
behaviour.
Psychometric Assessment: Wide range o f assessments used including WAIS-III,
AMIPB, verbal fluency, Hayling and Brixton, BADS, WCST, Trail 
making test, GET, Homophone meaning generation test.
Teaching: Informal teaching to staff on principles of behaviour management.
Presentation/ workshop on PTSD given to the University of the Third 
Age.
Research: Literature search on anger management and social skills groups
following brain injury for a new cognitive rehabilitation group.
Poster presented to Surrey Oaklands NHS Trust conference on major 
research project.
Meetings: Visits to other rehabilitation hospitals. Case reviews and MDT
meetings attended.
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Attended a CPD day in Forensic Neuropsychology.
Neuropsychology special interest group meetings.
Transforming personality - a 2- day workshop presented by Christine 
Padesky.
Main Model: Neuropsychology. CBT.
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Specialist Placem ent - Forensic: Dates: 04.04.01 - 21.09.01.
Supervisor: Dr Mary Hill, Consultant Neuropsychologist
Dr Estelle Moore, Consultant Clinical and Forensic Psychologist
Location: Broadmoor Hospital, West London Mental Health NHS Trust
Experience: Assessment and therapeutic intervention with patients within a special
hospital setting with mental illness and/or personality disorder. 
Cognitive assessments of patients at admission and as follow-up 
referrals.
Schema focused therapy with borderline personality disorder. 
Management of challenging behaviour.
Personality and Psychosexual assessments.
Admission assessment conducted.
Discussion about drugs and alcohol assessment.
Psychometric Assessment: Personality assessments including Millon, anger
assessments, offence related assessments.
Cognitive assessments, including, WAIS-III, WASI, AMIPB, WMS-r, 
Suggestibility scales, BADS, Hayling and Brixton, Complex Figure 
test, Stroop, Trail making test, SCOLP.
Teaching: Staff training o f principles of behavioural management.
Research: Administration of tests of executive functioning as part o f a research
project.
Meetings: Attended meeting o f neuropsychologists working within the special
hospitals. Visit to HMP Grendon.
Attended day workshop on suicide prevention.
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Attended ward rounds, community meetings, psychology department 
meetings, case presentations and the British Neuropsychology Society 
conference.
Main Model: Neuropsychology, CBT, Schema focused therapy. Narrative therapy.
Case Report Summary - Adult Mental Health.
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy For Depression.
Reason For Referral.
Miss S was a lady in her mid thirties, referred for individual therapy by a staff nurse in 
the local mental health resource centre. She had had a recent episode o f depression 
and had low self-confidence and complained of relationship difficulties. She had been 
started on Prozac by the time of her referral.
Assessment.
Presenting Problem.
Miss S stated that her problems began six weeks prior to the assessment following an 
argument with her boyfriend during which she had threatened to cut her wrists with a 
knife. She believed at the time that no one loved her and that people were talking 
about her. She thought that she had been feeling low for about four years following 
her parents’ divorce. She believed that her father blamed her for the break-up o f the 
marriage.
Expectations from Therapy.
Miss S wanted to gain an understanding of why she had become depressed and wished 
to become more assertive. She also wished to get the emotions "out of her system" 
since she had always tended to bottle up emotions.
Formulation.
Miss S's current difficulties were formulated within a cognitive behavioural theory o f 
depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). She had a negative view o f herself, a 
core belief being that she felt unworthy and that everything she did was wrong. She 
did not however feel hopeless about the future, which was important in terms of 
lowering her current risk of suicide. Cognitive distortions elicited were "all-or-nothing 
thinking", "jumping to conclusions" and "personalisation".
Intervention.
Individual sessions, including mid therapy and end of therapy reviews were 
undertaken. Strategies such as distraction, activity scheduling, diary keeping and 
monitoring and challenging o f negative automatic thoughts were used.
Outcome.
On measures o f anxiety and depression. Miss S was initially scoring in the sever 
range. By the end o f therapy the scores were not suggestive o f anxiety or depressive 
symptoms. Subjectively she felt more able to cope and felt that she had become more 
assertive.
Prognosis.
Miss S's progress was suggestive of a good prognosis and her gradual move from 
dependence on therapy to independence and increased self-confidence were also good 
signs.
Critique.
Longer-term work could have employed schema focused techniques in order to work 
on the core beliefs.
Reference.
Beck, A.T., Rush, A.J., Shaw, B.F. & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive Therapy o f  
Depression. The Guilford Press: New York.
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Case report summary - People with Learning Disabilities.
Behavioural Assessment in a Case o f Challenging Behaviour.
Reason for referral.
Mr S was referred by staff on the day unit that he attended for an assessment of his 
challenging behaviour. He had a severe learning disability and was not able to 
communicate verbally. He had also lost the sight in his left eye and had difficulties 
walking due to shortening of his Achilles tendons.
Assessment.
The behaviours causing concern were his se lf  injurious behaviour (including banging 
his head against hard objects) and physically aggressive behaviour (including 
scratching staff and clients).
An observational assessment was also carried out to obtain baseline data for the main 
types of behaviours that Mr S was exhibiting and the time o f day when they were 
occurring.
The observational assessment also provided an opportunity to gather information 
about potential reinforcers such as "toys" which were able to provide sensory 
stimulation.
A functional analysis o f the behaviour was conducted using the Motivation 
Assessment Scale. Sensory stimulation appeared to be the main function for the self- 
injurious behaviour. A detailed analysis o f the behaviour was performed using an 
ABC chart, to assess the antecedents and consequences of the challenging behaviours. 
This assessment suggested that the head hitting served to provide sensory stimulation 
as well as being an attempt to gain attention. The scratching behaviour appeared to 
serve a number of functions; being a sign that he wished an interaction to end, to 
communicate to staff that they had not done what he wanted them to do and/ or 
sensory stimulation.
Formulation.
Mr S was vulnerable to developing self-injurious behaviour because o f his severe 
learning disability, no expressive verbal communication, lack of sight in one eye.
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long-term institutional care and little individual attention or sensory stimulation. The 
challenging behaviours appeared to be precipitated by little sensory stimulation and 
little social interaction and were maintained by sensory stimulation and interaction 
with staff.
Intervention.
A plan for intervention was shared with the staff working on the unit and included 
management guidelines as well as plans for increasing the amount of sensory 
stimulation available to Mr S without him having to resort to hitting his head.
Prognosis.
Severe challenging behaviour tends to have a poor prognosis, especially if  it has been 
present for a number of years. However, given the enthusiasm and commitment of the 
staff working with Mr S and the possibility of increasing Mr S's access to the sensory 
stimulation equipment it may be possible to reduce the frequency of his challenging 
behaviour.
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Case Report Summary - Child and Family.
Cognitive-Behavioural Assessment and Intervention with a boy with "sickness 
phobia".
Reason For Referral.
Terry was referred to the Child and Family service by his GP. He suggested that Terry 
was suffering from a sickness phobia and that he would benefit from desensitisation.
Assessment of Presenting Problem.
The initial assessment sessions included Terry (aged 12), his parents and his two 
younger brothers. His mother described Terry's problem as a fear of being sick which 
occurred every day. This usually occurred at night prior to going to bed. The "phobia" 
appeared to have been precipitated by an illness, which the whole family had had. 
Terry had been at a friend's house when he had become unwell and vomited. All the 
way home from his friend's house he had been worried that he would vomit in the car. 
Following this episode Terry had worried about vomiting every day and felt that it 
was ruining his life. His fears caused him to constantly ask his brothers and his family 
if they felt sick. He worried that if  they were ill he would catch the "bug" and would 
then vomit. He had stopped staying at his friend's houses and would only go out with 
his friends if  his parents took him in the car. Terry's parents had been unable to go out 
as much because Terry would become hysterical as they were about to leave the 
house.
Terry was not depressed as measured on the Birleson depression scale but he had 
elevated scores on the Spence Children's anxiety scale in areas of separation anxiety, 
panic and physical injury fear. A visual analogue scale was used to assess his fear of 
being sick on a scale of 1 to 100.
Expectations from Therapv.
Terry's parents hoped that his anxiety would reduce so that he would not become 
hysterical every night. They also wanted to find a consistent way of managing Terry's 
anxiety. Terry wanted to be able to go to bed without worrying and not having to seek 
reassurance.
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Formulation. -
Terry and his parents had anxious temperaments and this is likely to have predisposed 
him to experiencing his current levels of anxiety. Terry's fears were probably triggered 
by the family illness but were also likely to have been influenced by the death o f his 
grandfather and the subsequent fears that harm would come to his parents. Factors 
maintaining the anxiety were the misinterpretation of symptoms of anxiety as being 
signs of illness, scanning his body for signs of illness and reassurance seeking. 
Protective factors included a caring, supportive and motivated family as well as 
Terry's sociable nature and sense of humour.
Intervention.
Individual and family sessions were conducted using a cognitive-behavioural yet child 
centred model. Psycho education about anxiety was conducted in one o f the family 
sessions. Terry kept diaries monitoring his symptoms and behaviours and negative 
thoughts were challenged in sessions. Terry also used distraction techniques at night 
such as playing his computer games. Visualisation was also used to help to externalise 
the problem and to help Terry to see that he could tackle and defeat the problem. 
Terry's parents discussed ways in which they could be more consistent in managing 
his behaviour and used rewards to reinforce Terry's ability to cope with his anxiety.
Outcome.
There had been a reduction in levels of anxiety as measured by the Spence anxiety 
scale and the visual analogue scales showed significant reductions in fear. Family 
members had noted a positive change in Terry's mood and his brothers noted how he 
no longer asked them if they felt ill.
Prognosis.
The prognosis was thought to be good, despite his probable genetic loading for 
experiencing anxiety. The intervention had included an educational component for the 
whole family and Terry had learned cognitive-behavioural techniques for managing 
his anxiety, which he would be able to use in the future if needed. Terry's sense of 
increased confidence and self-efficacy were also positive signs.
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Case Report Summary - Older Adults.
Cognitive-behavioural intervention with a man with medical illness and depressed 
mood.
Reason for Referral.
Mr E was a 70 year old man referred to the psychology department by his consultant 
physician. Staff involved in his rehabilitation following his stroke reported that despite 
having an ability to engage in activities, he was not achieving his optimal level of 
functioning. They believed that his wife was not allowing him to complete some tasks 
for himself, although he was able to, and that this was impeding his progress.
Assessment of Presenting Problem.
It transpired that Mr E had attempted to take his life relatively recently by taking an 
overdose of his painkillers. He was subsequently in contact with a CPN who visited 
him occasionally. Following a heart attack and triple bypass surgery, Mr E had 
suffered a stroke, he had also been recently diagnosed with very early stage 
Parkinson's disease. Despite his recent suicide attempt, a risk assessment had not been 
performed. This was therefore seen as being the immediate priority. There were 
thought to be a number of risk factors (his mild depression, previous attempt and 
physical illness) however there were also a number of protective factors (a supportive 
family and hope for the future). Suicide was not considered to be a current risk, 
however, the situation was monitored throughout the therapy.
Mr E described pain in his leg and shoulder which was causing him distress and this 
affected his ability to carry out activities.
Goals for therapy.
Mr and Mrs E both hoped that he would be able to take part in more activities around 
the house and be able to attend to his personal care as far as possible.
Formulation.
There were significant life events present prior to the development of the presenting 
problem. The low mood and functional impairment was triggered by his physical ill
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health. The pain that Mr E experienced was also a factor in precipitating his low 
mood. He had also recently ceased physiotherapy and this may have caused him to 
believe that there was no hope of improvement in his physical condition. Maintaining 
factors included Mrs E's overprotection o f her husband, driven in part by her guilt 
over his suicide attempt. Mr E's pain behaviour may also have helped to shape her 
behaviour towards him, thus reinforcing his behaviour. Protective factors included a 
supportive and caring relationship.
Intervention.
Information about pain and its relationship with cognitive, emotional and 
physiological variables was shared with the couple. Alternative ways o f coping with 
pain were explored such as encouraging a moderate amount of exercise and by 
learning autogenic relaxation techniques. Cognitive restructuring took place during 
therapy sessions, particularly regarding thoughts about his pain. Diaries monitoring 
his symptoms and activities were kept. Activity scheduling was used to increase the 
activities he was involved in as well as being behavioural experiments to challenge the 
thoughts that he would not be able to complete the tasks. Adaptive behaviours were 
reinforced by Mrs E.
Outcome.
By the end o f therapy, Mr E had managed to achieve a number of targets that he set 
for himself. His wife was less over-involved in his care, allowing him for example to 
dress himself and attend to his personal care as far as possible. This was despite his 
ratings of his pain being relatively constant throughout therapy.
Prognosis.
Mr E had been able to use the relaxation techniques as one means of gaining more 
control over his pain and his wife had been more able to allow her husband to 
complete tasks for himself. Mr E was likely to remain vulnerable to experiencing 
depression, especially if his health were to deteriorate further and continuing support 
was offered by the psychology service.
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Case report summary - Specialist placement in Neuropsychology.
Neuropsychological assessment of a young man with a severe traumatic brain injury.
Background to referral.
Mr P had been involved in a road traffic accident in which he had been a back-seat 
passenger. He was admitted to accident and emergency with a severe head injury. He 
was agitated and aggressive following his transfer from the Intensive Treatment Unit 
onto a general ward. A CT scan showed a small haemorrhage and contusion in the left 
frontal lobe. -
He was admitted to the rehabilitation unit and received a neuropsychological 
assessment as part of his treatment plan. Due to the nature^ of closed head injury, 
organic damage is likely to be widespread rather than focal. Whilst the CT scan 
showed damage to the frontal lobes further damage to other areas o f the brain could 
not be ruled out. The neuropsychological assessment was designed to examine a range 
of cognitive functions, not necessarily confined to those o f the frontal lobes. Areas of 
cognitive functioning, which possibly remained intact, were also important to assess, 
as these are important factors to be taken into account in rehabilitation.
Assessment.
A wide range of neuropsychological tests were used; the NART-r, WAIS-R, the Adult 
Memory and Information Processing Battery, Trail Making Test, Finger Tapping Test, 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test, Word Synonym Test, Modified Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test, Cognitive Estimation Test and the Behavioural Assessment o f the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome Battery. Overall the tests showed that he was within the 
average range of intellectual ability. He showed relative difficulties on tests of verbal 
learning, visual memory, verbal fluency and motor and information processing speed. 
He also showed evidence of impulsivity and distractibility. The Wimbledon Self- 
Report Scale (a measure of affect which has been widely used with brain injured 
patients) showed problems with low mood, irritability and anxiety.
147
Reassessment.
The neuropsychological assessment was conducted after four months of rehabilitation, 
just prior to discharge. Mr P had by this time returned to work but was noted to be 
quieter, lacking in confidence, initiative and motivation.
The majority o f the tests used in the initial assessment were used, with alternate forms 
utilised where available. Cognitive impairments were still evident, particularly in 
areas of attention, information processing and verbal memory. These deficits were 
consistent with the damage that he had sustained to the frontal lobes (attention, 
concentration, lack of motivation and irritability), to the fronto-temporal horns 
(memory) and with the diffuse damage (slowed information processing).
Prognosis.
Recovery from brain injury can take place over many years. Whilst therefore, there 
was scope for improvement, it was thought that he would not be able to perform to the 
level of ability that he had prior to the accident.
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Referrals to a community forensic mental health team: implications for clinical
resources.
Abstract.
Objective: To conduct an audit o f all of the referrals made to a Community Mentally 
Disordered Offenders Team (CMDOT) in 1998.
Setting and design: A comparison was made between those who were taken on to the 
CMDOT caseload and those who were not. It was hypothesised that those diagnosed 
by the team as having a personality disorder, particularly Psychopathic personality 
disorder, would not be taken on by the team, because of the issues surrounding the 
treatability of their disorder.
Main measures: Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist- Revised (PCL-R) was used as an 
experimental tool to ascertain the severity of the behavioural and personality 
disturbance for individuals who were taken on by the CMDOT for further assessment 
or treatment. The mean scores for the CMDOT sample on this measure were 
compared with some normative data provided for a prison sample and a forensic 
psychiatric outpatient sample.
Results: As would be expected, those who, after assessment, did not have a mental 
health problem were less likely to be taken on to the caseload than those who did have 
mental health problems. The PCL-R scores for the current sample were significantly 
lower than the norms for a prison population but were not significantly different from 
the norms for a forensic outpatient sample.
Conclusions: Those clients with a diagnosis of a personality disorder were no less 
likely to be offered treatment than clients with another diagnosis.
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Introduction.
Between 15% and 25% of offenders meet the criteria for psychopathy as specified by 
the Psychopathy Checklist (Revised) (Hare, Strachan & Forth, 1993) and it is often a 
recommendation from the courts that such offenders should receive treatment for their 
disorder (Beck & Freeman, 1990). However, the labels “psychopath” and “anti-social 
personality” carry with them the notion of untreatability (Dolan & Cold, 1993). Some 
authors have suggested that they should not be treated (Adshead, 1996) since they do 
not consider such individuals to be “ill”. However, if  offenders with such personalities 
are as prevalent as Hare et al. (1993) would suggest and no attempt is made to treat 
them then their cost to the criminal justice system and to society will remain high, due 
to the high risk of re-offending. Detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 allows 
for treatment that is “likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration o f the condition” 
(Department of Health, 1993). Treatment may therefore serve to prevent deterioration 
in functioning and this is worthwhile even if  the disorder cannot be ameliorated.
Various terms have been used to describe similar presentations of behaviour; however. 
Psychopathy, sociopathy, anti-social personality disorder and dyssocial personality 
disorder all have slightly different emphases in their defining criteria. Anti-social 
personality disorder emphasises criminal behaviour but does not include the affective 
and interpersonal components present in the criteria for psychopathy (Hare, Strachan 
& Forth, 1993). Hare and his colleagues argued against the usefulness of anti-social 
personality disorder since most criminals meet the criteria for classification by virtue 
o f their criminal behaviour alone (Hare et ah, 1993).
The aim of this study was to explore the prevalence o f “psychopathy” among those 
referred to the community team as well as trying to gauge the impact that they had on 
the resources o f the team. It was the opinion of some o f the team members that there 
was a high proportion of clients with personality disorder being referred to the team 
and that included among these was a high proportion of people with psychopathic 
personality disorder. It is well documented that there is an increased likelihood that 
psychopaths will be involved in criminal behaviour (e.g. Hare, McPherson & Forth,
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1988) and therefore the likelihood of them being referred to a community mental 
health team increases. The normative data in the PCL-R manual provides a 
comparison between the research scores and the scores o f a sample of prison inmates 
and forensic outpatients. The Psychopathy Checklist -  Revised was used in this study 
to provide an independent measure of psychopathy.
It is suggested that clients with this diagnosis will not be offered treatment by the team 
since clinical opinion suggests that these clients cannot be successfully treated. It has 
been suggested that the psychopath is difficult to treat because they lack the 
motivation to change since they are happy with themselves the way they are (Lykken, 
1995). Cleckley argued that since clinicians have been unsuccessful in treating 
“normal” offenders they are even less likely to succeed in treating psychopathic 
offenders (Cleckley, 1978). Although Cleckley’s view has been influential and has 
been supported by others (e.g. Grounds, 1987), recent authors have not been deterred 
by this pessimistic view and studies have provided conflicting evidence that offenders 
are amenable to treatment (Gendrau & Ross, 1979). Since Cleckley’s had been one of 
the main arguments against the treatment of psychopathic offenders, this opposing 
evidence should weaken the argument based on “anecdotal evidence” that 
psychopaths are untreatable (Blackburn, 1990).
Treatment of personality disorders in general and o f psychopathy in particular have 
focused on change rather than cure (Blackburn, 1989). Indeed, it has been suggested 
that the only treatment which has been shown to be effective for the anti-social 
offender is the management of their behaviour within a secure environment (Beck & 
Freeman, 1990). However, a review paper by Levine & Bomstein (1972) suggested 
that the vast majority of a sample o f 300 treatment outcome studies for individuals 
with psychopathic disorder were methodologically flawed. However, eight o f the 
remaining ten reported therapeutic effects on antisocial behaviour following treatment. 
The treatment of psychopathic personality disorder may therefore not be as futile as 
some clinicians would believe if treatment outcomes are evaluated using well 
designed studies.
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Hypotheses.
1. The referrals to the CMDOT service will display m o re . severe personality 
disturbance as measured by the PCL-R than the prison and outpatient normative 
samples.
2. Individuals with a diagnosis of personality disorder are less likely to be offered 
treatment than those with another diagnosis.
Methodology.
Design.
A comparison of normative data provided in the PCL-R Manual with the research 
scores in addition to an audit o f the referrals and of the community team resources 
used.
Participants.
All clients referred in 1998 were examined. If clients were referred more than once, 
data concerning the referral itself (e.g. the index offence, reason for referral, source 
and point of referral) were analysed as separate referrals. However, for the 
demographic characteristics of the individual (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, diagnosis 
and psychopathy score) the individual was only included once in the analysis.
Procedures.
Referrals made to the community forensic team during 1998 were identified. Data 
including age, gender, ethnicity, diagnosis, index offence, the referrer and the reason 
for referral was collected. Where applicable, the recommendations made by the team 
and the outcome of the assessment (for example if  clients were taken on for treatment) 
were also recorded. The involvement o f different professionals, particularly the 
Psychologist was recorded. In addition to the audit, the Psychopathy Checklist 
(Revised) was completed where possible, using information recorded in the case 
notes. Although the PCL-R is usually completed from the case notes and through a 
detailed interview. Hare suggests that it may be completed with only the case notes as 
a source of information. Data derived in this way is reliable (Wong, 1988). The scores 
obtained from this measure were used purely for research purposes and were not used
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as a clinical tool for diagnosis or decision making. The scores obtained were not 
therefore added to the client files. Each of the twenty items can be scored on a scale of 
0, 1 or 2 (scores for “no”, “maybe” and “yes” respectively) using the criteria in the 
manual. A score of 30 (and above) out of a total of 40 was used to define psychopathy 
(Hare, 1991). Up to five items could be omitted from the checklist if  the information 
was not available. The score was then pro-rated using the table in the manual. 
Although there is no normative data for females, the manual states that the checklist 
can be used with a female population (Hare, 1991) as it was in this study since the 
items contained in the checklist are not gender specific. Similarly, there is no 
normative data for Learning Disabled individuals. However, rather than diagnosing 
individuals with Psychopathy, the checklist was used to look at the severity of 
behaviours and personality traits associated with psychopathy, and its use with a 
different range o f clients is therefore justified. A copy of the Psychopathy Checklist 
can be found in appendix 5.
Statistical Analysis.
An a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Erdfelder, Paul & 
Buchner, 1996) in order to ascertain the number of scores (referrals) that would be 
needed to compare the research group with the normative samples in the PCL-R 
manual. For a two-tailed test, a sample size of 58 would be sufficient to find a 
difference between the groups, if  one was present.
The data was entered on to an SPSS database and descriptive statistics were obtained 
from the sample. An independent t-test was used to compare the psychopathy scores 
from this sample with the normative data for prison inmates and for forensic patients. 
Comparisons were also drawn between those clients who were taken on for treatment 
by the team and those who were not, looking at age, gender, index offence and 
diagnosis. Some of the statistical tests were calculated by hand and therefore the 
approximate p value derived from statistical tables is given.
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Results.
There were a total o f 104 individuals referred to the CMDO team in 1998. Six clients 
were referred to the CMDO team twice during 1998 and one client was referred three 
times. In total, 112 referrals made to the team.
Demographic Characteristics.
There were eighty-nine (86%) males and 15 (14%) females. The average age was 30.7 
years, ranging between 15 and 68 years.
The majority o f the referrals were white European, (93%). There were two Black 
Afro-Caribbean referrals and one referral from each of the following groups, dark 
European, Indian, Mixed race and Black African. Ethnicity data was missing for one 
of the referrals.
The Referrals.
Table 1. Numbers (and percentages) of Referrals made at pre-court, post-court and 
outpatient contact.
Point of Referral Number Percentage
Pre -  Court (police/ police screening) 71 63.4
Post- Court (e.g. for court report) 25 22.3
Outpatient (e.g. for advice or 2"  ^assessment) 10 8.9
Missing data 6 5.4
Table 2. Numbers (and percentages) of referrals grouped bv the source o f referral.
Source Number Percentage
Police 56 50.0
Courts 14 12.5
Probation Service 12 10.7
Psychiatrist/ CMHT 11 9.7
Solicitors 9 8.0
Prison 6 5.4
GP 1 0.9
Self referral 2 1.8
Missing information 1 0.9
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The majority of the police referrals were received through the police screening which 
involved a professional from the CMDOT attending the police station each weekday 
and assessing the files of all individuals brought into custody over the previous 24 
hours. Those already known to the CMDO team as well as others who were thought to 
have mental health needs were assessed in greater detail.
Table 3. Numbers (and percentages) of clients and the reason for referral.
Reason N um ber Percentage
Mental state Examination 74 66.0
Risk Assessment 10 8.9
Court Report 17 15.2
Fitness to plead/ be interviewed 3 2.7
Second assessment/ management advice 7 6.3
Missing data 1 1.8
The majority of the referrals were for a mental state examination and the risk 
associated with it (e.g. suicide risk whilst in police custody).
Index Offence.
The largest group of referrals had been arrested for criminal damage, (13.4%) 
followed by assault (9.8%) and sexual offences (8%) which included rape, indecent 
exposure and indecent assault. A table showing the full range of offences can be found 
in appendix I.
Diagnosis.
The diagnosis was not mentioned in the notes for three of the referrals. Forty-three 
(41%) of the referrals were given more than one diagnosis, for example personality 
disorder and psychosis. Where this was the case, they were included in the statistics 
for both of the classifications. There were seventeen referrals (16%) who were not 
thought to be suffering from a mental disorder. Thirty-six (35%) of the referrals were 
given a diagnosis of personality disorder, twenty-nine of whom (80.6%) had another 
diagnosis as well. The type of personality disorder was not often specified, but where
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it was specified, four referrals (4%) were diagnosed with Psychopathic personality 
disorder, and two (2%) with Borderline personality disorder. Thirty-three o f the 
referrals (32%) were diagnosed as suffering from depression, nine (9%) had a learning 
disability, sixteen (16%) were suffering from a psychosis (which included 
schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis) and thirty-nine (38%) abused drugs or 
alcohol. The diagnoses o f the referrals taken on by the team are in appendix 2.
Table 4. Numbers (and percentages) of referrals and the mental health 
recommendations made to the referrer.
Recommendation Number Percentage
No recommendation (e.g. assessed not to 
have mental illness)
38 33.9
Probation order with condition of treatment 15 13.4
Hospital Admission 8 7.1
Further Assessment Required 10 8.9
Outpatient Treatment 9 8.0
Court to deal as they see fit 8 7.1
Referred to another team 6 5.4
Advice about management 6 5.4
Other 3 2.7
Did not attend appointment 4 3.6
Missing data 5 4.5
For those referred to another team, one was referred to a child and adolescent 
psychiatry team, two were already known to another community team and three were 
referred to the drug and alcohol team. The recommendations were accepted in 96% of 
the referrals that requested a recommendation.
Were the referrals taken on for treatment?
All of the referrals made to the team were assessed. Fifty-eight (56%) of the referrals 
were only assessed and were not taken on for treatment by the team. The nurse 
specialist suggested that some of the reasons why referrals were not taken on to the 
caseload were because they were out of area”, or because no further action was 
required because the individuals were either not mentally ill or their illness was not 
implicated in their offending behaviour. Inappropriate referrals were not thought to be 
an issue because most of the referrals were screened at the police station by a member
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of the CMDOT, or they were referred by professionals who had considered the 
appropriateness of the referral. From the data collected, other reasons why referrals 
were not taken on by the team were; the individual was a missing patient from another 
hospital, four referrals required a Regional Secure Unit admission and two referrals 
were offered treatment but had no motivation to make use of the treatment offered.
Forty-six (44%) were added to the team’s caseload for further assessment or were 
offered treatment by the team, either voluntarily or as part o f a probation order. Three 
referrals with no mental health diagnoses were taken on. These three referrals were 
not currently suffering from a mental illness but had a psychiatric history and were 
known to the team.
A comparison was made between the characteristics of those who were taken on by 
the team and those who were not. There were no significant differences between the 
two groups apart from the expected result that individuals who were not given a 
mental health diagnosis were less likely to be taken on for treatment than those who 
had a mental health problem. Three out o f seventeen (17.6%) of the former and 42 out 
of eighty-four (50%) of the latter group were taken on by the team (%^  = 6.12, d f =1, 
p<0.05). An interesting result is that those who were diagnosed with a personality 
disorder were just as likely to be offered treatment as those with another diagnosis. 
Nineteen out of thirty-six (53%) in the former group and twenty-six of the sixty-five 
(40%) of the latter group were offered treatment, (%^  = 1.57, df=l, p= 0.25).
Professionals Involved.
With regard to the professionals involved in the case, an initial assessment at the 
police station, usually only involved a community nurse. If  a hospital admission was 
needed then the Consultant and the Social ’W^orker were involved. Where a court 
report was requested, the Consultant Psychiatrist or Senior Registrar also assessed the 
client. The Consultant Psychiatrist was involved in the assessment of nine referrals 
who were not taken on for treatment and thirteen of the cases that were taken on for 
treatment. This difference was not significant, (%^  = 1.83, d f =1, p= 0.25). If  the client 
was seen at the CMDOT base there was more likely to be a number o f different 
professionals present at the assessment. The majority of the referrals however, were
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seen at the police station during screening and therefore were likely only to be 
assessed by the community nurse in the first instance.
The Clinical Psychologist took on ten of the referrals for therapy. The mean PCL-R 
score for these clients was 10.9 compared to 15.1 for those who were not seen by the 
psychologist. This difference was not significant (t=1.2, df= 35, p=0.2).
Psychopathy Checklist -  Revised (PCL-RT
Case notes for referrals not taken on by the team were not available, only a screening 
form was available, which did not include all o f the necessary data needed to complete 
the Psychopathy Checklist. The checklist was therefore only completed on thirty- 
seven of the referrals taken on by the team and was used to obtain a measure o f the 
severity of personality and behavioural disturbance, rather than being used as a 
diagnostic tool. The PCL-R could not be completed for nine of the referrals, one o f the 
clients did not attend the assessment appointment and there was not enough 
information in the files to complete the checklist for the remainder.
The mean score for the sample was 14.06 (SD 8.94) and ranged from 0 to 32.9. The 
normative data in the PCL-R manual has a normal distribution, as do the scores for the 
CMDOT sample (see appendix 3). An independent t-test was used to compare the 
research data with a group of prison inmates (mean = 23.6 SD 7.9). The means o f the 
two samples were significantly different (t=7.2, d f = 1227, p=< 0.001). A significant 
difference was also found (t = 2.2, df = 99, p<0.05) when the scores were compared to 
the normative data for a group of male forensic psychiatric outpatients (mean = 17.7 
SD 7). The differences remained significant when the PCL-R scores for the females 
were excluded from the analysis and the new mean compared to the prison sample, 
(t=6.1, df = 1222, p= < 0.001). The current sample means were significantly lower 
than the prison and outpatient samples. However, with the female scores excluded, 
there was no significant difference when the sample mean was compared to the 
forensic outpatients (t= 1.6, df = 94, p>0.2).
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The mean PCL-R score for the males in the research sample was 14.9 (SD 9.12) and 
was 9.47 (SD 6.76) for the female sample. This difference was not significant, (t = 
1.40, df = 35, p= 0.2).
The PCL-R identified four (11%) of the referrals as being above the cut-off point for 
psychopathic personality disorder. Three of these had been diagnosed by the team as 
having a personality disorder (one being categorised specifically as psychopathic 
disorder). The other had not been given a mental health diagnosis. One o f the referrals 
assessed by the team as having psychopathic personality disorder did not quite fulfil 
the criteria using the checklist. The PCL-R did not misdiagnose those given a 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder.
A table comparing the Psychopathy scores of the learning disabled referrals and those 
without a learning disability can be found in appendix 4.
Impact on Resources.
Research has shown that the higher the Psychopathy score as measured by the PCL-R, 
the less motivated and the less improvement is shown in treatment (Ogloff, Wong & 
Greenwood, 1990). The higher the score therefore, the more untreatable the individual 
is thought to be. Five of the clients taken on by the team fell into Ogloff et al.’s (1990) 
criteria for those with high scores (i.e. had scores of 27 and above). These individuals 
are therefore likely to have a significant impact on the team’s resources, probably 
requiring longer- term intervention as a result o f their psychopathic personality traits 
and associated behaviours. Although the focus here is on those with personality 
disorders and in particular. Psychopathy, there are likely to be individuals who have a 
great impact on resources for other reasons, for example because of the severity of 
their psychosis.
Implications for the service.
The CMDOT is currently undergoing a change in its function, becoming an 
assessment and advisory service. The team will no longer carry a caseload and 
therefore clients will be directed towards the community teams or to the drug and 
alcohol service. A significant number of clients referred to the service in 1998 had a
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personality disorder and it is important to consider that, in the future these individuals 
will have to be supported by the community teams. Coupled with this is the cun'ent 
Home Office discussion document suggesting that people with severe personality 
disorders should receive treatment if  they present a risk to the public, even if  no 
offence has yet been committed. This will obviously have an impact on services that 
are already receiving a large number o f referrals of individuals with personality 
disorders. The PCL-R could be used as a screening tool in the service to identify those 
individuals who are likely to need a lot of therapeutic input. Such information about 
clients could ensure that adequate resources are available to deal with the extra work 
that such cases may bring.
Conclusions.
The fact that the male referrals to the CMDOT are similar in terms of Psychopathy 
scores to the forensic outpatient population norms is not surprising. The finding 
suggests that the team is not being over-burdened with referrals of Psychopathic 
clients and indeed the mean Psychopathy scores for the research sample are 
significantly lower than the norms provided for a prison population. It could be 
assumed therefore that those individuals who would score highly on the Psychopathy 
Checklist have already found their way into the Criminal Justice System and are not 
being monitored or offered treatment by community teams. It may also be that these 
individuals are being offered treatment within secure units rather than from 
community teams because of the risk that they pose to society.
However, there are still some on the team’s caseload who meet the criteria for 
Psychopathy and the issue of treatability is still relevant. Blackburn (1990) 
importantly notes that it is not just the “psychopathy” which may require treatment, 
but a great number of people with this disorder may also suffer from anxiety and 
depression or post-traumatic stress disorder and thus widely used and effective 
treatments could be employed on this population. It is therefore necessary to be clear 
about exactly what is considered to be “untreatable”. In the current study, 81% of 
those with a personality disorder also had another mental health diagnosis such as 
drug and alcohol abuse, depression, psychosis and learning disability, highlighting the 
complexity of the cases in question.
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The hypothesis that those with personality disorder would not be taken on by the team 
has not been upheld. Treatment was not refused on the basis of the individual being 
diagnosed with a personality disorder. This result shows a willingness of the team to 
offer treatment in difficult and complex cases (the individuals with personality 
disorder often having multiple diagnoses) with clients who it is thought are at best 
difficult and at worst impossible to treat.
Critique.
It would have been useful to have had a control group for the study with which to 
compare the psychopathy scores. Psychopathy scores could have been obtained for a 
sample of general psychiatric outpatients. However, due to the length of time needed 
to complete the Psychopathy Checklist for each individual, the study could not be 
extended to consider non- forensic samples. This aspect of the research is going to be 
pursued to include a sample of general psychiatric outpatients, by the Clinical 
Psychologist working in the team.
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Appendix 1. ’
Table 5. Frequencies and Percentages o f the Index Offences for the referrals.
Offence Frequency Percentage
Sex offence 9 9.7
Threats to kill 7 6.7
Affray 4 3.8
Assault 9 8.7
Possession of offensive weapon 4 3.8
Criminal damage 15 14.4
Robbery/ theft 9 8.7
Other (e.g. breach of probation 
order, drunk & disorderly)
21 20.2
Drink driving 7 6.7
Murder/ Manslaughter 2 1.9
Sex offence & assault 1 1.0
Threats to kill and affray 1 1.0
Assault & criminal damage 3 2.9
Assault & robbery 1 1.0
Criminal damage & theft 2 1.9
Criminal damage & arson 1 1.0
Sex offence, assault, robbery 1 1.0
Assault, criminal damage, robbery 1 1.0
Theft, arson & other 1 1.0
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Appendix 2.
Table 6. Frequencies and Percentages of the diagnoses of all of the refen-als who were 
taken on bv the team.
Diagnosis Frequency Percentage
No diagnosis 3 4.2
Neurosis & depression 17 23.6
Drug and alcohol abuse 19 26.4
Personality disorder 19 26.4
Learning disability 6 8.3
Psychosis 5 6.9
Manic depressive psychosis 2 2.8
Other (Paraphilia) 1 1.4
The diagnosis was not recorded in the file o f one of the referrals.
The above figures represent the frequencies of each of the diagnoses. Twenty- three of 
the referrals had multiple diagnoses and thus one person could be represented more 
than once in the above table.
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Appendix 3. 
Figure 1.
The distribution of PCL-R scores for the MDO 
sample.
The normal curve is also shown.
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Appendix 4.
Table 7. Mean Psychopathy scores for different groups of clients within the research 
sample.
learning disability N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation
PCL- R score no 32 0 32.9 13.884 9.081
yes 5 6.7 30.0 15.180 8.811
An independent samples T- test was used to compare these groups. There was no 
significant difference between the mean scores for those clients with learning 
disabilities and those without a learning disability, (t = -2.98, df = 35, p = 0.768).
One of the learning disabled clients reached the cut off score for psychopathy and 
three of the non- learning disabled sample reached the criteria.
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Understanding the role of beliefs in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. 
Introduction.
The importance of the role o f beliefs in both the onset and the maintenance of many 
psychological problems, for example depression, has long been known and studied. 
The basic tenet of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, one o f the more robust 
psychological therapies both in terms of theory and effectiveness, is the importance o f 
the beliefs that the individual holds about themselves and the situation they find 
themselves in. It is often by altering the beliefs that people hold about themselves, the 
world and their future, that therapeutic gains are made. Beck applied this theory 
predominantly to depressive disorders (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) but more 
recently the role of beliefs in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has been studied.
The review that follows will outline the role of beliefs in PTSD by examining some of 
the cognitive theories purported to explain this role, from some of the earliest theories, 
for example that of Janoff-Bulman (1989), to more comprehensive models that seek to 
explain further aspects of the disorder, for example the most recent model by Ehlers & 
Clark (2000).
What is PTSD?
Recent diagnostic classification systems classify PTSD as an anxiety disorder (DSM- 
IV, APA, 1994). DSM-IV criteria specify that to be diagnosed with PTSD the 
individual has to have experienced a traumatic event in which they "witnessed or were 
confronted by an event that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a 
threat to the physical integrity o f themselves or others". A "Traumatic event" was 
defined in DSM-III-R as being one which was outside the range o f normal human 
experience and that would be distressing to almost anyone (APA, 1987). This 
definition has been broadened in DSM-IV to include any event to which the individual 
responded with intense fear, helplessness or horror. The criteria include three classes 
of symptoms which include re-experiencing, (e.g. intrusive memories), numbing (e.g. 
reduced affect) and arousal (e.g. hypervigilance). The full criteria can be found in the 
following table.
173
Table 1. PTSD Criteria (Adapted from APA. 19941
A. Re-experiencing. One or more of the following;
1. Recurrent intrusive recollections of the event (images, thoughts or perceptions).
2. Recurrent distressing dreams of the event.
3. Acting or feeling as if  the traumatic event were recurring (e.g. sense of reliving the 
experience, illusions, hallucinations and dissociative flashback episodes).
4. Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues symbolizing 
or resembling part of the traumatic event.
5. Physiological reactivity on exposure to the above cues.
B. Avoidance or general numbing. Three or more of the following:
Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings or conversations associated with the trauma. 
Efforts to avoid activities places or people who arouse memories of the trauma. 
Inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma.
Diminished interest or participation in significant activities.
Feeling detached or estranged from others.
Restricted range of affect.
Sense of foreshortened future.
C. Arousal. Two or more o f the following:
1. Difficulty falling or staying asleep.
2. Irritability or outbursts of anger.
3. Difficulty concentrating.
4. Hypervigilance.
5. Exaggerated startle response.
Symptoms should have been present for at least one month.
The disturbance caused significant impairment or distress in social or occupational 
functioning.
Acute PTSD, symptom duration is less than three months.
Chronic PTSD, symptoms for more than three months.
Delayed onset PTSD, onset of symptoms occurs at least six months after the stressor.
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The Role of Beliefs in Post-tranm atic Stress Disorder.
Some of the theories that have been proposed to account for PTSD will be outlined 
below. The theories are comprehensive and cover many aspects o f the disorder, 
however the main focus of the discussion that follows will be on the role o f beliefs in 
both the onset and the maintenance of the disorder. Some of the first theories looked at 
the role of core beliefs/ schema in the development o f symptoms o f PTSD. Janoff- 
Bulman (1989) was one o f the first to explore this, and her ideas were drawn upon by 
Foa and colleagues, (Foa & Kozak, 1986 & Foa & Riggs, 1993), Brewin, Dalgleish 
and Joseph (1996) and by Ehlers & Clark (2000). Chemtob et al.'s Cognitive Action 
Theory (Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson & Twentyman, 1988) will only be 
mentioned briefly, because it does not discuss the specific role o f beliefs in PTSD.
This Cognitive Action theory explains the method by which mental structures process 
trauma information and the reasons why flashbacks and low level stimulus arousal 
occur in PTSD. The essence o f their model is that mental structures process 
information and lead to emotion, action, cognition and memory. If these structures do 
not function properly, or if  inappropriate structures are activated, psychological 
disorders result (Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson & Twentyman, 1988). They 
also incorporate confirmation biases into their model to account for persistence of 
PTSD, when individuals have a greater tendency to seek information that confirms 
expectations that they already hold (Evans, 1989).
Although this model accounts for some of the features o f PTSD, for example intrusive 
images, hyperalertness and avoidance, it pays little attention to the content o f the 
thoughts that people have. Subsequent research has shown this to be particularly 
important both in the onset and in the maintenance o f PTSD.
The importance of schemas and beliefs has been highlighted in a number o f other 
psychiatric disorders. The term schema refers to an abstract structure, stored in 
memory, which holds information about an individual's prior experiences, their 
beliefs, assumptions and expectations for the future. They guide what we take notice 
of in the world and effect how we make sense of new information (Fiske & Taylor, 
19&^ L
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1. Shattered Assumvtions. Janoff- Bulman (1989).
One o f the most influential theories o f the development o f PTSD is that of Janoff- 
Bulman (1989). This theory takes as its starting point the idea that people usually 
operate and live their lives according to the set of assumptions that they hold about 
themselves and the world (their schema). When a person suffers a traumatic 
experience, this will have a profound challenging effect on their schemas (Janoff- 
Bulman, 1989). They must either attempt to assimilate the new information about the 
world into their pre-existing schema or else they must change them. To change an 
existing schema would require a great cognitive shift, the schemas having been built 
up over many years experience. Individuals therefore attempt to preserve their existing 
schemas wherever possible (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Whilst Janoff-Bulman's ideas 
about schemas was not new, the theory was developed to include types of assumptions 
that were considered to be core elements of each person's conceptual system and 
which were particularly vulnerable following trauma. The three main core 
assumptions will be outlined below.
i. The Benevolence o f  the World. Janoff-Bulman argued that this set of 
assumptions would include the extent to which the world is viewed in positive 
or negative terms and incorporates both the benevolence of the impersonal 
world and the benevolence of people. This set of assumptions will govern 
whether a person, for example, believes that people are inherently good and 
kind or whether they see the world as being a place full o f misfortune.
ii. The Meaningfulness o f  the World. This concept contains three sets of ideas 
which can all be held by an individual to a greater or lesser extent. Following 
from the above assumption about the extent to which good or bad things occur, 
the first part of this assumption is concerned with how good and bad outcomes 
are distributed. Some people believe in a "just world" by which people "get 
what they deserve"; (i.e. that an individual's character/ personality will affect 
their vulnerability to receiving bad outcomes). The second aspect o f this 
assumption concerns an individual's beliefs about whether or not they can 
exert control over outcomes, for example, by being cautious. It has been 
suggested that people tend to overestimate the extent to which they can
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influence the world and underestimate their vulnerability to negative events 
(Taylor, 1983). A third aspect of this assumption concerns the concept of 
chance and the extent to which we can make sense of the things that happen to 
us. If an individual believes that no sense can be made of why certain things 
happen to certain people, they are unlikely to believe that an individual has the 
ability to control outcomes and may place more weight on a belief that we are 
all vulnerable.
iii. The Worthiness o f  the Self The third set of core assumptions which Janoff- 
Bulman (1989) considered to be important and likely to be affected by a 
traumatic experience is an individual's beliefs about themselves and the extent 
to which they think that they deserve good things to happen to them. If a 
person has a low sense of self worth they may not think that they deserve good 
things to happen to them, even if they think that the world is a benevolent 
place. Within this basic assumption are three dimensions. The first relates to 
whether the individual sees themselves as moral and worthy. The second 
involves whether the individual feels that they engage in behaviours that 
enable them to control outcomes. The third relates to whether the person views 
themselves as being a lucky person which relates to the randomness o f the 
world in distributing good and bad outcomes.
The assumptions that people hold change gradually over time through experience and 
interaction with the environment. It is proposed that change occurs if  the existing 
schema is confronted by information that is incongruent with that already held. In this 
way, the schema change is deliberate and gradual (Rothbart, 1981) and is a process of 
updating information. Another model for schema change was proposed by Rothbart, 
which suggests that a few pieces of highly salient incongruent information can have a 
catastrophic effect on the schema (1981).
Janoff-Bulman (1989) argues that traumatic events cannot be easily assimilated into 
individuals' pre-existing schema, neither can they be ignored. It is suggested that 
changing the assumptions at such a basic level could have a catastrophic effect on an 
individual's entire conceptual system. The more a person holds positive unchallenged
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beliefs, the greater the likelihood that the beliefs will be "shattered" following a 
traumatic experience (Janoff-Bulman, 1989).
Janoff-Bulman's model does not only attempt to address the method by which trauma 
affects beliefs but also attempts to explain some of the symptoms seen in PTSD in 
relation to the model. In order to cope with the traumatic event, the individual must 
attempt to integrate the new information and Janoff-Bulman suggests that some o f the 
behaviours that people engage in following a traumatic event are due to their attempts 
to do this. For example, blaming themselves may ease assimilation of the information. 
That is, if  the individual sees themselves as having done something to cause the event, 
or not done something to protect themselves, then they need not alter their schema 
about the controllability of events.
It has been argued that self-blame regarding behaviours may be a useful coping 
strategy in that it supposes that the event was due to behaviour that could be changed 
in the future, and increases the sense o f control that individuals have about their future 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1979). On the other hand, if  the individual blames themselves for the 
event because of a perceived fault in their character, it is less likely to be adaptive as 
personal characteristics are more stable and the individual is less able to modify their 
character.
Characterological self-blame has been shown to be associated with poor adjustment 
post-rape (Meyer & Taylor, 1986). In this study, poor adjustment was also seen in 
those people who blamed their behaviour for the trauma, contradicting Janoff- 
Bulman's assumption. In a study of women who had been the victims of marital 
violence, characterological self blame was shown to be associated with a history of 
repeated physical or sexual abuse in childhood, demonstrating the importance of 
taking into account a prior history of trauma (Andrews & Brewin, 1990).
Some people also report seeing the traumatic event in a positive light. In doing so they 
are able to keep their assumption that the world is benevolent since it has offered them 
an opportunity, through experiencing the trauma, to reorder their priorities or to 
increase their self-knowledge (Janoff-Bulman, 1989).
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Janoff-Bulman (1989) suggests that intrusive thoughts may be due to the cognitive 
attempt to integrate the information and denial may be an attempt to slow down the 
process of assimilation and schema modification so that the individual is not 
overwhelmed. This is similar to Horowitz's (1980) model of the "completion 
tendency" which suggests that people need to match new information with that 
already held in memory and revisions may need to be made until both sets of 
information tallies. In this model, memories o f the event are moved into active 
memory where it can be processed until "completion" occurs (Horowitz, 1980). 
Recurrent thoughts and images found in PTSD are a symptom of this processing. 
Denial is a response to an initial failure to "complete" and keeps memories in the 
unconscious. However, these memories break into the conscious and are experienced 
in the form of flashbacks. Denial aids assimilation of information by slowing 
integration, and is a defence mechanism to stop the individual being overwhelmed by 
traumatic material.
Horowitz's (1980) model accounts for the intrusive images suffered by people with 
PTSD but does not attempt to explain how delayed onset PTSD can occur, or why 
some people do not experience symptoms of PTSD following a traumatic event. 
Janoff-Bulman's (1989) model goes some way in explaining the latter, suggesting that 
it is the pre-existing assumptions that people hold that are important in determining 
how they may react to a traumatic event. It is these assumptions and beliefs that have 
become the focus of more recent cognitive models used to explain post-trauma 
reactions.
Whilst Janoff-Bulman's theory was able to distinguish between assault victims and 
non-victims, with assault victims holding more negative beliefs after the trauma 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1989), there was no evidence to suggest that previously held positive 
beliefs had been "shattered". Janoff-Bulman's study also did not distinguish between 
those who had developed PTSD and those who had not.
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2. Confirmation Hvvothesis. Foa & R isss (1993).
Janoff-Bulman (1989) did not explore the impact that a trauma could have on 
someone whose beliefs were negative prior to the trauma. The shattered assumptions 
model relies upon the shattering o f positive beliefs about the world and the self. It 
suggests that those people with the most positive beliefs prior to the event will be 
more likely to develop PTSD because they will be more vulnerable to "shattering". 
Recent research however has suggested that those who reported more negative beliefs 
prior to an assault suffered more severe and long-lasting PTSD subsequently 
(Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 1999).
Foa's model o f PTSD describes fear networks, stored in long-term memory which 
hold information about the traumatic event. It describes how successful recovery from 
symptoms of PTSD relies upon changing the meaning of the trauma memory through 
processing so that it fits with pre-existing schema. The model also suggests that 
previously held negative beliefs about the world and the self are particularly important 
in the development of PTSD because they can be confirmed by a traumatic 
experience.
The Foa and Riggs information processing model also accounts for other aspects of 
PTSD such as the disorganisation of the trauma memory, post-trauma fear responses, 
guilt and avoidance (1993). The disorganised memory is a result of the difficulty of 
processing information during periods of intense stress, i.e. after a traumatic event. 
Post-trauma fear responses within this model may be caused by the biases in 
information processing to attending to threat-relevant stimuli in the environment 
which will lead to a sense of current threat as well as a bias in the retrieval of the 
trauma memory in favour of the threat information. Avoidance is an attempt to protect 
the self from experiencing further distress caused by re-experiencing. The importance 
of guilt and other intense emotions in producing cognitive and behavioural avoidance 
is also explored. These emotions are held within the fear structure and may be 
experienced when the fear structure is activated (Foa & Riggs, 1993). The model will 
be outlined below in more detail with a focus on the importance of beliefs.
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Foa's earlier model in collaboration with Kozak (Foa & Kozak, 1986) was based upon 
the work of Lang, which described fear structures in memory that consisted of 
information about the feared situation, about verbal, physiological and behavioural 
responses and information about the meaning of these things (Lang, 1979). The fear 
structures were essential in providing information that would prompt the individual to 
escape or to avoid the feared stimulus. Foa & Kozak (1986) suggested that what was 
important in these fear structures was the information about danger that it contained. 
They cite evidence for this suggestion from examples of rape victims who were more 
likely to experience PTSD if  they perceived the situation as having been life 
threatening than those who did not. The "threat" information is incorporated into the 
memory and fear structure and symptoms of PTSD develop. Those who do not 
perceive the event as life-threatening do not form fear structures in this way, (Foa, 
Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989). Foa & Kozak (1986) suggest, like Janoff-Bulman 
(1989), that the traumatic event shatters previously held core assumptions about 
safety, and that once this occurs, the individual lives in a world that is uncontrollable 
and unpredictable, so that they are in a state of constant anxiety and fear. In order to 
break down the fear structure, it must first be activated and new information that 
contradicts the information in the memory must be received. The information 
structures present in PTSD are difficult to fully access because they usually contain a 
vast amount of elements and activation may be difficult due to cognitive avoidance 
(Foa & Kozak, 1986). They also suggest that the aspects of the fear structure that are 
more amenable to change are the cognitions pertaining to the physiological responses 
of fear rather than the cognitions which are concerned with the feared harm itself. 
They further suggest that chronic sufferers of PTSD are more likely to have fear 
structures that contain more elements (therefore less easily fully accessible) and to 
have more intense response elements than those with short-lived PTSD. Those with 
greater avoidance are also likely to have persistent symptoms as explained by 
Rachman's (1980) theory of emotional processing. Avoidance means that the 
information is not processed satisfactorily and therefore symptoms persist (Rachman, 
1980). In Foa & Kozak's (1986) model of PTSD, the meaning of the stimulus, the 
implication of threat and the responses to the stimuli are thought to be the most 
important factors in predicting both the onset and the persistence of PTSD.
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Foa and Riggs (1993) suggest that it is counterintuitive to believe that all people hold 
positive beliefs prior to a trauma, since many people live in circumstances which are 
likely to lead to negative schemas about the world being an unsafe and unpredictable 
place. They suggest that a traumatic event in such cases would be likely to confirm 
these negative beliefs. Some clinical evidence for their theory came from a case study 
of a rape victim whose traumatic experience had confirmed the beliefs that she held 
about herself and the world (McCann & Pearlman, 1990). The recent rape had 
confirmed beliefs that she held about herself deserving to be punished. A history of 
abuse by her father had led to the development of these beliefs. The fact that she 
developed PTSD suggests that whilst Janoff-Bulman's shattered assumptions 
hypothesis provides part of the answer for why PTSD occurs, it does not fully explain 
it. Instead it is argued that both shattering o f previously held rigid positive beliefs and 
confirmation of pre-trauma rigid negative beliefs can result in the experience of 
symptoms of PTSD. It is suggested by Foa and Riggs (1993) that the latter negative 
schemas may be stored in long term memory with a high threshold for activation and 
it is only when a traumatic event is experienced that they are primed. Due to their 
priming even subsequent low level, remotely connected stimuli can activate the 
schema and produce symptoms of PTSD. Foa and Riggs also propose that people with 
more flexible schemas both in terms of the world's dangerousness and their ability to 
cope in different situations are more likely to have a better prognosis following a 
traumatic experience (Foa & Riggs, 1993).
Some empirical support for the model, particularly in relation to schema, is provided 
in a study by Kushner and colleagues, (Kushner, Riggs, Foa & Miller, 1993). Victims 
of rape who believed that they were unable to control the extent to which negative 
events would happen in their lives, (i.e. perceiving the world as uncontrollable), were 
more likely to develop long-lasting and more severe PTSD. Guilt and shame about the 
event can also add support to negative beliefs that they were to blame for the event, 
increasing the likelihood of persistent symptoms (Foa & Riggs, 1993). Foa and 
colleagues (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin & Orsillo, 1999) have also recently developed 
and validated a questionnaire designed to investigate the importance of beliefs in 
PTSD. The three groups of statements considered to be important in PTSD were 
negative beliefs about the self, negative beliefs about the world and self blame. The
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Post-traumatic Cognitions Inventory was able to distinguish between those trauma 
victims who had developed PTSD and those who had not.
Foa's (1993) model does not fully explain why some people develop fear structures 
whilst others do not, neither is it comprehensive enough to explain the mechanisms by 
which processing and integration of the trauma memory occurs.
3. A Dual Reyresentation Theory o f  PTSD - Brewin, Dalsleish and Joseph (1996). 
This is a further cognitive model of PTSD focusing on the memory processes involved 
in PTSD as well as the importance of pre-existing beliefs and schemas. In doing so, it 
incorporates both Foa's (1993) work and that of Janoff-Bulman (1989) and attempts to 
produce a more comprehensive model.
The authors suggest that two types of memory can be produced after an individual has 
experienced a trauma, one that can be accessed verbally and another that is 
automatically accessed through specific environmental cues (Brewin, Dalgleish & 
Joseph, 1996). The verbally accessible memories are the individual's conscious 
experience of the traumatic event and can be deliberately retrieved and amended. The 
situationally accessible memories are not open to these processes. They suggest that 
during the traumatic event both types o f memories are encoded and that they can 
account for both the individual's ability to give a narrative of the event and also the 
occurrence of unwanted intrusive memories. They also discuss the importance o f the 
emotional processing of the information. The activation of the situationally accessible 
memories enables access to variables such as the sensory information encoded during 
the trauma, which will help enable processing to occur. The situationally accessible 
memories can be processed through the incorporation of non-threatening information 
into the structure through exposure to the cues that stimulate the fear response in the 
absence of threat. The verbally accessible memories need to be processed so that 
conflicting new and old information can be synthesised so that trauma information can 
be integrated with pre-existing beliefs and assumptions about the safety and 
controllability of the world. Cognitive restructuring produces amended information 
about the trauma which is less threatening and which causes less distress for the 
victim, for example by absolving themselves from blame or by restoring a sense of
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safety (Brewin et al., 1996). Once the emotional processing has occurred, activation of 
the new memories should lead to a reduction in PTSD symptoms.
Chronic PTSD can occur when the discrepancy between the pre-existing assumptions 
and the trauma information is too great. Chronic attempts to emotionally process this 
incompatible information leads to persistent symptoms. Persistence can also occur if 
the individual's avoidance of the distressing memories prevents the completion of 
emotional processing.
This model accounts for the different types o f memory processes evident in those who 
suffer from PTSD as well as the variety o f symptoms and emotions experienced. 
Emotions such as anger and guilt may develop as a result of the appraisals made by 
the individual following the trauma. These may interfere with emotional processing 
and increase the persistence o f symptoms (Riggs, Dancu, Gershuny, Greenberg & 
Foa, 1992). The theory also suggests that delayed onset PTSD can occur if  an 
individual attempts to avoid reminders of the event, thus delaying processing of the 
trauma information. However, since the information is still held in the situationally 
accessible memory, delayed symptoms could occur when the situationally relevant 
cues are encountered at a point in the future. The model also incorporates the 
importance of previously held beliefs and explains why some people suffer from 
persistent symptoms whereas others recover. However, it does not add to Horowitz's 
completion tendency hypothesis (1986) in its discussion of the role o f beliefs in 
PTSD.
4. A cosnitive Model o f  PTSD - Ehlers & Clark (2000).
Probably the most comprehensive o f all of the cognitive models of PTSD is that of 
Ehlers and Clark (2000). A diagramatical representation of the model adapted from 
Ehlers and Clark can be found in Figure 1. It focuses on the mechanisms by which 
PTSD becomes persistent and emphasises the importance of the negative appraisals 
that people make about the traumatic event and the sequelae of that event and the 
importance of the trauma memory itself. These two processes lead to the individual's 
sense of current threat, which can directly produce feelings of anxiety, intrusions and 
other behavioural and cognitive responses such as avoidance. The strategies used to
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try and reduce anxiety in the short-term do not allow change to occur in the appraisals, 
and increase the likelihood of persistent symptoms.
Figure 1. A cognitive model of PTSD - Ehlers & Clark.
Characteristics o f  
trauma/ sequelae/ 
prior experiences/ 
beliefs/
coping/state o f  
individual
Cognitive 
processing 
during trauma
PERSISTENT PTSD
Nature o f  Trauma 
memory
Negative appraisal o f  trauma 
and/or its sequelae
Matching
trissers
Current Threat - 
Intrusions 
Arousal symptoms 
Strong emotions
Strategies intended to control threat/ symptoms
Ehlers and Clark (2000) argue that pre-existing beliefs make people vulnerable to 
developing PTSD though they are not sufficient in themselves to produce it. They 
interact with the cognitive processing which takes place during the trauma and 
influence the experience of the nature of the trauma memory, negative appraisals 
about the trauma or its sequelae, and the strategies which attempt to control PTSD
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symptoms. Post-trauma beliefs within this model are the key to understanding the 
onset and maintenance of the disorder and will be explained more fully later.
The negative appraisals in this model account for the reason why the individual 
experiences a sense o f current threat when in fact the traumatic event is in the past. 
For example, a person who believes that "nowhere is safe" will experience cunent 
tlireat.
The importance of cognitive processes during the trauma is also incorporated into the 
model. Mental defeat by the victim during a physical or sexual assault has been 
related to negative beliefs regarding the world, the self and the future. In a study by 
Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers (1997), victims who experienced mental defeat (feeling that 
they had no control over the situation) were more likely to have negative appraisals of 
themselves and their actions and of the reactions of others following the event. They 
were also more likely to have negative appraisals of their symptoms of PTSD than 
those who retained a sense o f control and who were involved in mental planning. 
Those who showed evidence of mental defeat are more likely to suffer from persistent 
symptoms of PTSD and are less likely to benefit from exposure treatment because 
repeated exposure will only serve to confirm the negative appraisals that they have 
made (Ehlers, Clark, Dunmore, Jay cox. Meadows & Foa, 1998).
The importance o f  Avpraisals within the Ehlers & Clark Model.
The authors argue that appraisals about the event and the inability to see that it was a 
time-limited event that took place in the past leads to persistent threat. The threat may 
either be centred on the dangerousness o f the world or may be an internal threat to the 
person's view of themself. The individual may also have distorted appraisals of 
traumatic events, overestimating the probability o f experiencing another trauma. They 
may also have negative appraisals of their behaviour during the traumatic event, 
which may have a lasting effect on how they view themselves.
Individuals can also negatively appraise the sequelae of the traumatic event in terms 
of their symptomatic response (e.g. nightmares and intrusions), their interpretation of 
the reactions of others and their beliefs about the effect that the trauma has had on
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their life. The importance of the idiosyncratic meaning of the intrusions and the 
subsequent cognitive strategies that are used to try and control them, has been 
demonstrated in a recent study by Steil and Ehlers (2000). Strategies of cognitive 
avoidance such as rumination and thought suppression result in the persistence of 
PTSD symptoms since they do not allow emotional processing to take place. Viewing 
post-trauma symptoms in a negative way, for example perceiving them as a sign that 
they have been permanently changed in some way by the trauma, may lead directly to 
feelings of anxiety or depression or efforts to try and suppress them. The Steil and 
Ehlers study showed that individual's negative appraisals of their symptoms resulted 
in more intrusion-related distress and cognitive avoidance was associated with greater 
PTSD severity (Steil & Ehlers, 2000).
Research concerning appraisals has also examined the appraisals that may be 
important in the onset of PTSD compared with those that are important in the 
maintenance of PTSD. Appraisals that were associated with both onset and 
maintenance of victims of assault were those relating to the trauma itself, for example 
mental defeat, mental confusion and the emotional response during the trauma, 
appraisals o f the trauma sequelae and the effect on global beliefs (e.g. the world is not 
safe, I cannot cope). A sense of detachment during the assault, failure to see positive 
responses in others following the trauma and mental undoing (mental attempts to alter 
the event by rumination) are related only to the onset of PTSD (Dunmore, Clark & 
Ehlers, 1999).
The model also accounts for the different emotional responses that can occur 
following a traumatic event. For example, anger can be due to appraisals o f unfairness 
that the event happened to them, fear may be caused by beliefs that the world is an 
unsafe place, guilt may be due to a perception that the event happened because of the 
way they acted and sadness may be caused by appraisals that the event has had a 
catastrophic effect on their life (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The appraisals of the trauma 
interact with the memory of the traumatic event in such a way that when the event is 
recalled, only the details of the event that are consistent with the appraisals are elicited 
from memory. This selective retrieval confirms the appraisals made and prevents 
cognitive change (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
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One of the strengths of this model is its emphasis on the idiosyncratic meaning o f the 
event for the individual, whereas previous models have made general statements about 
cognitions. It has also received empirical support. A prospective study by Dunmore, 
Clark and Ehlers (in press) with victims of assault investigated some of the cognitive 
factors suggested to be important in maintenance of PTSD within the Clark and Ehlers 
(2000) model. The importance o f the role of mental planning and defeat during the 
trauma, the appraisal o f the post-trauma sequelae, the dysfunctional use o f strategies 
used to attempt to control PTSD symptoms and the importance o f beliefs about the 
self and the world were supported by the research. The authors suggest that these 
factors lead to current threat, thus prolonging the symptoms of PTSD. Previously held 
negative beliefs about the world and the self were found in this study to be linked to 
persistent PTSD, supporting Foa and Riggs' confirmation hypothesis (1993). Dunmore 
et al. (in press) suggest that not only may the trauma confirm these previously held 
negative beliefs, but that the events after the trauma (e.g. the responses o f others and 
the PTSD symptoms) may further confirm the beliefs. Janoff-Bulman's (1989) 
shattering hypothesis was also confirmed to some extent by this study and highlights 
the importance of a model o f PTSD which is not too narrow in its focus, since the role 
of beliefs is not a straightforward one, and a number of processes appear to be at 
work.
Conclusions.
From the research literature, the most compelling evidence supports the theories 
regarding the importance of beliefs in both the onset and the maintenance o f PTSD. 
Contrary to the shattered assumption theory of Janoff-Bulman (1989), it appears that 
previously held negative beliefs may be more important than positive beliefs in the 
onset and maintenance o f PTSD. It may be possible that for certain types o f trauma, 
particular beliefs may be more relevant than others and it is also possible that this may 
be true for both the "shattering" hypothesis (Janoff-Bulman, 1989) and the 
"confirmation" hypothesis (Foa & Riggs, 1993).
Whilst the importance of these sets of beliefs has been studied in PTSD sufferers it is 
also possible that the beliefs are important in the onset and the maintenance o f other
psychological disorders such as depression. Since the identification of such beliefs 
may have implications for targets for belief change in cognitive therapy, it is 
obviously important to see whether there are beliefs that are common in other 
disorders. This would provide a useful avenue for further research, particularly given 
the high rates of traumatic experiences present in the histories of those presenting to 
psychiatric services with disorders other than PTSD.
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Abstract.
A comparison of the trauma-sensitive beliefs of trauma victims and non-victims and
Dsvchiatric controls.
Objective: This study aimed to compare the trauma sensitive beliefs of trauma 
victims, non-victims and psychiatric controls. The Post-Traumatic Cognitions 
Inventory was used to assess both pre-trauma and post-trauma beliefs.
Participants: Eighty-two participants were recruited and these were allocated into 
different groups according to the criteria on the Posttraumatic diagnostic scale. The 
groups comprised; Trauma no PTSD, Trauma persistent PTSD, Trauma recovered 
PTSD, a psychiatric control group and a community control group. The groups were 
compared on measures including beliefs, PTSD severity, anxiety and depression. 
Results: The persistent PTSD group had significantly more negative beliefs than all o f 
the groups apart from the psychiatric control group. These two groups did not differ on 
any of the measures other than the criteria for feeling helpless or terrified during the 
traumatic event or the threat o f injury, by which they were allocated into the separate 
groups. Pre-trauma beliefs were significantly more negative in these two groups than 
in the other groups.
Conclusions: The overlap between PTSD and other psychiatric problems such as 
depression is evident from these findings and the usefulness o f the PTCI in the 
assessment of disorders other than PTSD is suggested.
The results supports Foa & Riggs' confirmation hypothesis (1993) and other studies 
which have suggested the importance of previously held negative beliefs in the onset 
and maintenance of PTSD.
195
Introduction.
“Trauma” is a common word, both in lay usage and in the psychiatric literature. 
However, not all “traumas” would meet the diagnostic criteria for a “traumatic event”.
A "traumatic event" in diagnostic terms, as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) is 
"an event which caused actual or threatened death to a person, serious injury or a 
threat to the physical integrity of the self or to another". The event may have happened 
to the person or have been witnessed happening to another. Many events would meet 
this criteria, for example, serious road traffic accidents, being diagnosed with a 
terminal illness, military combat or assault. However, it is not sufficient in itself to 
have experienced or witnessed one of these traumatic events. The individual must 
have reacted to the event with intense fear or helplessness, (APA, 1994). People react 
to "traumatic events" in very different ways; an event that may fill one person with 
fear may not affect another in the same way.
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, as the name suggests, is a particular type o f reaction to 
the experience of a traumatic event. The symptoms of PTSD have been discussed 
elsewhere in this portfolio, so they will only be outlined here. The symptoms form 
three clusters: -
a. re-experiencing (e.g. flashbacks).
b. avoidance and numbing (e.g. trying not to think about the traumatic event).
c. arousal (e.g. hypervigilance).
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Trauma and Psychiatric Illness.
There appears to be a strong link between psychiatric illness and a history of trauma. 
Carmen and colleagues suggest that physical and sexual abuse are frequent 
experiences for many people, though studies have rarely looked at the effect that such 
experiences have on subsequent psychiatric illness (Carmen, Rieker & Mills, 1984). 
There is an underreporting of victimisation by psychiatric patients (Rosenfeld, 1979) 
and therapists rarely ask about histories of abuse. However, it appears that when it is 
actively enquired about, the numbers of patients reporting abuse is very high 
(Rosenfeld, 1979). In Carmen et al.'s study, the number of men and women in their 
inpatient sample who had experienced physical or sexual abuse approached 50%
(Hwwy
The difficulties faced by their sample following the abuse included anger management 
problems, low self-esteem and an inability to trust others. The female patients tended 
to present with depression, self-injury and suicide attempts and expressed feelings of 
worthlessness, shame and guilt. The male patients tended to have similar feelings of 
self-hate but expressed their anger towards other people (Carmen et ah, 1984). Bryer 
and colleagues investigated the relationship between childhood sexual and physical 
abuse and the severity of psychiatric illness. They suggested that a history o f abuse 
was a common feature among the female inpatients who were the most difficult to 
diagnose and to treat. Among their sample of female psychiatric inpatients, almost 
75% reported a history of physical or sexual abuse. Victims of abuse experienced 
long-standing consequences from their abuse and abuse was correlated with severity of 
illness. Their sample was more likely than non-abused controls to have psychotic
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symptoms, borderline personality disorder and suicidal ideation (Bryer, Nelson, Miller 
1987X
PTSD is another one of the reactions following the experience of a traumatic event. 
Furthermore, symptoms of depression and anxiety are often present in an individual 
who is also experiencing PTSD (Joseph, Brewin, Yule & Williams, 1993).
Davidson and Smith (1990) studied psychiatric outpatients and discovered that 81.5% 
of the sample reported having experienced at least one traumatic event, a fifth of 
whom met the criteria for either current symptoms of PTSD or had experienced PTSD 
in the past. Those with symptoms of PTSD when compared with those who had no 
symptoms had experienced their trauma at an earlier age, (below the age of 10) and 
had experienced more traumatic events. The study also enquired about reactions to the 
trauma. The PTSD symptom group reported feeling more frightened and thinking their 
life was in danger than those who did not have PTSD symptoms. The authors also 
suggested that, in their psychiatric sample, vulnerability to an initial trauma is greatest 
in early childhood and as a teenager than during other times of life. Symptoms may 
develop for the first time in a teenager who experienced a traumatic event as a child 
(Davidson & Smith, 1990). This may be due to the developmental tasks o f childhood 
(forming self-image and acquiring a sense o f safety) and adolescence (developing peer 
relationships and a sense of mastery). Since these two stages are very important in 
terms of development, a traumatic experience at either of these times is particularly 
significant (Davidson & Smith, 1990).
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Prevalence of PTSD in the general population.
The National comorbidity survey estimated the lifetime prevalence o f PTSD in the 
United States to be 7.8% (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes and Nelson, 1995) with 
the stimuli most likely to generate PTSD being combat exposure among men, and rape 
and sexual assault among women. Women were twice as likely as men to suffer from 
PTSD (Kessler et ah, 1995). A review by Yule, Williams and Joseph (1999) suggests 
that between 40% and 70% of the population will experience a traumatic event, with a 
lifetime prevalence of PTSD being between 4% and 12%. One particular study has 
estimated that the lifetime prevalence of traumatic events in the general population is 
39.1% and the prevalence of PTSD was 23.6% in those people exposed to these 
traumatic events (Breslau, Davis, Andreski & Peterson, 1991). The lifetime prevalence 
of PTSD in their urban sample of young adults was 9.2% (Breslau et ah, 1991). They 
also reported that about one third of people suffering from PTSD shortly after a trauma 
will have chronic symptoms lasting more than three months.
PTSD and Comorbiditv. ;
PTSD is often associated with another psychiatric disorder or with a history of 
psychiatric illness. In one study of combat veterans, 84% met the criteria for at least 
one other diagnosis, including alcohol/ drug dependence, depression or antisocial 
personality disorder (Sierles, Chen, McFarland & Taylor, 1983). In this study, the 
authors suggest that the diagnosis of PTSD could have been overlooked and the 
disorder misdiagnosed had the clinician not asked specifically about PTSD symptoms 
(Sierles et al., 1983). There have been few studies examining the prevalence o f pure 
depression or pure anger control problems following a traumatic experience. Helzer
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and colleagues reported that approximately 80% of their sample of people with PTSD 
had experienced other forms of psychiatric illness previously, compared to about 30% 
of their control group, (Helzer, Robins & McEvoy, 1987).
The following sections will discuss the mechanisms through which the experience o f a 
traumatic event can lead to psychological distress. In order to do this it is necessary to 
first explore the nature o f cognitive models of psychological disorder and the concept 
o f schemas.
Cognitive Models of Psvchological Disorder and Schemas.
Cognitive therapy is based upon the assumption that our thoughts (cognitions) are 
important in determining our behaviour and emotion. These thoughts are determined 
by our assumptions about the world, ourselves and others (Beck, Rush, Shaw & 
Emery, 1979). Beck's theory of depression, hypothesises three important components 
(Beck et ah, 1979):-
a. The cognitive triad, i.e. seeing the self in a negative light, viewing their 
experiences in a negative way and having a negative view of the future.
b. Schemas - These are beliefs which develop through life which help people to make 
sense of the world around them and are relatively stable. Therefore an individual 
will tend to view similar situations in similar ways.
c. Faulty information processing.
The first two factors are particularly important in the discussion about trauma and its 
effects. As with the idea of characterological self-blame and its association with poor
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adjustment post- rape (Meyer & Taylor, 1986), people suffering from depression, tend 
to categorise themselves as "losers" and as having negative stable personality 
characteristics (Beck et al., 1979). The schema theory suggests that some people will 
be more prone to developing depression than others, depending upon their life 
experiences and the way that this has influenced the development of their schemas. 
These schemas may be latent until activated by a trigger (Beck et al., 1979). Young 
(1994) describes schemas as being strong beliefs that a person holds about themselves, 
which are developed from an early age. The schemas are so strongly held that they are 
considered to be absolute truths (Young, 1994). Young describes "early maladaptive 
schemas" as being unconditional beliefs which a person holds which may be activated 
by environmental cues and which are highly linked with emotions (Young, 1994). 
They are maladaptive in the sense that they may directly cause psychological distress 
such as depression or may lead to dysfunctional ways of behaving, for example 
producing difficulties in interpersonal relationships (Young, 1994).
Padesky has written about the three main types of schemas which Beck suggested; 
schemas about the self, other people and the world (Padesky, 1994). Schemas are 
important because they maintain psychological and psychosocial difficulties. They 
influence the way in which people remember their experiences and determine which 
things they attend to in their environments (Padesky, 1994; Young, 1994).
Given the above discussion about schemas and the effect that they have on a person's 
way of thinking and their interaction with the world, it is possible to see the 
connection which they may have in not only the development of depression and
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anxiety but also to other psychological difficulties. It could be hypothesised that some 
individuals will be more likely to develop symptoms o f PTSD depending upon the 
schemas which they hold about themselves and the world, just as some people appear 
more likely to suffer from depression. People who develop and have persistent 
symptoms of PTSD may hold more negative schemas about the world, themselves and 
other people prior to a traumatic event and this will influence how they react to the 
event. In this way they may be predisposed to developing lasting symptoms. These 
schemas may be similar to those that predispose people to develop other disorders 
such as depression. Beck et al. (1979) suggested that depressive thinking is 
characterised by negative thoughts about the future, or by a sense of hopelessness. 
Feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness have also been described by people 
experiencing symptoms of PTSD (Joseph, Williams & Yule, 1993).
The schemas thought to be present in depression centre around feelings o f failure and 
personal loss whilst in anxiety they seem to involve threat and harm (Clark & Beck, 
1989). Research has attempted to explore the specificity of these schemas in these 
disorders. There appears to be more empirical support for the specificity o f loss and 
failure cognitions in depression rather than the cognitions of threat in anxiety (Clark & 
Beck, 1989; Ingram, 1990). A study by Riskind and colleagues looked at the causal 
explanations that depressed individuals used to explain difficult life events. They 
found that they were more likely to have thoughts characterised by feelings of 
helplessness (Riskind, Castellon & Beck, 1989). This study also showed that 
depressed individuals tended to attribute negative events to internal, stable and global 
causes which differed to the attributions o f people suffering from anxiety disorders
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(Riskind et al., 1989). These types of attributions were stated to be specific to 
depression rather than to psychopathology more generally, (Riskind et al., 1989). A 
study has shown that during the course of psychotherapy for depression, causal 
attributions move in the direction of greater control (Frith-Cozens & Brewin, 1988).
Some of the schemas mentioned as being important in depression and anxiety are 
likely to be important in PTSD and are assessed on the Post-Traumatic Cognitions 
Inventory (PTCI, Foa, Clark, Ehlers, Tolin & Orsillo, 1999) which was used in the 
present study and which will be discussed later. Cognitive models o f PTSD, for 
example that of Ehlers and Clark (2000), hypothesise that PTSD involves a sense o f 
current threat. Whilst the Ehlers and Clark model suggests that post-trauma beliefs are 
important in the onset and the maintenance of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), it is 
possible, in the light of schema theory, to suggest that a person's pre-existing schemas 
may predispose them to developing PTSD having experienced a traumatic event.
Cognitive Factors and PTSD.
Individuals react to traumatic experiences in different ways, some being more 
vulnerable and some being more resilient to the effects of trauma and subsequently to 
the potential development of PTSD (Yule, Williams & Joseph, 1999). This may be 
due to biological factors or to do with the individual's prior exposure to trauma (Yule 
et ah, 1999). The individual's personality may make them vulnerable to developing 
PTSD, can affect the way in which the symptoms of PTSD are expressed, or can be 
altered by the experience of a traumatic event and subsequent experiencing o f PTSD 
(Clark, Watson & Mineka, 1994). Personality variables such as beliefs, attitudes.
203
coping styles and mood may all effect an individual's reaction to trauma (Wilson, 
1994). Some of the theories, which have been used to explain the way in which PTSD 
and personality are related, have been described previously in this volume. Horowitz's 
model of processing traumatic information (1980) and Janoff-Bulman's (1989) 
"shattered assumptions" theory stress the importance of the individual's schematic 
representation of the world and the way in which this affects processing of 
information. This will therefore influence the development of PTSD. Personality 
variables also include neurophysiological aspects. Yehuda & McFarlane (1995) 
examined the importance of cortisol levels in the development of psychopathology. 
They suggested that whilst high levels of cortisol made people vulnerable to 
depression, low levels o f cortisol meant that individuals were more likely to develop 
PTSD (Yehuda & McFarlane, 1995).
Other variables which are related to the traumatic event itself have been linked to the 
development of PTSD. These include the degree of threat to life, severity and duration 
of the trauma, where the trauma occurred and its impact on society (Wilson, 1994). 
Whether the person receives social, emotional or financial support in the aftermath of 
the trauma can also mediate PTSD symptoms (Wilson, 1994).
Attribution theory suggests that people need to make sense of and explain events 
which happen to them, especially if  they are unexpected (Weiner, 1985). These causal 
attributions greatly affect the way in which an individual responds to an event 
(Brewin, 1988) and may explain why people can react very differently in their 
reactions to the same event (Joseph, Brewin, Yule & Williams, 1991). Joseph and his
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colleagues found that where the individuals held internal causal attributions for some 
negative aspects of the traumatic event, they were likely to have more severe 
symptoms of PTSD at a one-year follow up (Joseph, Brewin, Yule & Williams, 1993). 
Internal attributions for a negative event have also been linked to feelings o f shame. 
Shame and guilt are common factors in depression in adults (Joseph, Brewin, Yule & 
Williams, 1991).
Finding Meaning In Trauma.
People live their lives according to the schema they hold about the way the world and 
other people operate. The experience of a traumatic event may threaten to "shatter" 
these assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1985). In this event, an individual may try and 
make sense of the event so that it can perhaps be incorporated into the existing 
schemas (Janoff- Bulman & Wortman, 1977). It has often been suggested that one way 
to recover from trauma is to find meaning in it (e.g. Taylor, 1983). However, as has 
already been discussed, meaning in terms of an internal causal attribution will not help 
recovery, rather it appears to evoke feelings of guilt and shame, associated with 
depression and with more severe symptoms of PTSD. Silver and colleagues studied 
the search for finding a meaning in female survivors of father-daughter incest. This 
search for meaning is thought to be a "common and adaptive process" (Silver, Boon & 
Stones, 1983). People who are able to find meaning in trauma in terms of the 
opportunity for personal growth appear to recover more quickly (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, 
Tolin & Orsillo, 1999). The search for meaning can continue for many years following 
the event. In Silver et al.'s study, where the average length of time since the incest was 
20 years, more than 80% of their sample were still searching for meaning, which was
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described in this study as asking the question "why me?". Whilst the study found that 
the frequency of the incest and the occurrence of physical violence were not related to 
the search for meaning, the length o f time over which the incest occurred was 
positively correlated with the frequency of the search for meaning. The more active the 
search for meaning, the more recurrent, disruptive and intrusive were the ruminations 
(Silver et ah, 1983). They suggested that these ruminations were an attempt by their 
participants to make sense of their past experiences, by replaying and reviewing them 
(Silver et ah, 1983). Half of their participants said that they were unable to make any 
sense of their experience. However it was suggested by the authors that those who 
were able to find a meaning were able to effectively cope with their experience and 
suffered less psychological distress as a consequence (Silver et ah, 1983). They also 
suggested however, that whilst finding a meaning was helpful and provided some 
comfort, it did not prevent ruminations (Silver et al., 1983). It has also been suggested 
that the individual may have to come to the understanding that the event may have no 
meaning and is therefore unexplainable (Straker, 1971).
Traumatic events which occur in childhood may challenge schemas more easily and 
may be more easily integrated since the schemas are only just being established 
(Grinker & Spiegel, 1945, cited in Silver, Boon & Stones, 1983). However, 
experiences which are perceived as particularly unfair or unjust may be more difficult 
to integrate into existing schemas (Janoff-Bulman & Wortman, 1977).
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Beliefs.
The role of beliefs in PTSD has been mentioned previously in this portfolio. However, 
there may be certain beliefs that are more important than others in the development 
and maintenance of PTSD.
Janoff-Bulman describes these beliefs as being basic assumptions or schemas about 
the world and the self which have developed over the individual's lifetime (Janoff -  
Bulman, 1989). If the individual experiences a trauma, new information may be 
presented which is inconsistent with these beliefs. The new information cannot easily 
be assimilated into the pre-existing beliefs and they may therefore be shattered, 
causing psychological upheaval (Janoff-Bulman, 1989). It has been argued that 
shattering of beliefs concerned with personal invulnerability and self concept and the 
meaningfulness o f the world, are particularly important in PTSD (Janoff-Bulman, 
1985). Foa and Riggs (1993) developed this idea and suggested that there are two 
basic dysfunctional cognitions underlying PTSD: the world is completely dangerous 
and the self is totally incompetent. If an individual holds these types o f assumptions 
then they are more susceptible to developing PTSD since these beliefs may be 
confirmed by the traumatic experience.
A pilot study by Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers (1997) looked, amongst other things at the 
"global beliefs" which victims of assault discussed during interviews. They found that 
the assault had caused them to view themselves, other people and their future in a 
negative way. Dunmore, Clark an Ehlers (1999) then looked at both pre and post 
assault beliefs. They suggested that negative pre-trauma beliefs were associated with
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onset of and persistence of PTSD. Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers (in press) again looked at 
pre and post assault beliefs. Their sample of people who had experienced an assault 
were given a Trauma Sensitive Beliefs questionnaire and were asked to rate the extent 
to which they agreed with each belief after the assault. They were given another copy 
of the same questionnaire and asked to rate agreement in terms of the beliefs that they 
had held before the assault. Individuals with more severe PTSD held more negative 
beliefs before the assault. These findings suggest that pre-trauma negative beliefs are 
associated with a greater vulnerability to PTSD. Ali, Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers (in 
press) used a "Global Beliefs Questionnaire" to explore pre and post trauma beliefs. It 
compared a persistent PTSD group, a recovered PTSD group, a no PTSD group and a 
no trauma group. The persistent group held more negative beliefs following the assault 
than those who had recovered from PTSD. Those who did not experience PTSD 
following the trauma had the least negative beliefs after the assault. When compared 
to a group who had not experienced a trauma, the persistent group were shown to have 
more negative pre and post trauma beliefs. The persistent and recovered PTSD groups 
held more negative post assault beliefs than the never assaulted group (Ali et ah, in 
press).
Recently, a standardised measure, the Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI) 
has been developed to assess the trauma sensitive beliefs addressed in the Dunmore et 
al. study. This measure was developed and validated by Foa and colleagues (Foa, 
Ehlers, Clark, Tolin & Orsillo, 1999). It explores three groups o f beliefs, which are all 
thought to be affected by trauma; negative beliefs about the self, negative beliefs about 
the world and self-blame. Given the discussion earlier about the importance o f these
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types of beliefs in other psychiatric disorders, it seems likely that this inventory may 
also be useful in investigating disorders such as depression. Its use may be in 
identifying beliefs, which maintain the disorders, as well as trying to identify the types 
of beliefs, which may predispose the individual to suffer from psychological distress. 
However, the Foa et al. (1999) study did not use a psychiatric control group to 
ascertain whether the effects of these beliefs were confined to PTSD or whether they 
influenced other psychiatric disorders as well. The study by Ali & Dunmore (in press) 
used a questionnaire similar to the PTCI but also did not use a psychiatric control 
group. The current study attempts to address this omission. The term “trauma-sensitive 
beliefs” will be used in this study to describe the cognitions assessed by the PTCI. 
Higher scores on the PTCI indicate more negative beliefs and lower scores indicate 
more positive beliefs.
Summarv.
The concept of trauma and its relation to psychopathology and to PTSD have been 
discussed. Cognitive models of disorder and schema theories of PTSD help to explain 
the possible role of beliefs in the onset and the maintenance of the disorder. There is 
an overlap in terms of dysfunctional beliefs between PTSD and other disorders such as 
depression and anxiety. These will be commented upon further with regard to the aims 
of the present study.
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Aims.
The overall aim of this research is to investigate whether the beliefs which have been 
found to be associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following assault 
(e.g. Dunmore, Ehlers, & Clark, 1997 & 1999; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 
1999) and other traumatic events, are specific to PTSD, or are a feature of more 
general psychopathology. More specifically, the aim is to compare the beliefs of 
victims of trauma with the beliefs of individuals suffering from psychological 
problems who have not suffered a "traumatic event" and with the beliefs of people 
who have not suffered a "trauma" mid who are not experiencing psychological 
problems.
By clarifying the factors that make people more or less vulnerable to PTSD following 
traumatic events, more effective treatments can be designed to help people who are 
suffering from PTSD.
Hvpotheses.
Hypotheses about vost-trauma beliefs measured by the PTCI:
la. Participants with persistent PTSD will have higher scores on the PTCI than 
participants who have recovered from PTSD.
b. The persistent PTSD group will also have higher scores than those who did not 
develop PTSD.
c. The persistent PTSD group will have higher scores than the no-trauma group.
2. Participants with persistent PTSD will have higher scores on the PTCI than the 
psychiatric control group.
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3 a. The psychiatric controls will have higher scores on the PTCI than participants who 
did not develop PTSD. 
b. The psychiatric controls will have higher scores on the PTCI than those in the no­
trauma group.
Hvpotheses about vre-trauma beliefs measured by the PTCI 2:
4a. Participants with persistent PTSD will have higher scores on the pre-trauma PTCI 
measure than participants who suffered a trauma but who did not develop PTSD.
b. The persistent PTSD group will have higher scores than those in the no-trauma 
group.
5. Participants who suffered a trauma but did not develop PTSD will have lower 
scores on the PTCI than the no-trauma group.
In addition to these hypotheses, differences between the other groups will be explored. 
There is insufficient evidence in the literature, particularly with regard to the 
psychiatric control group, to make strong logical predictions about these differences at 
the present time.
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Method.
Procedures.
A summary of the procedures involved in the study are shown below and are 
elaborated on later.
1. Ethical approval was gained from the Surrey University Ethics Committee and the 
ethics committee covering the CMHTs (i.e. East Surrey Local Research Ethics 
Committee). Approval for the study to go ahead was also gained from the 
organisations from whom the participants would be recruited.
2. Questionnaire packs sent to potential participants (details of questionnaires can be 
found in table 2).
3. Returned questionnaires were scored and the participants were allocated to one of 
the groups (according to criteria outlined in table 2).
4. Data was entered onto an SPSS for Windows database.
5. Statistical analyses was performed.
Participants.
Three main groups were recruited for this postal questionnaire study. The ’’Trauma 
group” (n= 51) consisted of individuals who had suffered a traumatic event at least 
three months ago. Participants for the sample were recruited from a Victim Support 
Group. Questionnaire packs were sent out by the Victim Support staff, to people who 
had been referred to them since January 2000. The "event" described by the participant 
was only classified as a "traumatic event" if it met the criteria outlined on the 
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale by Foa (1995). The ’’community control group” (n 
= 22) were recruited from a number of sources, including staff working in a large retail
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store and from a University o f the Third Age group. The "psychiatric control group" 
(n= 9) were recruited from two community mental health teams (CMHTs). All 
referrals (other than those suffering from psychosis) to the clinical psychologists 
within these teams were sent the questionnaire packs by staff at the CMHT when they 
were sent their first appointment letter. This ensured that the beliefs which the study 
was interested in examining would not have begun to have been changed by the 
process of therapy.
Measures.
Table 1. Summarv of Measures Used.
1. Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale - (Foa et al., 1997) completed for the month after 
the trauma / most upsetting life experience and for the present time.
2. Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory - (Foa et al., 1999) completed for a time before 
the traumatic event/ most upsetting life event and for the present time.
3. Beck Depression Inventory - (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979)
4. State- Trait Anxiety Inventory - Form Y (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & 
Jacobs, 1983)
5. Demographic Question Sheet
6. Screening questionnaire (self report reason for referral to psychology) for the 
psychiatric controls
Posttraumatic Diasnostic Scale.
This scale is based upon the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4^ '^  Edition) and therefore provides a diagnosis o f PTSD which is consistent with the
2i;
DSM-IV criteria, (Foa, Cashman, Jaycox and Perry, 1997). This PDS self-report 
questionnaire also provides a measure of severity of PTSD symptoms. It has been 
shown to have good diagnostic agreement when compared with a clinical interview 
based diagnosis; Foa, et al. (1997) used the Structured Clinical Interview, (Spitzer, 
Williams, Gibbons & First, 1990, cited in Foa et al., 1997) as part of their validation 
study for the PDS. To meet criteria for PTSD, the person must have responded to the 
event with either helplessness or by feeling terrified. There must also have been a 
thi'eat to life either in reality or in feeling that they or someone else was in danger. The 
questionnaire contains statements referring to seventeen symptoms of PTSD which 
can be divided into 5 re-experiencing, 7 avoidance and 5 arousal symptoms. They 
must have experienced the symptom more than once over the past month to score. 
They need to have at least 1 re-experiencing, 3 avoidance and 2 arousal symptoms 
over the course of at least a month. They must also have impairment in at least one 
area of functioning (e.g. in relationships or at work). A copy of the PDS can be found 
in the appendix. A total severity score can be obtained by adding the scores for all of 
the seventeen symptom items. Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin and Orsillo (1999) suggest 
that a score of less than fifteen can be used to classify people with low symptom 
severity whilst a score of fifteen or more indicated at least moderate severity. A 
discriminant function analysis had been performed which suggested that a score o f at 
least fifteen provided the best prediction for a diagnosis of PTSD (Foa, 1998, cited in 
Foa et al., 1999). The PDS (Foa, 1995) has 49 items and has high internal consistency 
and test-retest reliability, (Foa, Cashman, Jaycox & Perry, 1997).
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Allocation into the Trauma Suh-^roups.
The "trauma" group was subdivided into participants with persistent PTSD, those who 
had recovered from PTSD and those who had never suffered PTSD. This subdivision 
was made on the basis of their scores on the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS, 
Foa, 1995). All of the participants within these groups had experienced a "traumatic 
event" as outlined in the first part of the PDS. The PDS was completed for the month 
following the traumatic event and for the previous month in the present time. On the 
basis of this, the participants could be allocated into one of the three "trauma" groups. 
In order to be diagnosed as experiencing PTSD they needed to have met the criteria 
outlined above. The PDS questionnaire after the initial event was used to ascertain 
whether or not the person had suffered PTSD symptoms and the PDS for the present 
time being used to see whether the person had recovered (i.e. no longer meeting the 
criteria on the PDS for the present time) or whether they had persistent symptoms of 
PTSD. Where the questionnaires suggested that the person had suffered from delayed 
onset PTSD and still had symptoms at the present time, they were allocated into the 
"persistent PTSD" group.
Allocation into the Psychiatric Control Group.
The "psychiatric control group" consisted of individuals presenting with 
psychological problems to Community Mental Health Teams who had not experienced 
a "trauma" in terms of the PDS criteria. However, participants from the psychiatric 
group could be allocated into one of the trauma groups if they met criteria for a 
"traumatic event" or for a diagnosis of PTSD, as assessed by the PDS. The psychiatric
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controls were also sent a screening questionnaire asking them to state their reason for 
refen'al, which may be found in the appendix.
Allocation to the Community Control Group (no trauma sroup).
The "community control group" consisted of individuals who had not experienced 
trauma and who were not presenting for psychological treatment. Participants could be 
allocated into this group from the Victim Support group if  their responses to the 
questionnaires meant that they did not meet the criteria for having experienced a 
"traumatic event", for example they did not respond to the event with fear or 
helplessness.
Table 2. SummaiT of participants and allocation to groups.-
1. Trauma no PTSD group - Experienced a traumatic event but no symptoms of 
PTSD
2. Trauma recovered PTSD group - Experienced a traumatic event. Initial symptoms 
of PTSD but none at the present time.
3. Trauma persistent PTSD group - Experienced a traumatic event. Currently 
experiencing symptoms meeting criteria for PTSD.
4. Community control / no trauma group - have not experienced a traumatic event.
5. Psychiatric control - Referred to CMHT - have not experienced a traumatic event.
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Other questionnaires used in the study.
Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory.
The Post- Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI, Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin & Orsillo, 
1999) has 36 items and measures the beliefs which people hold about themselves, 
other people and the world. The questionnaire was developed from Foa and Riggs’ 
(1993) emotional processing theory of PTSD. They suggested that there are two basic 
assumptions that mediate the process of recovery; seeing the world as completely 
dangerous and the self as totally incompetent. The theory suggests that people enter a 
traumatic experience with “pre trauma records” (assumptions they have about 
themselves and the world). These may be shattered or primed by the traumatic event 
information. The more flexible the beliefs of safety and competence which a person 
holds, the less likely they will experience adverse reactions to trauma because they 
may be able to view the event as a time-limited single event (Foa et ah, 1999). The 
PTCI has been recently validated with very good internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability and moderate to high construct validity when compared to scales measuring 
similar constructs (Foa et al., 1999). It has also been shown to be able to distinguish 
between traumatised individuals who did and did not have PTSD. The questionnaire 
was developed following scales such as Janoff-Bulman’s World Assumptions Scale 
(1989) and the Personal Beliefs and Reactions Scale (Mechanic & Resick, 1993).
The PTCI was developed to try and explore some of the reasons why not everyone 
develops PTSD following a trauma, and why some people who do develop PTSD 
suffer persistent symptoms whilst others recover (Foa et al., 1999).
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The questionnaire was modified slightly in the present study so that it could be 
completed for a time in the participant's life prior to the experience of a traumatic 
event. For example, items which related specifically to a particular traumatic event 
were altered so that it could be answered in general terms; the item "The event 
happened because of the way I acted" was altered to "Bad things happen because of 
the way I act". Ten of the 36 items were altered in this way to form the PTCI2 which 
was used in this study to examine cognitions present prior to the experience of a 
traumatic experience or other upsetting life event. The original PTCI was used to 
examine the cognitions after the traumatic experience/ upsetting life event. If the 
respondents had not experienced any of the traumatic events listed on the PDS, they 
were asked to complete the two versions of the PTCI and the PDS, thinking about 
their most upsetting life experience.
Higher scores on the PTCI indicate more negative beliefs. An item analysis may be 
conducted on the PTCI to ascertain whether the questionnaire is specific to trauma 
groups or whether there is overlap in the cognitions present in other psychiatric 
disorders. The hypotheses have been generated assuming that the beliefs targeted by 
the PTCI are specific to PTSD.
Assessment o f  Affect.
Two questionnaires were included in the pack to assess affect, namely depression and 
anxiety. The questionnaires were included so that an objective measure of 
psychological distress could be used to compare with the screening questionnaire
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completed by the psychiatric controls. They were also used as a measure of cun^ent 
distress in all o f the participants.
The revised Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) is a 21- 
item questionnaire that has been widely used and is a reliable and valid measure of 
depression. The BDI was used instead of the newly published BDI-II, since 
comparable studies looking at the role of beliefs in PTSD have used the BDI.
The State- Trait Anxiety Inventory -  Form Y (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & 
Jacobs, 1983) 40-item questionnaire was also used in this study to give a measure of 
both state and trait anxiety. This is also a well-established questionnaire with good 
reliability and validity.
A demographic question sheet was also included in the pack to record information 
such as gender, age and religion.
Covering letters from the departments in the case of the CMHTs were attached to the 
questionnaire packs, assuring potential respondents of the anonymous and confidential 
nature o f the questionnaires and the fact that their decision whether or not to take part 
in the study would not affect their care in any way. Covering letters for the community 
control groups and the Victim Support group also-stressed the confidentiality and 
anonymity of the study.
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A freepost envelope addressed to the principal investigator at the University o f Surrey
was provided with the questionnaires.
Ethical considerations.
The questionnaires were not of a distressing nature in themselves but they did ask the
participants to think about their traumatic experience or their most distressing
experience.
The following steps were therefore taken to minimise any distress caused:
a. The covering letter emphasised that participation was entirely voluntary and 
anonymous and explained the purpose of the study.
b. The information sheet explained the content of the questionnaires and encouraged 
individuals to ignore the questionnaires if  they did not wish to take part.
c. Although the participants were asked to indicate whether or not they have 
experienced specific traumatic events, they are not asked to elaborate on these.
d. The contact address for the principal investigator was provided if  the participants 
wished to find out more about the study or if  they wished to receive an information 
sheet of contact addresses and telephone numbers o f relevant support 
organisations.
e. A contact telephone number for the research supervisor, a Chartered Clinical 
Psychologist, was provided should any of the participants wished to speak to 
someone about issues raised for them in answering any of the questionnaires.
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No names were attached to any of the questionnaires and names of those to whom 
questionnaires were sent were not recorded. If participants sent their name and address 
in order to obtain more information then this was kept separate from their completed 
questionnaires and was kept in a locked filing cabinet.
Ethical approval for the study was gained from the Surrey University Ethics 
Committee and the ethics committee covering the Community Mental Health Teams 
used (i.e. East Surrey Local Research Ethics Committee). The approval letters from 
the ethics committees may be found in the appendix.
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Results.
Statistical Analysis.
Parametric tests were used where the criteria for their use were fulfilled. If the criteria 
were not met, non-parametric tests were used. All tests were two-tailed.
Participants.
A total of eighty-two participants returned the questionnaires, a response rate of 26%. 
There were 36 males (44%) and 46 females (56%) in the sample. The average age was 
39.5 years (range 18-84, standard deviation 18.17). The sample was recruited from the 
areas shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Where the sample was recruited from.
Number Percentage
Community Mental Health Teams 24 29
Community Control 35 43
Victim Support 23 28
Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the highest educational qualification, employment status and 
marital status for the whole sample, respectively.
Table 4. Highest Educational Qualification.
Number Percentage
None 14 17
GCSE/ 0  level 17 20
A level 14 17
Diploma 3 4
Degree 16 20
Postgraduate degree 18 22
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Table 5. Employment Status.
Full time work 39 48
Part time work 9 11
Housewife/ husband 3 4
Retired 14 17
Studying full time 6 7
Unemployed 4 5
Receiving Disability Allowance 6 7
On Sick leave 1 1
Table 6. Marital Status.
Number Percentage
Single 29 35
Married 32 39
Living as married 7 9
Divorced/ Separated 11 13
Widowed 3 4
Sixty-nine percent of the sample described themselves in terms of having a religious 
affiliation with the largest group being Protestant (52%). Sixteen percent of the sample 
described themselves as being atheists and 15% agnostic.
The majority of the participants in the study categorised themselves as being White 
UK (93%). Table 7 shows the ethnic backgrounds for all those who participated in the 
study.
Table 7. Ethnic background for the whole sample.
Ethnic background Number Percentage
Black- Caribbean 1 1
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi 1 1
White UK 76 93
White Other 3 4
Other 1 1
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Allocation to Groups.
The participants were allocated to the research groups, according to the criteria 
outlined earlier, once the questionnaires had been returned. Table 8 shows where the 
participants were recmited from and the research groups into which they were 
allocated once the data had been screened.
Table 8. Where the sample were recruited from and the research groups to which they 
were allocated.
Sample
recruited
from
Trauma - no 
PTSD
Trauma
Persistent
PTSD
Trauma
Recovered
PTSD
Psychiatric
Control
Community 
Control (no 
trauma)
Total
CMHT 1 12 2 9 0 24
Community 12 4 2 0 17 35
Victim
Support
8 7 3 0 5 23
Total 21 23 7 9 22 82
The participants in the groups did not significantly differ in terms o f age (F=1.51, d f = 
4, 79, p=0.208), gender = 3.707, df = 4, p=0.447), employment status = 
33.24, df = 28, p=0.227), ethnic background = 16.76, d f = 16, p=0.401) or religion 
( j 2^ 34.4, df == 28, p=0.187). The groups were significantly different in tenns of 
whether they had a partner 13.76, df = 4, p=0.0008). Post hoc chi square
comparisons revealed that the persistent PTSD group were more likely to be single 
than the community control group = 9.59, df = 1, p<0.01) and the trauma no PTSD
group (x^= 4.25, df=l, p<0.05).
Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory fPTCD.
Table 9 shows the means and standard deviations for the PTCI pre and post trauma 
beliefs questionnaires for each of the groups.
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Table 9. The PTCI pre and post trauma belief scores for the different groups.
Group Mean Standard Deviation
Trauma no PTSD PTCI pre 61 19.2
PTCI post 64.1 18.9
Trauma - persistent PTCI pre 128.3 50 8
PTSD PTCI post 145.2 38 5
Trauma recovered PTCI pre 86 9 39 2
PTSD PTCI post 106 1 34.0
Psychiatric control PTCI pre I26T 85 8
PTCI post 15T8 607
Community PTCI pre 674 34.0
Control PTCI post 7T0 25.1
This data is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. PTCI pre and post trauma beliefs for the five groups.
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The data in the sample was not normally distributed and whilst non-parametric tests 
would have been appropriate to use, there is no non-parametric equivalent to a
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mixed measures ANOVA and there are no non-parametric post hoc equivalents to a 
Tukey test. One of the analyses between groups required the use o f a mixed measures 
ANOVA. ANOVAs are considered to be robust statistical tests and therefore "even 
substantial departures from normality... have remarkably little influence on the final 
result" (p.289, Howell, 1992). However, given the unequal sample sizes within the 
groups and in order not to violate many of the assumptions of the use of an ANOVA, 
the PTCI data was transformed. A log transform (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996) was 
used to make the data more normally distributed. This transformed data was then used 
in the one-way ANOVAs and the mixed measures ANOVA.
Hvpotheses.
The one-way ANOVA and post hoc Tukey tests on the transformed data revealed the 
following information.
Hvpotheses about vost trauma beliefs measured by the PTCI.
There was an overall significant effect of group on the PTCI scores (F= 9.54 df = 4, 
81,p<0.0005.
la. The hypothesis that participants with persistent PTSD would have higher scores on 
the PTCI than participants who had recovered from PTSD was not supported (Mean 
difference 0.14, SE= 0.06, p= 0.18).
b. The hypothesis that the persistent PTSD group would have significantly higher 
scores than those who did not develop PTSD following a trauma was supported (mean 
difference = 0.36, SE=0.043, p<0.0005).
c. The hypothesis that the persistent PTSD group would have significantly higher 
scores on the PTCI than the no- trauma (community control) group was supported 
(mean difference = 0.31, SE = 0.042, p<0.0005).
2. The hypothesis that the participants with persistent PTSD would have significantly 
higher scores on the PTCI than the psychiatric control group was not supported (mean 
difference = 0.021, SE = 0.056, p=0.996).
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3a. The hypothesis that the psychiatric control group would have significantly higher 
scores on the PTCI than those who did not develop PTSD was supported (mean 
difference = 0.38, SE =0.056, p <0.0005).
b. The hypothesis that the psychiatric control group would have significantly higher 
scores than those in the no trauma (community control) group was supported (mean 
difference = 0.33, SE = 0.056, p<0.0005).
Additional findinss from the analysis o f  the transformed PTCI data.
Participants who had suffered a trauma but had not developed PTSD had significantly 
lower scores on the PTCI than those who had recovered from PTSD (mean difference 
= -0.22, SE=0.062,p<0.005).
Those who had recovered from PTSD had significantly higher scores on the PTCI than 
those in the no trauma (community control) group (mean difference = 0.31, SE=0.042, 
p<&0005).
Table 10 below, created by SPSS following the post hoc Tukey test, displays the three 
broad groups into which the five research groups fall. They are grouped according to 
their homogeneity on the PTCI scores.
Table 10. Post trauma beliefs and the homogeneitv o f the groups.
N Subset Subset Subset
GROUP 1 2 3
Trauma no PTSD 21 ■ 1.79
Community control 22 1.84
Trauma recovered PTSD 7 2.01
Trauma persistent 
PTD
23 2.15 2.15
Psychiatric control 2.17
Sig. .892 .117 .996
The significance figures suggest that the scores within the groups were not 
significantly different from each other.
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As can be seen from table 10, the Trauma no PTSD group and the community control 
group form one homogenous group and the Trauma persistent PTSD group and the 
psychiatric control form another homogenous group according to the PTCI scores. The 
scores for the recovered PTSD group are closest to the persistent PTSD group. Figure 
1 shows visually how the recovered group fall between the other groups in terms of 
their scores.
Hypotheses about vre - trauma beliefs measured by the PTCI 2.
There was a significant overall effect of group on this measure (F= 9.54, d f = 4 ,81 , 
p<0.0005).
4a. The hypothesis that the participants with persistent PTSD would have significantly 
higher scores on the pre-trauma PTCI measure than participants who had suffered a 
trauma but who did not develop PTSD was supported (mean difference = 0.31, SE = 
0.059, p<0.0005).
b. The hypothesis that the participants with persistent PTSD would have significantly 
higher scores than those in the no trauma (community control) group was supported 
(mean difference = 0.29, SE = 0.058, p<0.0005).
5. The hypothesis that the participants who suffered a trauma but did not develop 
PTSD would have significantly lower scores on the PTCI than the no-trauma group 
was not supported (mean difference = -0.019, SE=0.059, p=0.998).
Additional findinss from the analysis o f  the transformed PTCI2 data.
The psychiatric control group had significantly higher scores on the pre trauma belief 
PTCI than the participants who did not develop PTSD following a trauma (mean 
difference = 0.24, SE=0.078, p=0.026).
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The psychiatric control group also had significantly higher scores than those who had 
not suffered a traumatic experience (community control), (mean difference 0.22, 
SE=0.077, p=0.047).
Table 11 shows the two groups to which the research groups were allocated according 
to their homogeneity on the pre trauma PTCI scores.
Table 11. Pre trauma beliefs and the homogeneity of the groups.
N Subset Subset
Group 1 2
Trauma no PTSD 21 1.77
Community Control 22 1.78
Trauma recovered PTSD 7 1.91 1.91
Psychiatric control 9 2.00
Trauma persistent PTSD 23 2.07
Sis. 3 7 0 .203
As can be seen from table 11, the trauma no PTSD group and the community control 
group are very similar in terms of their pre trauma beliefs. The .psychiatric control 
group and the persistent PTSD group are similar to each other in terms of their pre 
trauma beliefs. The recovered PTSD group is more different in terms o f their pre 
trauma beliefs than the other groups and appears to fall in the middle o f the other 
groups. This is shown more clearly in figure 1 (see p.225).
It has been suggested that computing an ANOVA using SPSS for windows, the 
number in each of the cells should ideally be fifteen (Green, Salkind & Akey, 2000). 
In order to try and achieve this, collapsing some of the groups was considered. The 
recovered PTSD had the smallest number so, this was compared with the other groups 
to consider which group it could be combined with. It was initially considered that the 
recovered PTSD group and the trauma no PTSD group would be the most similar. 
However, considering the differences made clear in figure 1 (p.225) and the results of 
the Tukey tests, it was decided that these two groups were not similar enough to be 
combined.
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Further analysis comparing the pre and post trauma PTCI scores of the psychiatric 
control group and the persistent PTSD group.
A Mann Whitney U test was performed on the original (untransformed) PTCI pre and 
post data comparing the psychiatric control group and the persistent PTSD group. 
Since an analysis of variance involves comparing a larger number o f variables, a test 
comparing just two of the groups may reveal a difference where the ANOVA was not 
powerful enough to detect one.
There was no significant difference in the pre trauma beliefs on the PTCI2 between the 
psychiatric control and the persistent PTSD group (U= 90, p=0.592). There was also 
no significant difference between the two groups on the post trauma beliefs, measured 
by the PTCI (U= 90.5, p=0.592).
A comparison of the pre and post trauma beliefs for the groups and the effect of time.
A mixed measures ANOVA was used to look together at both the pre and post trauma 
beliefs and to examine the possible effect of time on the change in scores between the 
groups.
The ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of time within the groups on 
the pre and post PTCI scores (F20.08, df =1, 77, p<0.0005) with scores increasing 
between the pre and post trauma measures, with beliefs becoming more negative post 
trauma / most upsetting life experience. There was also an overall significant effect of 
group on the PTCI pre and post scores which was evident from the one-way ANOVAs 
(F=18.35, d f = 4, 77, P<0.0005). There was no significant interaction between time 
and the groups (F= 1.755, df = 4,77, P=0.147).
Analysis of Other Measures Of Symptoms Psychological Distress.
Examining the data in table 12 it may be seen that there were significant differences 
between the five groups on each of the measures (PDS, STAI and BDI). These 
differences were examined in turn using post hoc Tukey tests and will be explained 
below.
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PTSD symptom severity.
PDS scores fo r the month post trauma - The persistent PTSD group had significantly 
higher scores than the people who did not develop PTSD after their trauma (mean 
difference = 24.49, SE =3.53, p<0.0005) and significantly higher scores than the 
community control group (mean difference = 17.09, SE= 3.49, p<0.0005). The 
psychiatric control group had significantly higher scores than the no PTSD group 
(mean difference = 24.71, SE 4.61, p<0.0005) as well as the community control group 
(mean difference = 17.32, SE= 4.58, p<0.003). The recovered PTSD group had 
significantly higher scores than the trauma no PTSD group, (mean difference =14.71, 
SE=5.05, p=0.037). There was no significant difference in the PDS scores between the 
persistent PTSD group and the psychiatric control group (mean difference = -0.23, SE 
= 4.58, p=l).
PDS scores fo r the present time - As would be expected, given the criteria for 
allocation to groups, the persistent PTSD group had significantly higher scores than 
the trauma no PTSD group (mean difference = 23.22, SE2.67 p<0.0005); the 
recovered PTSD group (mean difference =16.60, SE = 3.74, p<0.0005) and the 
community control group (mean difference = 20.99, SE = 2.58, p<0.0005). The scores 
for the persistent PTSD group were however not significantly different from the 
psychiatric control group (mean difference = 4.84, SE3.41, p=0.617).
The psychiatric control group had significantly higher scores on the PDS than both the 
trauma no PTSD group (mean difference = 18.38, SE=3.45, p<0.0005) and the 
community control group (mean difference 16.15, SE=3.43, p<0.0005).
According to scores on the PDS, the post hoc Tukey test grouped the Psychiatric 
control group and the persistent PTSD group into one homogenous sample and the 
other three categories into another category. This is shown in table 13.
9 1 ?
Table 13. Homogeneitv of groups according to PDS scores.
N Subset for alpha = .05 Subset
GROUP 1 2
Trauma no PTSD 21 3.95
Community control 22 6T8
Trauma recovered 7 10.57
Psychiatric control 9 22.33
Trauma persistent 23 27.17
Sig. 309 .621
Anxiety Scores.
The State Trait Anxiety Inventory score comprised the total of the state and the trait 
scores. Whilst the scores are usually separated in clinical practice, the scores and 
therefore the analyses were simplified by combining the two measures of anxiety.
The Persistent PTSD group had significantly higher scores on the STAI than the 
trauma no PTSD group (mean difference = 49.53, SE = 6.18, p<0.0005) and higher 
scores than the community control group (mean difference = 42.93 SE=6.18, 
p<&0005).
The recovered PTSD group had significantly higher scores than the those who had 
suffered a trauma but did not develop PTSD (mean difference = 30.05, SE = 9.34, 
p<0.016). They did not differ significantly from the other groups in terms of their 
anxiety scores.
The Psychiatric control group had significantly higher scores on the STAI than those 
who had not developed PTSD following a trauma (mean difference = 51.16, SE = 
8.07, p<0.0005). They also had significantly higher scores than the community control 
group (mean difference = 44.57, SE = 7.89, p<0.0005).
Table 14 shows the groupings according to homogeneity of STAI scores. The analysis 
places the recovered and persistent PTSD and psychiatric control groups into one of 
the similar groups and the no PTSD and community control group into another.
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Table 14. Homogeneitv between the'groups in terms of Anxiety Scores.
N Subset for alpha = .05 Subset
GROUP 1 2
Trauma no PTSD 19 62.95
Community control 22 69.55
Trauma recovered 6 93.00
Trauma persistent 23 112.48
Psychiatric control 9 114.11
Sig. .927 384
Devression Scores.
The persistent PTSD group had significantly higher scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory than the trauma no PTSD group (mean difference 17.96, SE = 3.04, 
p<0.0005) and significantly higher scores than the community control group (mean 
difference = 15.67, SE = 2.92, p<0.0005).
The recovered PTSD group had significantly lower depression scores than the 
psychiatric control group (mean difference = -15.83, SE = 5.17, p= 0.025) but did not 
significantly differ in their scores from any of the other groups.
The psychiatric control group had significantly higher scores than all o f the other 
groups apart from those suffering from persistent PTSD. They had higher scores than 
the no PTSD group (mean difference = 26.46, SE = 3.97, p<0.0005); the recovered 
PTSD group (as mentioned above) and the community control group (mean difference 
= 24.17, SE = 3.88, p<0.0005).
Table 15. Homogeneitv between groups and depression scores.
N Subset for alpha = .05 Subset Subset
Group 1 2 3
Trauma no PTSD 19 4.21
Community control 22 630
Trauma recovered PTSD 6 14.83 1433
Trauma persistent PTSD 22 22T7 22.17
Psychiatric control 9 3037
Sig. 0.072 365 725
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Table 15 shows that the research groups have been divided into three categories 
according to the similarity o f depression scores. Again, the recovered group are less 
similar in terms of depression than any of the other groups.
Number O f Traumatic Expériences.
The numbers of traumatic events indicated by the participants in the study ranged 
from 0 to 7. These traumatic experiences did not necessarily meet criteria for a PTSD 
"traumatic event" insofar as the participants may not have reacted to the event with 
feelings of helplessness or by feeling terrified. The median number o f traumatic 
experiences reported was 1 (35%). Seventeen percent of respondents reported no 
traumatic experiences. These figures are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Number o f traumatic experiences per person.
0)
Q .
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Number of traumas
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Table 16 shows the number of traumas per participants in each of the groups. The 
groups were compared in relation to the number of traumas using a one-way ANOVA. 
There was a significant difference between the groups (F=3.249, d f =4,81, p=0.016). 
Post hoc Tukey tests revealed that the only significant difference between the groups 
was between the persistent PTSD group and the community control group. The 
persistent PTSD group had experienced a significantly higher number of traumatic 
experiences than the community control group (mean difference = 1 .21 , SE = 0.38, 
p=0.017).
Table 16. Number of traumatic experiences per participant within each of the groups.
GROUP Total
Trauma 
no PTSD
Trauma
persistent
Trauma
recovered
Psychiatric
control
Community
control
Number 
of traumas
0 4 10 14
1 14 8 4 1 2 29
2 6 6 1 1 8 22
3 1 6 2 2 11
4 2 2
5 2 1 3
7 1 1
Total 21 23 L 9 22 82
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T ab le  17. T ypes o f  T rau m atic  E xperiences.
Type of trauma Trauma
no
PTSD
(21)
Persistent
PTSD
(23)
Recovered 
PTSD (7)
Psychiatric 
control (9)
Community
Control
(22)
Total
Serious
accident
7 (33%) 6 (26%) 3 (43%) 3 (33%) 3 (14%) 22
Natural disaster 0 1 (4%) 0 0 1 (594) 2
Non sexual 
assault (family 
member)
1(5%) 9 (39%) 1 (14%) 1 (11%) 0 12
Non sexual
assault
(stranger)
11
(52%)
6 (26%) 4 (57%) 1 (11%) 6 (27%) 28
Sexual assault 
(family)
1(5%) 4(17%) 0 3 (33%) 1(5%) 9
Sexual assault 
(stranger)
0 5 (22%) 0 0 0 5
Military combat 0 3 (13%) 0 1 (11%) 3 (14%) 7
Sexual contact 
under age 18
3 (14%) 4(17%) 1 (14%) 2 (22%) 3 (14%) 13
Imprisonment 0 2(9%) I (14%) i n i % 9 0 4
Torture 0 1 (4%) 1 (14%) 0 0 2
Life threatening 
illness
2(10%d 5 (22%) 1(14%0 0 4(18%) 12
Other 4(19%)) 4(17%) 2(29%)) 2(22%0 3 (14%) 15
Table 17 shows the types of traumatic events endorsed by the participants in each of 
the groups. Non sexual assault by a stranger was the most commonly reported 
traumatic event followed by serious accident. The events described as "other" 
involved experiences such as the death o f a loved one. Sexual assault by a stranger 
was only endorsed by people suffering from persistent PTSD and torture was only 
endorsed by those who had developed and were still experiencing PTSD or by those 
who had recovered.
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Results of Correlations.
Non-parametric Spearman's rho correlations were conducted between a number of the 
variables measuring psychological distress.
1. The BDI and STAI scores were significantly positively coiTelated (r = 0.841, p 
<310005).
2. The STAI score was significantly positively correlated with the PDS score (r = 
&71%p<030&)).
3. The BDI score was significantly correlated with the PDS score (r = 0.699, 
p<0.0005).
4. The current PTCI scores were significantly correlated with the BDI (r = 0.753, 
p<0.0005) and with the STAI scores (r = 0.804, p<0.0005).
5. The number of traumas experienced was significantly correlated with the current 
PTCI score (r = 0.273, p=0.015) and with the PDS score (r = 0.235, p= 0.037) but 
was not correlated with the PDS scores for the month following the traumatic 
event (r = 0.109, p= 0.342).
Within subject analysis of the sample recruited from the community mental health 
teams.
O f the twenty-four participants recruited from the Community Mental Health Teams, 
fifteen (63%) met criteria for having experienced a "traumatic event" according to the 
DSM IV criteria (APA, 1994). Fifty percent met the criteria for having persistent 
symptoms of PTSD and 8% had recovered from symptoms of PTSD.
The reasons for referral to the CMHTs, as stated by the participants, are shown in 
table 18. (Some of the participants stated that they were referred for a number o f 
reasons).
T able  18. R easo n  fo r R eferra l.
Reason for Referral Percentage
Depression 63%
Anxiety 42%
Coming to terms with a traumatic 
experience
29%
Relationship difficulties 25%
Difficulties around eating 13%
Pain 8%
Health worries 4%
Problematic Drug use 4%
Other (poor memory) 4%
Those recruited from the CMHTs were compared between the groups to which they 
were allocated on the measures used in the study using Mann-Whitney U tests. Since 
the two main groups were the psychiatric control and the persistent PTSD group, these 
two groups were analysed. There were only three further participants from this CMHT 
group (two who were allocated to the recovered PTSD group and 1 allocated to the 
trauma no PTSD group). Due to the small numbers, it was not possible to compare 
them and they were therefore excluded from this particular analysis. The CMHT 
participants allocated to the persistent PTSD group and the Psychiatric control group 
did not significantly differ on any of the measures as can be seen below.
a. PTSD symptom severity for the month after the event (U = 39.0, p= 0.456).
b. PTSD symptom severity for the present time (U= 32.5, p= 0.129)
c. BDI scores (U= 47.0, p=0.651)
d. STAI scores (U= 30.0, p= 0.651)
e. PTCI pre trauma beliefs (U= 43.0, p=0.464)
f. PTCI post trauma beliefs (U= 50.0, p= 0.808)
g. Number of traumatic events that they had experienced (U= 40.0, p=0.345).
All of the people in the group recruited from the CMHTs had suffered a traumatic 
experience though not all o f them met the criteria for it being a "traumatic event" 
according to DSM IV criteria i.e. they were not all terrified or helpless during the 
event, or the event may not have tlireatened their life or someone else's. This was the
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only criterion by which the sample recruited from the CMHT differed from each 
other. It was on the basis of this criterion that they were allocated into the different 
groups.
Psychiatric Control group and the persistent PTSD group.
As mentioned previously, the psychiatric control group and the persistent PTSD group 
did not differ significantly from each other in terms of their pre (U = 90, p=0.592) and 
post trauma beliefs (U= 90.5, p=0.592) as measured by the PTCI. Further Mann- 
Whitney U tests were conducted to explore possible differences between them with 
regard to the other measures used in the study. The persistent PTSD group did not 
significantly differ from the psychiatric control group on any of the following 
measures: -
a. PTSD symptoms for the month post trauma (U= 83, p=0.507).
b. PTSD symptoms for the present time (U= 77, p=0.183).
c. BDI scores (U= 69.5, p=0.157).
d. STAI scores (U= 100.5, p= 0.902).
e. Number o f traumatic experiences (U= 71, p=0.183).
They therefore only differed on the helplessness/ terrified or threat to self or others 
criteria, as this was the means by which they were allocated into the different groups, 
if  the criteria for PTSD symptoms were met.
Summary of Main Findings.
The persistent PTSD group had significantly higher scores on both the pre and post 
trauma beliefs measures than the people who had suffered a trauma but did not 
develop PTSD and the community control group.
The hypothesis that the persistent PTSD group would have significantly higher scores 
than the psychiatric control group on the post trauma beliefs measure was not 
supported. They also did not differ significantly on the pre trauma beliefs measure.
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The hypothesis that the psychiatric control group would have significantly higher 
scores on the post trauma beliefs measure than those who did not develop PTSD 
following a trauma and those in the community control group was supported.
The hypothesis that those who suffered a trauma but did not develop PTSD would 
have significantly lower scores on the pre trauma beliefs than the community control 
group was not supported.
Further interesting findings are concerned with the participants recruited from the 
community mental health teams. All of them had experienced a traumatic event 
(though not all of these events met the criteria for PTSD "traumatic event"). Half of 
those recruited from this source had symptoms of persistent PTSD. When the 
psychiatric control group was compared to the persistent PTSD group, they did not 
significantly differ on any of the measures used in the study. They only differed 
according to the helpless or terrified or the potential or actual injury criteria contained 
on the PDS, which was one of the criteria by which they were allocated into the 
groups.
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Discussion.
Hvpotheses - Post Traumatic Cognitions Inventory.
Post- Trauma beliefs.
la. The hypothesis that the participants with persistent PTSD would have higher 
scores on the PTCI than those who had recovered from PTSD was not supported. This 
may be due to the fact that the recovered group only contained relatively few 
individuals and there may not have been sufficient power to detect a significant result 
if  one was there. However, the lack of a significant difference between the groups may 
suggest that the impact of a traumatic event and the subsequent development o f PTSD 
have a lasting negative effect on an individual's beliefs about themselves, the world 
and other people, and these do not necessarily reduce significantly over time. The 
beliefs of the recovered PTSD group are more negative than the beliefs of those who 
have never suffered a traumatic event and those who have not developed PTSD. 
Therefore whilst the symptoms o f PTSD reduce so that they no longer meet criteria 
for PTSD, the negative cognitions which are likely to have been influenced by the 
experience of a trauma, remain dysfunctional.
lb. The persistent PTSD group was found to have significantly higher scores on the 
PTCI than those who did not develop PTSD following a trauma, replicating the 
finding by Ali and Dunmore (in press). This finding suggests that these cognitions are 
related to the experience of PTSD. Statements such as "the world is a dangerous 
place" are implicated in the maintenance of PTSD, since they are associated with a 
sense of current threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Beliefs that the traumatic experience 
has had an effect on them as an individual, for example that "I will never be able to
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feel normal emotions again" or that "My reactions since the event mean that I am 
going crazy" have been linked vs^ ith the development o f PTSD (Foa & Riggs, 1993). 
Whilst the PTCI explores areas such as self blame in relation to the event (which has 
also been associated with the experience of PTSD) (Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 1997), 
it also explores more global beliefs about the self, the world and others. The finding 
that these global beliefs are significantly different to the beliefs o f those who did not 
develop PTSD is an important finding, since it suggests that they are an important 
factor in the onset and persistence of PTSD.
Ic. The persistent PTSD group (as in the Ali et al. study, in press) also had 
significantly higher scores on the PTCI than the community control group.
The community group and the trauma no PTSD group did not differ significantly on 
the PTCI suggesting that it is not the experience of trauma per se which causes people 
to have negative beliefs. The community control group and the trauma no PTSD 
group both had relatively positive views; seeing themselves as competent, the world 
as safe and other people as trustworthy. There was an overall effect of time when data 
from all o f the groups was analysed with post trauma beliefs scores being slightly 
more elevated (and therefore negative) than pre trauma beliefs. However, the 
community control and the no PTSD groups' scores did not change very much. It does 
not appear to be the experience o f trauma per se, which effects these beliefs; rather it 
may be the previously held beliefs that are important. These will be discussed later. 
This finding does not support Janoff-Bulman's (1989) theory that positive beliefs are 
"shattered" by the experience of trauma. The beliefs actually remained relatively 
stable (and positive) over time.
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2. The hypothesis that the people with persistent PTSD would have higher scores on 
the PTCI than the psychiatric control group was not supported. The finding suggests 
that the beliefs that are present in those who are suffering from PTSD and which are 
more negative than those of people in the community control and no PTSD group, are 
also present in people suffering from other psychological problems, ranging from 
depression to relationship problems. The importance of negative beliefs about the self 
and the future are characteristic of people with depression. Pre-existing mood 
disorders have been associated with a greater likelihood of experiencing PTSD 
following a trauma (Breslau, Davis, Andreski & Peterson, 1991).
3a & b. The psychiatric control group had significantly higher PTCI scores than the no 
PTSD group and the community control group. They therefore had more negative 
beliefs about themselves, the world and other people. This again fits with views of 
depression and other psychological disorders being influenced by schemas about these 
things (Padesky, 1994).
The recovered PTSD group had elevated scores on the PTCI compared with those 
who did not develop PTSD following a trauma. This suggests that the beliefs have 
been affected by trauma and remain affected by the trauma, even though the 
symptoms of PTSD have dissipated. This view would also be supported by the 
elevation in scores when the recovered group is compared with those people in the 
community control group who had never suffered a traumatic experience. The 
recovered group's beliefs may leave them with a vulnerability to experience PTSD or 
other forms of psychological distress in the future. Rachman (1996) suggests that
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some negative cognitions will remain post-treatment but it is what he calls "key 
cognitions" about threat and safety which are important to change if symptoms of 
PTSD are to be alleviated.
Pre Trauma beliefs.
4a. The hypothesis that the persistent PTSD group would have significantly higher 
scores on the pre trauma beliefs questionnaires than the no PTSD group was 
supported. This finding supports the confirmation hypothesis of Foa & Riggs (1993). 
Previously held negative beliefs about the world being dangerous and the self as being 
incompetent are confirmed by the experience of a traumatic event and the 
consequences of it.
4b. The persistent PTSD group also had more negative pre trauma beliefs than the 
group who had never experienced a trauma. This result supports findings from the Ali 
et al. study (1997) which compared assault victims with non-victims. The assault 
victims in their study had more negative pre trauma beliefs which it was suggested 
were confirmed by the experience of trauma. An alternative explanation may be that . 
the experience of a trauma affects the way in which people report their previously held 
beliefs, reporting them as being generally negative. This may be influenced by the 
experience of symptoms of PTSD rather than the experience of a trauma per se since 
the no PTSD group reported significantly more positive pre trauma beliefs than the 
persistent group.
5. The no PTSD group and the community control group had similarly positive pre 
trauma beliefs. This finding does not replicate those of Ali et al. (in press) which 
found that the no PTSD group held more positive pre-trauma beliefs. Therefore it 
appears from this study that generally people have positive views about the world, the
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self and other people. This finding is in keeping with schema theory. If people are 
constantly living in a world they see as unsafe, with little confidence in their ability to 
manage themselves in this world, it is likely that they would constantly experience 
symptoms of anxiety and depression. In fact, people who develop these dysfunctional 
schemas as a result o f early life experiences have difficulties in inteipersonal 
relationships and suffer from psychological problems (Young, 1994). More positive 
views about the self, the world and other people therefore seem to be more adaptive. 
In fact, people who hold these positive beliefs, even though they may experience a 
trauma, are able to sustain their beliefs and adapt to their experience. The findings 
from the current research therefore could be viewed as providing evidence for 
adaptive and maladaptive schemas. The fact that the psychiatric control group had 
significantly more negative pre trauma beliefs than the no PTSD and community 
control groups also supports schema theory, since these people seem more prone to 
developing psychological problems as a result o f their negative beliefs.
There was a significant effect of time on the PTCI scores with beliefs becoming more 
negative after the experience of a traumatic event or an upsetting life experience. The 
beliefs appear to have been modified by the experience of a trauma, with the new 
information resulting from the experience, modifying the previously held beliefs. This 
finding supports the assumptions o f Janoff-Bulman (1989) that new information needs 
to be assimilated into the pre-existing schemas. Whilst the present findings do not 
support a "shattering" of the assumptions (beliefs) as Janoff-Bulman hypothesised 
(1989) it does support the idea that new information is assimilated (Janoff- Bulman, 
1989) and that this appears to result in slight changes to the existing belief system.
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This also supports the idea that individuals attempt to preserve their existing belief 
systems whenever possible (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
The change in scores over time was not a result of developing more negative views 
with age as a scatter plot of the PTCI scores and age did not reveal any such 
relationship.
Symptom severity as measured by the PDS scores.
For the month post trauma/ most upsetting life experience, the persistent PTSD group 
had significantly higher scores than the no PTSD and community control groups. This 
is expected given the diagnosis of PTSD according to the PDS and the allocation to 
groups. The PDS is measuring symptoms o f PTSD and even though the two 
comparison groups scored positively on some o f the symptoms, the difference 
between the groups was large enough to meet significance. The PDS is therefore 
measuring distress over and above that which is experienced following upsetting life 
events.
The psychiatric control group had significantly higher scores than the no PTSD group 
and the community control group suggesting that, even though they did not meet the 
criteria for having experienced a "traumatic event" according to DSM-IV criteria, they 
were experiencing symptoms of PTSD. They did not differ from the persistent PTSD 
group in the severity of their reactions to upsetting life experiences. It would suggest 
that symptoms of PTSD including arousal and hypervigilance, avoidance and reliving 
are also present in other psychiatric disorders. This finding was supported by the lack 
of significant difference in the current PDS scores between the psychiatric control
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group and the persistent PTSD group. The levels o f distress are therefore similar in 
terms of the PTSD symptoms. The defining feature of PTSD therefore appears to be 
the experience o f a "traumatic event" according to DSM IV criteria, i.e. that caused 
helplessness or terror and a threat of harm to the self or to another. The symptoms of 
PTSD appear to be common to other disorders such as depression and other forms of 
anxiety, rather than being specific to PTSD. The diagnosis of PTSD appears therefore 
to be specifically defined by its "cause" rather than its symptoms. This point has 
recently been debated in a discussion paper by Summerfield (2001). PTSD is the only 
disorder which is thought to be attributable to a single cause (Wessely, 2000, lecture 
cited in Summerfield, 2001). Summerfield (2001) argues that "PTSD" may be more an 
"invention" of the social and political climate post war, than being a reflection o f a 
"real" disorder. He suggests that men who were returning from combat and who were 
suffering from psychological distress were initially diagnosed as suffering from 
disorders such as depression, anxiety and substance abuse. It was later that these 
diagnoses were replaced by "PTSD".
Anxiety.
Neuroticism has been associated with the development of PTSD (Breslau, Davis, 
Andreski & Peterson, 1991). The persistent PTSD group had significantly higher 
scores on the STAl than the no PTSD and the community control groups, which is 
unsurprising given that PTSD is an anxiety disorder. The recovered PTSD group had 
significantly higher scores than the no PTSD group but not the community control 
group. The no PTSD group had the lowest anxiety scores and it would appear from 
this finding that the no PTSD group are less likely to experience anxiety than the 
community group. Their levels of generalised anxiety and trait anxiety suggest that
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they are not prone to experiencing anxiety and this may be one of the reasons why 
they did not experience PTSD following the traumatic experience. It could be 
hypothesised that it is something about their biological and genetic make-up which 
protects them from experiencing symptoms of anxiety since the difference cannot be 
explained in terms of different beliefs. Their beliefs about the world, themselves and 
others were not significantly different to those o f the community controls. This 
finding supports previous research that some people are more resilient to the effects of 
trauma (Yule et ah, 1999). It also in part supports the finding by Ali et al. (in press) 
that the no PTSD group had more positive pre trauma beliefs. It may be that the 
differences in measures used to target the beliefs was the reason why the exact finding 
was not replicated. However, as Ali et al. (2001) suggested, the no trauma group do 
appear to have something which "buffers" them against experiencing psychological 
distress. In their study it appeared to be more positive pre trauma beliefs whereas in 
the current study it appears to be a general protection against anxiety, the reason being 
unclear.
As would be expected, the psychiatric control group had significantly higher levels of 
anxiety than the community control and the no PTSD group.
Depression.
The persistent PTSD group had significantly higher levels of depression than the no 
PTSD and community control groups. Given the high comorbidity of depression and 
anxiety with PTSD (Sierles et a l, 1983), this finding is perhaps not surprising. The 
recovered PTSD group had significantly lower depression scores than the psychiatric 
control group. For the recovered group therefore, there is likely to have been a
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reduction in the symptoms of depression in conjunction with decreasing symptoms of 
PTSD. Their ability to recover from symptoms of PTSD may also reflect an ability to 
recover from symptoms of depression or, recovery from PTSD may have led to 
decreased levels o f depression because they were no longer being distressed by the 
PTSD symptoms. Alternatively, they may have been able to recover from symptoms 
of PTSD because they did not have high levels of depression and the additional 
complicating factors that this would bring. For example, lowered mood and decreased 
motivation may make it more difficult for them to participate in their usual activities, 
thus isolating them from social support which is an important feature in recovering 
from distressing experiences (Carr, Lewin, Webster, Kenardy, Hazell & Carter, 1997). 
The psychiatric control group and the persistent PTSD group did not differ 
significantly in their depression scores, again highlighting the comorbidity o f 
depression and PTSD (Sierles et ah, 1983). The fact that the psychiatric group had 
significantly higher depression scores than the remaining groups (recovered PTSD, no 
PTSD and no trauma groups) suggests that depression is another defining feature o f 
the psychiatric control group, which necessitates a referral to psychological services. 
However, the persistent PTSD group were suffering from similar levels of depression 
and although it was not enquired about, it is assumed that these people were not in 
contact with mental health services and were therefore not receiving help.
PTSD in the seneral Population.
O f the 58 people recruited from the community (including the Victim Support group), 
62% had experienced a "traumatic event". This is a higher prevalence than that 
reported by (Breslau et al. 1991) but reflects the bias in sampling in the current study, 
sampling a population such as the Victim support group which by its nature would
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have a high prevalence of traumatic events. It is however, within the range suggested 
by Yule et al. (1999). O f the 35 recruited from the community (excluding Victim 
Support) 18 (51%) had experienced a traumatic event and four had persistent PTSD. 
Looking at the whole sample, of those exposed to a traumatic event, 30% had 
persistent symptoms. This is similar to the 23.6% quoted by Breslau et al. (1991) 
suggesting that between a quarter and a third of people exposed to traumatic events, 
will suffer from PTSD.
There are also a significant number o f people in the general population who may not 
be in contact with mental health services, who are suffering from persistent symptoms 
of PTSD. For example, one third of the Victim support sample were suffering from 
persistent and distressing symptoms o f PTSD. A number of these people took up the 
offer of receiving advice about gaining further information and support. This would 
suggest a need for raising public awareness about the effects of trauma and the 
services available to those who have suffered adverse consequences as a result o f their 
experiences.
Type o f  Trauma.
Different types of traumatic experiences are associated with differing prevalence rates 
of PTSD. For example, studies have shown that experiencing a sexual assault carries a 
high risk o f developing PTSD (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes & Nelson, 1995) as 
does torture (Maerker & Schuetzwohl, 1997). However, Breslau and colleagues found 
that 14.3% of their sample who had learnt about the unexpected death o f a loved one 
had developed PTSD (Breslau, Kessler, Chilcoat, Schultz, Davis & Andreski, 1998). 
Breslau et al. (1998) also suggested that experiencing accidents and disasters or
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witnessing death or injury were associated with a low risk of developing PTSD 
(Breslau et ah, 1998). The present study had similar findings. O f the fourteen people 
who had experienced a sexual assault, 9 (64%) had persistent symptoms of PTSD and 
21% had another psychological problem. O f the 22 people who experienced an 
accident 32% had no symptoms of PTSD whilst 41% had persistent PTSD and 14% 
had another psychological problem. Contrary to Breslau et al. (1998) these figures 
would be suggestive of a high risk of developing PTSD following an accident. 
However, it is likely that these figures are elevated because the participants in the 
study may have experienced more than one traumatic incident, the involvement in an 
accident being just one.
Number o f  Traumatic Experiences.
The number of traumatic incidents was correlated with the PTCI score and the current 
PDS score although it was not correlated with the PDS score for the month post 
trauma. This suggests that cumulative traumatic experiences have an effect on long­
term recovery from trauma and effect the ways people view the world. The more 
traumatic events they experience, the more negative their beliefs. Ehlers and Clark 
(2000) suggest that prior experience may be linked with current trauma in that they 
attach extra negative meaning to it. Recent trauma may also trigger memories of 
previous experiences thus adding to the current distress (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
Between the groups in this study there was only a significant difference in terms of 
numbers of trauma between the persistent PTSD group and the community control 
group. This finding is expected given the nature of the allocation into groups but also 
means that the number of traumas experienced does not account for the differences
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between the other groups on the different measures used and does not fully explain 
why some have persistent PTSD whilst others do not develop PTSD or recover from 
it.
Co-morbidity.
Both the STAI and the BDI were significantly positively correlated with the PDS. 
This supports studies showing the comorbidity between PTSD and other psychiatric 
disorders such as anxiety and depression (Sierles et ah, 1983). In addition, as 
symptoms of PTSD ameliorate so do symptoms of anxiety and depression. The 
current PTCI scores were also significantly positively correlated with the BDI scores. 
The more depressed the individuals, the more negative their beliefs about the self, the 
world and other people, as measured on the PTCI. This is important in terms o f the 
probable overlap in these "post traumatic cognitions" with cognitions present in 
depression. It also suggests that the PTCI may be useful in detecting dysfunctional 
cognitions in psychiatric samples, enabling the tool to be used in assessments and 
therapy.
Social Support.
Those in the persistent PTSD group were more likely to be single than those in the 
community control and the trauma no PTSD group. A lack of good social support 
following a traumatic event has been associated with an increased likelihood that 
symptoms of PTSD will persist (Carr et ah, 1997). The finding from the current 
research therefore supports this.
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The community mental health team sample.
Some of the most interesting findings from the current study concerned the 
participants recruited from the community mental health teams. All of the participants 
recruited from this group endorsed having experienced one of the traumatic 
experiences listed on the PDS. Sixty percent met the criteria for this being a 
"traumatic event" according to DSM-IV criteria. The high percentage (48%) of those 
from this group who had persistent PTSD is striking, especially since this was only 
mentioned as a reason for referral in a third of cases. This finding has implications for 
service provision and assessment of clients attending CMHT appointments. It is likely 
that the experience of a traumatic event, whether or not it is the presenting problem, is 
contributing in some way to the problem for which the client has been referred. The 
symptoms of PTSD being reported by those allocated to the psychiatric control group 
were similar in severity to those in the persistent PTSD group. Distressing symptoms 
such as flashbacks and nightmares may only be actively enquired about if  PTSD is 
suspected. If the psychologist is unaware that these symptoms are present they are 
unlikely to be treated and therefore ameliorated.
Of course it is likely that the percentages in this study are inflated since people may 
have been more likely to participate in the study if they believed that they had suffered 
a traumatic event. However, this does not detract from the finding that there is a 
proportion of clients presenting to psychology services with persistent symptoms of 
PTSD who may have been referred for a different problem. It highlights the 
importance of enquiring about traumatic experiences and of not underestimating their 
prevalence in the population referred to the Community Mental Health Teams (e.g. 
Rosenfeld, 1979). The question also remains as to whether all psychiatric problems
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stem from the experience o f a traumatic event and whether depression and anxiety are 
merely different labels for what is essentially posttraumatic stress disorder. The 
comparison between the psychiatric control group and the persistent PTSD group only 
revealed one difference, i.e. the defining criterion was whether the event had made 
them feel helpless or terrified or whether there was a threat to life.
Potential clinical benefits o f  the study.
The project aimed to ascertain whether the trauma sensitive beliefs implicated in 
PTSD have a maintaining role in other psychiatric disorders. If they are implicated in 
other anxiety disorders and in depression for example then interventions which target 
these specific beliefs may be utilised by clinicians and in doing so will hopefully 
enhance the therapeutic interventions offered to these clients. Interventions which are 
based upon knowledge of how disorders are maintained are more likely to succeed 
(Clark, 1999). Therefore, as it appears from this research, if  the beliefs measured by 
the PTCI are important in the maintenance of both PTSD and other psychiatric 
disorders, more effective interventions may be developed.
Limitations.
The conclusions, which have been drawn from this study, must be tentative and 
treated with caution because of the relatively small sample, especially within the 
psychiatric control and recovered PTSD group. It was difficult to increase the 
numbers in these groups because it was not possible to recruit specifically for the 
groups. One of the strengths of the study is that participants were only allocated to 
groups once their questionnaires had been returned. Assumptions that all o f the victim 
support group for example would fall into one o f the trauma categories would have
255
been incorrect. The high percentage of persistent PTSD sufferers in the community 
mental health teams could also not have been predicted. Finding a true psychiatric 
control group was therefore difficult. Allocation on the basis of scores rather than on 
the basis of where the participants were recruited from was therefore particularly 
important in this study.
It has been suggested that there should be at least 15 in each of the groups for an 
ANOVA to be performed (Green. Salkind & Akey, 2000). In two of the research 
groups there were less than 15 participants. However, this is particularly important if 
the dependent variable is not normally distributed (Green, et ah, 2000) and since the 
PTCI scores were transformed so that they became more normally distributed, this is 
less crucial.
The relatively low response rate (26%) was not thought to be a serious problem of the 
study since the objective of the study was not to ascertain prevalence in the 
population. However, it does mean that the numbers o f people experiencing traumatic 
events within the community mental health team referrals should be treated with 
caution as it ma\ reflect a higher incidence than is the case in reality. Response rates 
could have been improved by reducing the number of questionnaires in the pack. 
Response rates are sometimes improved by sending out reminder letters. However, 
because of the nature o f the study and the anonymous nature of the questionnaires it 
was considered that reminder letters were not appropriate.
Another limitation of the study was asking the participants to retrospectively recall 
their previously held beliefs. It has been suggested that memory for past events and
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experience is influenced by the state of mind at the time of recall (Brewin, Andrews & 
Gotlib, 1993) and affects the meaning given to it (King, King, Erickson, Huang, 
Sharkansky & Wolfe, 2000). It may be that symptoms o f PTSD at the time of 
completing the questionnaires were affecting the recall o f previous experiences, 
making them more negative. Roemer and colleagues suggested that PTSD symptoms 
influenced reports of prior stressful events with people reporting more stressful events 
if  their PTSD symptoms were severe (Roemer, Litz, Orsillo, Ehlich & Friedman, 
1998). However, what is important is the individual's perception of the event and how 
they view their experiences and their lives before the traumatic event, rather than 
needing to deal with absolute truths. The current study was not asking about particular 
details o f the traumatic event and it is unlikely that the participants would endorse 
having experienced an event that they had not experienced. In the Roemer et al., study 
(1998) participants were asked about particular details within the event and it was the 
details that were influenced by the PTSD symptoms.
King et al. (2000) highlight reporting biases and investigator expectancies as 
influencing the recall of experience. The fact that the current study was a postal 
questionnaire and there was no face to face contact with the investigator may have 
reduced the likelihood of such biases. However, there may have been some biasing 
effect since the participants were told on the information sheet that the study was 
investigating the impact of trauma on beliefs. Despite this, retrospective accounts of 
traumatic experiences and asking people to think back to previously held beliefs have 
been used in other studies (Dunmore, et al., in press; Ali et al., in press). Young and 
Klosko have also used retrospective accounts o f previously held beliefs in their 
schema based therapy, "Life Traps" (Young & Klosko, 1993).
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The diagnosis of PTSD based upon self-report measures (PDS) rather than based upon 
a structured interview is also a limitation o f the current study. However, the PDS does 
have good reliability and diagnostic agreement with the Structured clinical interview 
(Foaetal., 1997).
Other methodological difficulties involve using modified questionnaires. The PTCI 
was adapted by the author for use as a retrospective measure. The PTCI had therefore 
not been validated in this form. However, to make the questionnaire clinically useful 
modifications were made.
Further Research.
Since the PTCI appears to be measuring psychological distress in general and not 
specifically cognitions associated with Post-traumatic stress disorder, because they are 
present to a similar extent in the psychiatric control group, it would be important to 
explore whether scores on the PTCI reduce once other symptoms dissipate. For 
example, the PTCI could be used in a therapeutic setting with people referred to 
psychology services with other forms o f anxiety and depression. They could complete 
the PTCI prior to therapy and then again at the end of therapy. By measuring anxiety 
and depression on measures such as the STAI and BDI, improvement in symptoms 
could be monitored. Once they no longer meet criteria for the psychiatric disorder they 
could complete the PTCI again to see whether their scores had changed. It may be 
interesting to compare those referred for cognitive therapy, which would by its nature 
attempt to alter dysfunctional cognitions, with those referred for other forms of
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therapy, for example psychoanalytic therapy, where there may not be an explicit focus 
on attempting to change the content of cognitions.
It would also be important to see whether by attempting to directly alter the 
dysfunctional cognitions during therapy, using the PTCI as a guide, symptoms can be 
reduced. In other words, do the cognitions themselves help to maintain the disorder, or 
are they a consequence of the disorder.
it would also be interesting to look at distinct groups of presenting psychopathology 
and to conduct an item analysis on the PTCI exploring potential differences in beliefs 
between for example depressed and anxious individuals. Whilst total scores on the 
P'fCl appeared to be elevated across different types of psychiatric disorder breaking 
the scores down in to the three components of negative beliefs about the self, the 
world and self-blame, may reveal differences. For example, depressed people may 
endorse more self-blame beliefs whereas people with anxiety may endorse more 
negative \ iews about the world. This analysis was not possible to do in the current 
studv because of the small numbers involved.
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Conclusions.
This research has made an important contribution to the understanding of pre trauma 
beliefs which has previously attracted very little research (Dunmore et ah, in press). 
The research has also highlighted the significant overlap between PTSD and other 
disorders such as anxiety and depression, both in terms of symptoms of PTSD and in 
terms of beliefs.
The PTCI can be viewed as a useful tool, not only in the assessment of PTSD but also 
in other disorders, and its use has been suggested in monitoring change during 
therap).
The high percentage of people referred to community mental health teams who are 
suffering from persistent PTSD. raises issues about service provision and suggests that 
assessment should include a full histoiy. asking about experiences, which may 
otherwise be overlooked, especially if trauma is not the "presenting problem".
I he relatively high proportion of people in the wider community who are suffering 
from significant levels of distress associated w ith trauma is also an issue of concern. It 
calls for wider public awareness of the possible effects of trauma and the services 
available for those who need them.
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D ate o f  expiry o f  A dvisory C om m ittee on Ethics approval:
P lease inform m e w hen the research has been com pleted.
Y ours sincerely
A  C W atson
Senior A ssistant Registrar
Cc: Professor L King, Chairman, ACE
Dr Emma Dunm ore, Principal Investigator, D ept o f  P sychology
03 October 2000 
02 October 2005
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EAST SURREY LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
Santhams, 
West Park Hospital, 
Horton Lane, 
Epsom, Surrey, 
KT19 8PB.
SH/AJR
Date: 3rd July 2000.
To: Claire Wilson,
Clinical Psychology Dept.,
University of Surrey,
Guildford, Surrey,
GU2 5XH.
Dear Ms Wilson,
RE: A COMPARISON OF THE TRAUMA-SENSITIVE BELIEFS OF TRAUMA 
VICTIMS, NON-VICTIMS & PSYCHIATRIC CONTROLS 
REF: 04CWTS{243) - to be quoted on aji future correspondence please
Thank you for your letter dated 7th June 2000 in response to our letter of concerns 
dated 22nd May which has now been reviewed and I now confirm that Chairman's 
Approval has been given to go ahead with this trial.
In future, the Committee would like to follow.up all new trials. Therefore, we would 
be grateful if you could send us an update after a period of a year from the 
commencement of the study with the following details:-
1. Is the research still continuing?
2. If it is, which stage has it reached:-
2.1. Data being collected
2.2. Data being analysed
2.3. Research being written up
2.4. Research published.
N.B. If you are sending any Protocol Amendments to us, please ensure that 
you hjahjig^ the areas of change.
Thank you for your trouble.
Youre sincerely,
SelinaTiarris, 
Manager - ESLREC
C.C. JT 
c.c. DrB
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Surrey Oaklands
NHS Trust
Horley C o m m u n i ty  M en ta l  H ea l th  Team a n d  Day Unit 
B eechcroft  120 Victoria Road 
Horley 
Surrey 
RH6 7AB
Tel: 01293 774434 (Day Unit) 
Tel: 01293 821184 (CMHT M a n a g e r  & Dr Brock) 
Fax: 01293 822536
D ear Sir/ M adam ,
Som e researchers based at the U niversity o f  Surrey are conducting an investigation  
look ing  at the links betw een  peofde's b e lie fs  and their reaction to  traum atic even ts. T o  
do this they need to  contact a  range o f  peop le including those w ho have exp erienced  a  
traumatic event and those w ho have not.
Our departm ent has agreed to  help  w ith  th is study by sending the en c lo sed  
questionnaires to  peop le on our w aiting  list. T he study is  com pletely  an onym ous and  
entirely voluntary. W e w ill not know  w hether you  d ecid e to take part and your  
d ecision  d oes not a ffect your care in any way.
I f  you  have any queries about this study p lease contact D r E m m a D unm ore on  
(0 1 4 8 3 ) 876863  or Claire W ilson  in the C lin ical P sych o logy  D epartm ent, U niversity  
o f  Surrey, Guildford Surrey G U 2 5X H .
W ith m any thanks.
Trust H e a d q u a r te r s  O aklands House C oulsdon Road C a te rh a m  Surrey CR3 5 t ^
Tel 01883 383838  Fax 01883 383522
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Victim Support
12a W estgate Street, 
B A T H , B A l lE Q .
Tel: 01225 444212 
Fax: 01225 482929
Bath District
W e have been asked by researchers at Surrey U niversity to  pass the attached letter and 
questionnaires to  you. W e shall not, o f  course, g ive  them  your name and address.
W e all w ant to  try and im prove things for victim s o f  crim e especially for p eop le like yo u  w h o  
have been victim s o f  violent crime.
Y our help and co-operation  in this important w ork w ould  be very m uch appreciated.
P lease accept our thanks for any help you  can g ive  and w e  w ould  like to  assure you  o f  our 
careful support.
Y ours sincerely.
Kenneth Jefferies 
Co-ordinator
Member of National Association of Victim Si j^port Schemes. - National Patron: RR.H. The Princess Royal.
Re^stered Charity No. 1004085.
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INVESTOR IN PEOPLE
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D ear Sir/Madam
Som e researchers b ased  at the University of Surrey are  
conducting an investigation looking at the links betw een 
p eo p le 's  beliefs and their reaction to traum atic events. To do 
this they need  to contact a  range of people including th o se  
who have experienced a traum atic event and th o se  who have 
not.
Our store h as  agreed  to help with this study by sending the 
enclosed questionnaires to our staff. The study is completely 
anonym ous and entirely voluntary and w e will not know 
w hether or not you have taken part.
If you have any queries about this study p lease  contact Dr. 
Emma Dunmore on (01483) 876863 or Claire Wilson in the 
Clinical Psychology Departm ent, University of Surrey, 
Guildford. Surrey GU2 5XH.
With m any thanks.
Yours faithfully.
K r  j.\ i II L  <1 II (1  o  n
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Inform ation Sheet.
A  stu d y  o f  th e  im p act o f  tra u m a  on b eliefs.
I am writing to ask i f  you  w ou ld  take part in an investigation  currently
University 
of Surrey
G u ild fo rd
S u r re y  G U 2  5X H . UK 
T e le p h o n e
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  3 0 0 8 0 0  
F a c s im ile
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  3 0 0 8 0 3
Study is to improve our 
beliefs about themselves
School of 
Human
S ciences
being
conducted  at the U niversity o f  Surrey. The aim  o f  this 
understanding o f  the w ay in w h ich  trauma affects people's 
and the world. B y  studying these b eliefs w e  hope to  im prove the help  offered to  
peop le w ho have suffered a traumatic experience such as an assault or a severe  
accident.
In order to do this w e are contacting both o f  peop le w ho have experienced  a traum atic 
event and people w ho have never experienced a traum atic event.
T his is a postal questionnaire study and should take about 15 m inutes to  com plete. A  
freepost envelop e has been provided in w hich  to return the questionnaires. T hese  
questionnaires form the entirety o f  the study and you  w ill not be contacted  again. A ll 
o f  the inform ation that you provide w ill be treated as strictlv confidential and b ecause  
the questionnaires are anonvm ous. you  w ill not be able to  be identified  by m e or by  
anyone else.
Participation is entirely voluntary. I f  you  do not w ish  to  take part then p lease fee l free  
to  ignore this letter.
I f  you  have experienced an assault, or any o f  the traum atic exp eriences that are 
m entioned on the questionnaire, w e  can provide advice about getting  further support. 
I f  you  w ould  like advice about receiving support fo llo w in g  an exp erien ce  o f  any o f  
the traumatic events listed on the questionnaire, or have any other questions you  m ay  
contact Dr. Em m a D unm ore, Chartered C linical P sych o log ist (P sych o logy  
Departm ent) or m e, Claire W ilson  at the above address.
A ll in form ation  w ill be trea ted  in th e  str ic tes t con fid en ce .
Thank you for your tim e in com pleting these questionnaires.
A ll in form ation  w ill i)e  trea ted  in th e  str ic tes t c o n f i d e n c e . / ^  
Claire W ilson
Trainee C linical P sycholog ist
Dr E m m a D unm ore '
Chartered C lin ical P sych o log ist
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Background Inform ation.
The information you give is confidential and anonymous and will not be used to 
identify you in any way.
1. Gender. (P lease circle) M ale Fem ale
2. A ge_____________________ _^____
3. W hich o f  the fo llow in g  term s best describes your ethnic background? (P lease tick)
Black  - British °
B lack - A frican  
Black - Caribbean  
Black - Other
C hinese ^
Indian /  Pakistani /  B a n g la d esh i^
W hite - U K  , °
W hite - Other ^
Other - (p lease sp ecify ).
4. W hat is you highest Educational Q ualification?
N o  formal qualifications □
G C SE / O - level /  CSE /N V Q  □
A  level □
D iplom a (H N D , SR N ) □
D egree □
Postgraduate degree /  d iplom a □
5. What is your current occupation? ( i f  you are no longer w orking, w hat w as your last 
occupation?)
6. What is your current em ploym ent status?
W orking Full tim e □  Studying Full T im e □
W orking Part tim e □  Studying Part tim e □
H ouse - w ife / husband □  U nem ployed  □
Retired □  R eceiv ing  d isab ility  a llow an ce □
7. What is you current marital status? {Please tick)
Single □
Married □
L iving as Married □
D ivorced / Separated □
W idow ed □
8. W hich o f  the fo llow in g  religions, i f  any, do you  identify w ith? (p lease tick)
Roman C atholic □
Protestant (C o f  E, Baptist, M ethodist, Lutheran) □
Jew ish  □
M uslim  ^
Hindu ^
Other (p lease sp ecify) O  ________________________
A theist (none) O
A gnostic (don't know ) □
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Many people have lived through or witnessed a very stressiui ana iraumatic eveni ai some pumi m 
their lives. Below is a list o f  traumatic events. Please put a checkmark in the box next to all the 
events that have happened to you or that you have witnessed.
Part 1. Please also include how old you w ere when the event happened.
Serious accident, fire or explosion (for. example, an industrial farm, car, plane or boating 
accident)
Natural disaster (for example , tornado, hurricane, flood or major earthquake)
Non sexual assault by a family member or someone you know (for example, being mugged, 
physically attacked, shot, stabbed or held at gunpoint)
Non sexual assault by a stranger (for example, being mugged, physically 
attacked, shot, stabbed or held at gunpoint)
Sexual assault by a family member or someone you know (for example, rape or attempted 
rape)
Sexual assault by a stranger (for example, rape or attempted rape)
Military combat or a war zone
Sexual contact when you were younger than 18 with someone who was 5 or more years 
older than you (for example contact with genitals, breasts)
Imprisonment (for example. Prison inmate, prisoner o f  war, hostage)
Torture
Life threatening illness
Other traumatic event.
Please specify............
IF NONE THEN PLEASE PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE.
13. If you marked more than one traumatic event event in Part 1 please put a checkmark in the box below 
next to the event that bothers you the most.
□ Accident
□ Disaster
G Non sexual assault  ^someone you know
□ Non-sexual assault/ stranger
G Sexual assault/ someone you know 
0 Sexual eissault/ stranger 
0 Combat
□ Sexual contact under 18 with someone 5 or more years older
□ Imprisonment
□ Torture
□ Life -threatening illness 
0 Other
Please briefly describe the traumatic event you marked above.
1. □
2. □
3. □
4. □
5. □
6. □
7. □
8. □
9. □
10. □
11. □
12. □
Below are several questions about the traumatic event you have just marked above.
14. How long ago did the traumatic event happen? (Circle one)
1 Less than 1 month
2 I to 3 months
3 3 to 6 months
4 6 months to 3 years
5 3 to 5 years
6 more than 5 years
For the following please circle Y for Yes and N for NO 
During the traumatic event:
Were you physically injured?
Was someone else physically injured?
Did you think that your life was in danger?
Did you think that someone else’s life was in danger? 
Y N Did you feel helpless?
Did vou feel terrified?
15. Y N
16. Y N
17. Y N
18. Y N
19. 
20. Y N
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Below is a list o f problems that people sometimes have after experiencing a traumatic event. Please read each one carefully 
and rate each problem with respect to the traumatic event you marked on the previous questionnaire that bothered you 
the most/ or your most upsetting life experience if you have not experienced any of the events listed.
Circle the number (0-3) that best described how often that problem has bothered you in the PAST MONTH.
0 = Not at all or only one time 2 = 2 to 4 times a week / half the time
1 = once a week or less / once in a while 3 = 5 or more times a week / almost always
Having upsetting thoughts or images about the traumatic event that came into your head when you didn’t want 
them to
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3 
0 1 2  3
Having bad dreams or nightmares about the traumatic event
Reliving the traumatic event, acting or feeling as if it was happening again
Feeling emotionally upset when you were reminded of the traumatic event (for example feeling scared, angry, sad, 0 1 2  3
guilty etc)
Experiencing physical reactions when you were reminded of the traumatic event (for example, breaking out in a 0 1 2  3
sweat, heart beating fast )
Trying not to think about, talk about or have feelings about the traumatic event 
Trying to avoid activities, people or places that remind you of the traumatic event 
Not being able to remember an important part of what happened during the traumatic event 
Having much less interest or participating less often in important activities 
Feeling distant or cut off from people around you
Feeling emotionally numb ( for example being unable to cry or unable to have loving feelings)
Feeling as if your future plans or hopes will not come true (for example, you will not have a career, marriage, 
children, or a long life.)
0 1 2  3 
0 1 2  3 
0 1 2  3 
0 1 2  3
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3 
0 1 2  3
Having trouble falling or staying asleep 
Feeling irritable or having fits of anger
Having trouble concentrating (for example drifting in and out of conversation, losing track of a story on television, 0 1 2  3
forgetting what you read)
Being overly alert (for example checking to see who is around you, being uncomfortable with your back to a door) 0 1 2  3
Being jumpy or easily startled (for example when someone walks up behind you) 0 1 2  3
How long have you experienced the problems that you have reported above? (circle one)
1. Less than I month
2. I to 3 months
3. More than 3 months
How long after the traumatic event did these problems begin? (Circle one)
1. Less than 6 months
2. 6 months or more
Please indicate if the problems you rated above have interfered with any of the following areas of your life DURING THE 
PAST MONTH. Circle Yes or No.
Work Yes No
Household chores and duties Yes No
Relationships with friends Yes No
Fun and leisure activities Yes No
Relationships with your family Yes No
Sex Life Yes No
General satisfaction with life Yes No
Overall level of functioning in all areas of your life Yes No
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PTCl.
I am interested in the kind o f  thoughts w hich  you  m ay have had after a traumatic 
experience. B e lo w  are a num ber o f  statem ents that m ay or m ay not be representative  
o f  your thinking. I f  vou  have not suffered a "traumatic" experience p lease com plete  
the questionnaire thinking about the most upsettim  event in your life.
P lease read each statem ent carefu lly  and say h ow  m uch you  A G R E E  or D ISA G R E E  
w ith each statement.
P eople react to traumatic even ts in m any different w ays. There are no right or w rong  
answ ers to these statem ents.
1 =  Totally D isagree 5 =  A gree slightly
2 =  D isagree Very M uch 6 =  A gree V ery M uch
3 =  D isagree Slightly 7 =  T otally  A gree
4 =  Neutral
 1. The event happened because o f  the w ay I acted
 2 . 1 can't trust that I w ill do the right thing
 3 .1  am a weak person
 4 .1  w ill not be able to control m y anger and w ill do som eth ing terrible
 5 . 1 can't deal w ith even  the slightest upset
 6 .1  used to be a happy person but now  I am alw ays m iserable
 7. People can't be trusted
  8. 1 have to be on guard all the tim e
  9 .1  feel dead inside
  10. Y ou can never know  w ho w ill harm you
 1 1 . 1 have to be especia lly  careful because you never know  w hat can happen n ext
 12.1 am inadequate
 13.1 w ill not be able to control m y em otions and som ething terrible w ill happen
 14. If 1 think about the event, I w ill not be able to handle it
 15. The event happened to m e because o f  the sort o f  person I am
 16. M y reactions since the event m ean that I am go in g  crazy
 1 7 . 1 w ill never be able to feel normal em otions again
 18. The world is a dangerous place
 19. Som ebody e lse  w ould  have stopped the event from  happening
 __ 20. 1  have permanently changed for the w orse
 21. 1 feel like an object, not like a person
   22. Som ebody e lse  w ould  not have gotten into this situation
 23. 1 can't rely on other people
 2 4 . 1 feel isolated and set apart from others
 25. 1 have no future
 26. 1 can't stop bad things from happening to m e
 27. People are not what they seem
 28. M y life has been destroyed by the trauma
 29. There is som ething w rong w ith m e as a person
 30. M y reactions sin ce the event sh ow  that I am a lousy coper
 31. There is som ething about m e that m ade the event happen
 3 2 . 1 wi l l  not be able to tolerate m y thoughts about the event, and I w ill fall apart
 3 3 . 1 feel like I don't know  m y se lf  anym ore
 34. Y ou never know  w hen som eth ing terrible w ill happen
 35. 1  can't rely on m y se lf
 36. N othing good can happen to m e anym ore
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Please think back to the month im m ediately after the traum atic event or your m ost upsetting life event if  you 
have not experienced any o f  the events listed. I f  the event happened when you w ere very young, please fill 
this in for how you felt about the event as a teenager.
Circle the number (0-3) that best described how often that problem bothered you in the M O N TH  after the event.
0 = Not at all or only one time 1 = once a week or less /  once in a while 2 = 2 to 4 times a week / half the time 
3 = 5 or more times a week / almost always
Having upsetting thoughts or images about the traumatic event that came into your head when you 0 1 2  3
didn’t want them to
Having bad dreams or nightmares about the traumatic event 0 1 2  3
Reliving the traumatic event, acting or feeling as if  it was happening again 0 1 2  3
Feeling emotionally upset when you were reminded o f  the traumatic event (for example feeling scared, 0 1 2  3
angry, sad, guilty etc)
Experiencing physical reactions when you were reminded o f the traumatic event (for example, breaking 0 1 2  3
out in a sweat, heart beating fast )
Trying not to think about, talk about or have feelings about the traumatic event 0 1 2  3
Trying to avoid activities, people or places that remind you o f  the traumatic event 0 1 2 3
Not being able to remember an important part o f what happened during the traumatic event 0 1 2 3
Having much less interest or participating less often in important activities 0 1 2  3
Feeling distant or cut o ff from people around you 0 1 2  3
Feeling emotionally numb ( for example being unable to cry or unable to have loving feelings) 0 1 2  3
Felling as if  your future plans or hopes will not come true (for example, you will not have a career, 0 1 2  3
marriage, children, or a long life.) '   ".......................
Having trouble falling or staying asleep 0 1 2  3
Feeling irritable or having fits o f  anger 0 1 2  3
Having trouble concentrating (for example drifting in and out o f  conversation, losing track o f  a story on 0 1 2  3
television, forgetting what you read)
Being overly alert (for example checking to see who is around you, being uncomfortable with your back 0 1 2  3
to a door)
Being jumpy or easily startled (for example when someone walks up behind you) 0 1 2  3
Part 2
Please indicate if the problems you rated above have interfered with any o f  the following areas o f  your life.
Circle Yes or No.
Work Yes No
Household chores and duties Yes N o
Relationships with friends Yes N o
Fun and leisure activities Yes No
Relationships with your family Yes N o
Sex Life Yes No
General satisfaction with life Yes No
Overall level o f  functioning in all areas o f  your life Yes No
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PTCI 2.
I am interested in the kind o f  thoughts w hich you  m ay have had b efo re  a traumatic 
experience. The questions are sim ilar to those on the previous questionnaire but 
please com plete this th in k in g  a b o u t a tim e b efo re  th e  tr a u m a tic  e v en t o r  y o u r  
m ost u p settin g  life  even t. I f  the event happened w hen you  w ere very young, please  
fill this in for the kinds o f  thoughts you had as a teenager.
P lease read each statem ent carefu lly  and say how  m uch you  A G R E E  or D ISA G R E E  
w ith each statement.
1 =  T otally D isagree 5 =  A gree sligh tly
2 = D isagree V ery M uch 6 = A gree V ery M uch
3 = D isagree S lightly 7 = T otally  A gree
4 = Neutral
 1. Bad things happen to m e because o f  the w ay I act
 2 . 1 can't trust that I w ill do the right thing
 3 . 1 am a w eak person
 4 . 1 wi l l  not be able to control m y anger and w ill do som eth ing terrible
 5 . 1 can't deal w ith even the slightest upset
 6 . 1 used to be a happy person but now  I am a lw ays m iserable
 7. People can't be trusted
 8. I have to be on guard all the tim e
 9 . 1 feel dead inside
 10. Y ou can never know  w ho w ill harm you
 1 1 . 1 have to be esp ecia lly  careful because you never k now  w hat can happen next
 1 2 . 1 am inadequate
 13. I w ill not be able to control m y em otions and som eth ing terrible w ill happen
 14. I f  1 think about upsetting events in m y life , I w on't be able to handle it.
 15. U psetting things happen to m e because o f  the type o f  person I am
 16. M y reactions to upsetting events mean that I am go in g  crazy.
 17. 1 wil l  never be able to feel normal em otions
 18. The world is a dangerous place
 19. Other people can stop upsetting things happening to them
 2 0 . 1 am perm anently changed for the w orse
 21 . 1  feel like an object, not like a person
 22. Som ebody e lse  w ould  not get into bad situations.
 23 . 1  can't rely on other people
 2 4 . 1 feel isolated and set apart from others
 2 5 . 1 have no future
 2 6 . 1 can't stop bad things from happening to m e
 27. People are not what they seem
 28. Bad things have destroyed m y life
 29.There is som ething w rong w ith m e as a person
 3 0 . 1 am a lousy coper
 31. There is som ething about m e that m akes bad th ings happen to m e
 3 2 . 1 cannot tolerate thoughts about upsetting events, and I w ill fall apart
 3 3 . 1 feel like I don't know  m y se lf
 3 4 .Y ou never know  w hen som ething terrible w ill happen
 3 5 . 1 can't rely on m y se lf
 36. N othing good can happen to m e
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STAIl
Directions.
A number o f  statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each 
statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right o f  the statement to indicate how you feel 
right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too long on any one 
statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
No
1 .1 feel calm
2 . 1 feel secure
3 . 1 am tense
4 . 1 feel strained
5 . 1 feel at ease
6 . 1 feel upset
7.1 am presently worrying over possible misfortunes
8. I feel satisfied
9. I feel frightened
10 . 1 feel comfortable
11.1 feel self- confident
12. I feel nervous
13. I am jittery
14 . 1 feel indecisive 
15 . 1 am relaxed
16 . 1 feel content 
17. I am worried 
18 1 feel confused
19. I feel steady
20. I feel pleasant
at all Somewhat Moderately so Very much so
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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STAI2.
D irections.
A number o f  statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each 
statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right o f  the statement to indicate how you 
generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too long on any one statement but give 
the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel.
21.1 feel pleasant
2 2 . 1 feel nervous and restless
2 3 . 1 feel satisfied with myself
2 4 . 1 wish I  could be as happy as others seem to be
2 5 . 1 feel like a failure
2 6 . 1 feel rested
2 7 . 1 am "calm, cool and collected"
2 8 . 1 feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot 
overcome them
2 9 . 1 worn too much over something that really doesn't matter 
30. 1 am happy
31.1 have disturbing thoughts 
32. I lack self-confidence
3 3 . 1 feel secure
34. I make decisions easily
3 5 . 1 feel inadequate
3 6 . 1 am content
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and 
bothers me
3 8 . 1 take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them 
out o f  my mind
39.1 am a steady person
4 0 . 1 get in a state o f  tension or turmoil as I think over 
my recent concerns and interests.
Almost Sometimes 
Never
1 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Often Almost 
Always
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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This questionnaire consists of 21 groups o f statements. After reading each group o f statements carefully, 
circle the number (0, 1,2 or 3) next to the one statement in each group which best describes the way you 
have been feeling the past week, including today. If several statements within a group seem to apply 
equally well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your 
choice.
2 . 0
8 0
10
1 do not feel sad 
I feel sad
I am sad all the time and 1 can't snap out 
of it
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand 
it.
I am not particularly discouraged about 
the future
I feel discouraged about the future 
I feel 1 have nothing to look forward to 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that 
things cannot improve.
I do not feel like a failure
1 feel I have failed more than the average
person
As I look back on my life, all 1 can see is 
a lot o f failures
1 feel I am a complete failure as a person
1 get as much satisfaction out o f things as 
1 used to
I don't enjoy things the way I used to 
I don’t get real satisfaction out of 
an\thing an>-more
I am dissausfied or bored with everything
1 don't feel particularly guilty 
1 feel guilt}' a good part o f the time 
1 feel guilty most o f the time 
I feel guilty all o f the time
I don't feel 1 am bcmg punished 
I feci 1 may be punished 
I expect to be punished 
I feel I am being punished
I don't feel disappomted in myself 
I am disappomted in myself 
I am disgusted in mv-self 
I hate myself
I don't feel 1 am an\ worse than anybody 
else
1 am critical o f m}3clf for my weaknesses 
or rmstakes
I blame myself all the ume for my faults 
I blame m>'self for everything bad that 
happens
I don't have any thoughts o f killing myself 
I have thoughts of killing myself, but I 
would not carry them out 
I would like to kill mv-self 
I would kill myself if 1 had the chance
1 don't CT}' an\ more than usual 
I cry more now than 1 used to 
I cry all the time now 
I used to be able to cry , but now I can't 
cry e\en  though 1 want to
II . 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than 
I used to
2 I feel irritated all the time now
3 I don’t get irritated at all by the things that 
used to irritate me
1 2 . 0  1 have not lost interest in other people
1 I am less interested in other people than I 
used to be
2 1 have lost most o f  my interest in other 
people
3 I have lost all o f  my interest in other 
people
1 3 . 0  1 make decisions about as well as I ever 
could
1 1 put off making decisions more than 1 
used to
2 1 have greater difficulty in making 
decisions than before
3 1 can't make decisions at all anymore
14. 0 1 don't feel 1 look any worse than 1 used to
1 1 am worried that 1 am looking old or 
unattractive
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in 
my appearance that make me look 
unattractive
3 1 believe that 1 look ugly
15. 0 1 can woric about as well as before
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at 
doing something
2 1 have to push myself very hard to do 
anything
3 I can’t do any work at all
1 6 . 0  1 can sleep as well as usual
1 1 don't sleep as well as 1 used to
2 I wake up 1 -2 hours earlier than usual and 
find it hard to get back to sleep
3 1 wake up several hours earlier than 1 
used to and cannot get back to sleep
1 7 . 0  1 don't get more tired than usual
1 1 get tired more easily than 1 used to
2 I get tired from doing almost anything
3 1 am too tired to do anything
18. 0 My appetite is no worse than usual
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be
2 My appetite is much worse now
3 1 have no appetite at all any more
19. 0 1 haven't lost much weight, if  any, lately
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds
2 1 have lost more than 10 pounds
3 1 have lost more than 15 pounds
1 am purposely trying to lose weight by 
eating less. Yes  No_____
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20. 0 I am no more worried about my health 
than usual
1 I am worried about physical problems 
such as aches and pains; or upset 
stomach; or constipation
2 I am very worried about physical 
problems and it's hard to think o f much 
else
3 I am so worried about my physical 
problems that I caimot think about 
anything else
2 1 . 0  I have not noticed any recent change in 
my interest in sex
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to 
be
2 I am much less interested in sex now
3 I have lost interest in sex completely
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Please tick the box b elow  next to  the category that best describes the reason w hy you  
have been referred to the P sychology department. I f  m ore than one applies then please 
tick the one that best_describes your current situation.
(Y our answ er to  this question is anonym ous and confidential, as are your answ ers to  
the other questionnaires in this pack).
A nxiety
D epression
Physical Health W orries 
Pain
A lcohol use  
D rug use
D ifficulties around eating
Relationship difficulties
Com ing to terms with a traumatic experience
Other. (P lease s p e c ify ) .......................................
P lease tick  
□  □
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
H ave you ever received help for any o f  the above before (for exam ple from  a 
Psychologist, Psychiatrist or Counsellor?) (p lease circle) Y E S /  N O
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C ontact sheet for further information ( if  d esired !
Thank you for your co-operation in filling out these questionnaires. W e are very  
grateful for your help in this research.
I f  you  have experienced any o f  the traumatic events m entioned on the questionnaire 
and w ould  like som e advice about getting further support, you may com plete your  
nam e and address below . (Providing this inform ation is entirely up to  you). 
Alternatively, you  may contact D r Emma D unm ore (Chartered Clinical P sychologist) 
on (0 1 4 8 3 ) 876863 or write to the address below .
N am e
A ddress
This information will be treated in the strictest confidence. 
Claire W ilson
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Departm ent O f Psychology
University o f  Surrey
Guildford
Surrey
G U 2 5 X H
P lease return in the envelope provided.
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